CA Unpub Decisions

On December 1, 2014, the Kern County Department of Human Services (department) filed a juvenile dependency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 for the failure of the parents of Levi L. to protect him from nonaccidental physical harm after he was admitted to the trauma unit of the local hospital and later transferred to Children’s Hospital in Madera. Levi was ordered detained. Amended petitions were filed alleging cruelty and severe physical abuse to Levi and seeking protective orders for his siblings, M.C. and Marcos L. The amended petition also alleged domestic violence as a contributing basis for the physical risk of harm to Levi. Protective custody warrants were issued by the juvenile court for M.C. and Marcos.

The resolution of the present appeal turns on the interpretation of the parties’ contract with respect to the matter of indemnification. The City of Fresno (City) entered into a written contract with the 21st District Agricultural Association, Big Fresno Fair (District) whereby the City agreed to provide onsite police protection and law enforcement services to the Big Fresno Fair (contract). The contract contained a broad indemnification provision requiring the District to indemnify the City from all claims, expenses or liability occasioned by the City’s performance of the contract. However, the contract also required the City to maintain certain insurance coverages “protecting the legal liability” of the District, including workers’ compensation coverage. The City’s method of furnishing such insurance coverage during the term of the contract was self-insurance.

Faced with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, a “strike” prior, three prison priors, and a potential nine-year sentence, defendant and appellant Sarkis Krdotyan entered a guilty plea to a single count of felon in possession of a firearm with a “strike” prior in exchange for a six-year sentence (plea bargain). Separately, defendant entered into a Cooperating Individual Agreement (CIA) with the district attorney’s office. Pursuant to the terms of the CIA, if defendant fulfilled certain conditions, the prosecution would recommend a lesser sentence than called for by the plea bargain or no sentence at all. The defendant failed to fulfill the conditions of the CIA, and the trial court sentenced him according to the plea bargain.

On May 6, 2016, a jury found defendant and appellant Charity Ellen Wilson guilty of felony animal cruelty (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b)) and misdemeanor neglect of an animal (§ 597.1, subd. (a)). Defendant was granted three years of felony probation and was ordered into the custody of Riverside County Sheriff for 120 days, 119 days to be served in the work release program. She appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to support both of her convictions, and that there were errors in the jury instructions. In addition, defendant asserts that the court imposed an unauthorized sentence and an overbroad residence approval probation condition. We agree that the residence approval probation condition must be modified. We reject her other claims and affirm.

Defendant Arsenio Devo Morgan, a member of a Black gang, went to a party attended by members of a rival Hispanic gang. When he arrived, he shot and killed two Hispanic men, then ran away. According to the prosecution, defendant knew that rival gang members would be at the party, and he went there, armed, with the intent to kill. According to defendant, however, he did not know that rival gang members would be there. He was always armed, for self-protection; he fired only when rival gang members confronted him and appeared to be about to attack him.
A jury found defendant guilty on two counts of first degree murder; he was sentenced to multiple life terms. Defendant contends that the trial court, after instructing that provocation can reduce first degree murder to second degree murder, erred by failing to define provocation.

The proceedings related to decedent Linn W. Derickson's holographic will have been protracted. Little of the past litigation, however, has a bearing on this appeal. We are tasked instead with a simple question of interpretation: Who is the person alternately referred to in the will as "Janet Derickson nee Whelan," "Janet Derickson-Whelan," and "Janet Derickson, Whelan"?
The decedent had two "Janets" in his life: (1) a daughter named Janet Benninghoff, who was known as Janet Derickson before she married; and (2) a companion, associate, paramour, or friend of sorts named Janet Whelan. Whelan contends that she is "Janet Derickson [] Whelan." The estate administrator and Benninghoff assert that Benninghoff is.

Karen Hayes appeals a judgment denying her writ of mandate petition seeking an order directing the Temecula Valley School District (District) to reinstate her as a middle school principal. The District removed Hayes as principal and reassigned her to a teaching position for the 2015-2016 school year under its statutory authority to reassign a school principal without cause. (Ed. Code, § 44951.) The District also placed Hayes on paid administrative leave through the end of the 2014-2015 school year.

Brianna Dorantes (Plaintiff) sued Edward Chapin (Defendant), an attorney, for legal malpractice. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff could not establish causation, a necessary element in Plaintiff's cause of action for professional negligence. The trial court did not commit error on the record presented to it, and Plaintiff forfeited appellate consideration of her new theories and related arguments on appeal that were not presented to the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant James Lee Hill appeals his conviction for involuntary manslaughter. He contends the trial court prejudicially misinstructed the jury in response to a question asked during deliberations as to whether the forensic pathologist’s testimony regarding the size and strength of the assailant was expert opinion or lay opinion. We find no error and affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant Jose Carlos Orejel-Valencia was convicted of attempted first degree burglary and sentenced to three years’ probation. On appeal, he contends he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel’s failure to request a claim-of-right instruction, and asserts there is insufficient evidence that he intended to take the property of another. We shall affirm the judgment.

The trial court found defendants Daniel Harsh and Harsh Enterprises, Inc. (collectively Harsh) liable for a malicious abuse of process in connection with the filing and service of an improper and invalid stop payment notice against plaintiff Mercer-Fraser Company (Mercer-Fraser). The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Harsh acted with malice in filing the stop payment notice and Mercer-Fraser suffered damages. Harsh appeals, arguing the court erred in failing to find the “litigation privilege” applied and erred in denying a request for leave to file a cross-complaint. We shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Patrick Trujillo appeals from his conviction for possessing a controlled substance while in prison. Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights to due process, to present a defense, and to a fair jury trial by not permitting him to present the defense of medical necessity. He further argues the court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on necessity.
We conclude defendant was not entitled to present a defense of medical necessity because Health and Safety Code section 11362.5 limits the common law medical necessity defense, as it relates to marijuana, to those who have “a physician’s recommendation or approval” for the use of marijuana and defendant had neither. (People v. Galambos (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1160-1161 (Galambos).) Accordingly, defendant also was not entitled to a jury instruction on necessity. We thus find no error and affirm.

This appeal arises from a probate court’s decision to supervise a testamentary special needs trust, to order the administrator of the estate to withhold distribution of certain funds, and to award extraordinary attorney fees to the administrator’s attorney. The appellant trustee contends the court did not have jurisdiction to supervise the trust, and that it abused its discretion in ordering the withholding and the extraordinary fees. We affirm the probate court’s orders.

Petitioner Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. petitioned this court for relief from an order of the Los Angeles Superior Court denying Disney’s motion to transfer venue as untimely. Because we conclude that the court erred in determining the motion was time-barred, we grant the petition for a writ of mandate and direct Respondent court to consider the motion on the merits.