CA Unpub Decisions

Z.B. (father) appeals from the orders of the juvenile court, challenging the denial of his request to be declared a presumed father and to order reunification services. He contends that the orders must be reversed because he presented substantial evidence of presumed father status, and because the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying services. Finding no merit to father’s contentions, we affirm the orders.

Gilberto V., father of H.V. and H.G.V. (Father), appeals from a dispositional order made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c)(1) removing the children from his custody. Father contends section 361, subdivision (c)(1) applies only to a parent with whom a child resides, and because H.V. and H.V.G. did not reside with Father, the court had no authority under that section to make the orders restricting his rights to the children. Father also contends the juvenile court erred by limiting him to monitored visitation. We agree with Father that section 361, subdivision (c) does not apply but we conclude that Father has failed to demonstrate prejudice. We do not agree that the juvenile court erred by limiting Father’s visitation with the children. Therefore, we affirm but remand with directions.

C.B. (Father), appeals from the dependency court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders relating to Father’s 12 year old son, G.B. He also challenges the permanent restraining order that enjoined him from certain conduct with respect to G.B., G.B.’s mother (Mother), and Mother’s husband, and challenges the exit order that granted Mother sole custody of G.B. Specifically, Father contends that insufficient evidence supported the jurisdictional findings against him; that the court denied him due process in conducting the adjudication proceedings and issuing a restraining order; that the court erred in dismissing the allegation that Mother emotionally abused G.B., and in failing to require the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to facilitate his visitation with G.B. DCFS filed a cross-appeal complaining that the court referred to the wrong statute when it terminated jurisdiction. As we explain, the parties’ contentions lack merit or are moot. Accordingly, we

M.W. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) She contends the court erred when it found she did not qualify for the beneficial relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

In a juvenile court petition, the prosecution alleged M.C. possessed a knife on school property. (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1).) M.C. moved to suppress evidence of the knife. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1.) The court denied M.C.’s motion. M.C. then admitted the allegation in the petition. The court declared the offense a misdemeanor, adjudged M.C. a ward of the court, and placed him home on probation. M.C. contends that the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. We affirm.

Oscar A. (father) and E.M. (mother) separately appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to James M. (minor). After mother’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, raising no issues, we notified mother and gave her the opportunity to file a letter or supplemental brief. Mother submitted a letter asking that minor be returned to her custody or that she be permitted to visit him. In her letter she failed to provide any reasoned legal argument or authority showing that any of the juvenile court’s rulings constitute reversible error. We thus deem her appeal abandoned. Father contends that through oversight the juvenile court omitted a finding that he was a presumed father, and that the omission resulted in a violation of due process.

Defendant Jose Pablo Hernandez appeals from a probation revocation order. We affirm the order.

After defendant Eduardo Salgado lightly hit the back of another car at a stoplight, he was confronted by the other driver. Remaining seated in his car, defendant picked up and cocked or racked his handgun and asked the other driver, “Is there any damage?” The jury convicted defendant of one count of making criminal threats and one count of possession of a concealed firearm. On appeal, defendant contends his criminal threats conviction was based on his nonverbal conduct and therefore cannot stand pursuant to People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138 (Gonzalez). He also argues that the trial court erred in failing to give a self-defense instruction. In addition, he raises a constitutional challenge to his conviction on the concealed firearm count. We affirm the convictions on both counts. We also conclude that defendant has forfeited his right to challenge the conditions of his probation.

Plaintiff and appellant Optikal Noize, Inc. (Optikal) appeals from an order dismissing its action against defendants and respondents Global Gift Foundation (GGF), Maria Bravo, and Alina Peralta (collectively, Respondents). The trial court dismissed the action 14 months after it had granted Respondents’ motion to stay the case under Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30 based upon a contractual forum selection clause. On November 24, 2015, the trial court initially stayed the case to permit an action to be commenced in Spain, the designated forum. Then, at a status hearing on January 18, 2017, the trial court dismissed the action after learning that Optikal had filed a complaint in Spain.

Appellant Vincent Lamont Heard appeals from the judgment of his convictions of assault with a semi-automatic firearm in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (b). Appellant argues that the court erred when it instructed the jury with a pinpoint instruction, stating “[i]n determining how a reasonable person would act, you cannot consider as a circumstance a mental state unique to the defendant which affected his ability to perceive the situation.” He complains that the instruction was misleading and invited the jury to ignore evidence regarding his defense of accident—that appellant lacked the intent to discharge the firearm. As we shall explain, we disagree. Notwithstanding our conclusion on the claim of instructional error, we remand this matter for resentencing in light of the Legislature’s recent amendment to the law regarding imposition of handgun enhancements. (§ 12022.5.)

Defendant Richard McIntee took his two-year-old daughter, Z., from the arms of the babysitter her mother hired and drove her away in his van. For the next two weeks, defendant declined Z.’s mother’s entreaties to return Z. or disclose her whereabouts. Law enforcement officers tracked defendant to Riverside County and arrested him; his girlfriend led the officers to a converted garage, from which Z. was recovered unharmed.
Defendant was charged with kidnapping Z., depriving Z.’s mother of child custody, making criminal threats, endangering a child, and vandalism. During his jury trial, the court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the child endangerment and vandalism charges as time-barred. The jury, which the court instructed with CALCRIM pattern instructions, convicted defendant of kidnapping Z. and depriving her mother of custody. It acquitted him of making criminal threats.

After being charged with felony resisting arrest and attempting to take a firearm from a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (d)), a jury convicted Son Thanh Tran of resisting a peace officer, a misdemeanor (§ 148, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to one year in county jail.
Tran contends the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to sustain his conviction. He also asks us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied disclosure of some of the information he sought at an in camera Pitchess hearing. We affirm.

In this CEQA action Covina Residents for Responsible Development (CRRD) appeals from the trial court’s denial of its petition for writ of mandate seeking to overturn the City of Covina’s approval of a 68-unit, mixed-use, infill project located a quarter-mile from the Covina Metrolink commuter rail station. CRRD contends the project’s significant parking impacts required the City to prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) rather than the mitigated negative declaration it adopted in March 2016. We conclude section 21099, subdivision (d)(1), which took effect three months before the City approved the project, exempts the project’s parking impacts, as alleged by CRRD, from CEQA review. We also reject CRRD’s contentions the City’s approval of the project violated the Subdivision Map Act and affirm the judgment.

Ronald Wormser, as trustee of the Wormser Revocable Trust, filed a petition for writ of mandate and inverse condemnation against the Santa Monica Rent Control Board, seeking reversal of the Board’s decision to deny Wormser’s application in 2014 for an exemption from the rent control law for owner-occupied properties that contained three or fewer units on April 10, 1979, the determinative date. Wormser argued the Board’s denial was an abuse of discretion, and factually and legally unsupported, because the Board had granted Wormser’s property the exemption in August 1979 and October 1985. Wormser contended the Board was bound by, and precluded from contradicting, its previous decisions that there were only three residential units on the property as of April 10, 1979.
The trial court sustained the Board’s demurrer to the petition without leave to amend, and Wormser appeals from the ensuing judgment of dismissal.