CA Unpub Decisions

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, defendant and appellant Steven Morris Hurd entered his no contest plea to one count of engaging in oral copulation with a child who is 10 years old or younger. Hurd appeals the denial of his suppression motion. He claims the warrantless search of his cell phone incident to arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights under the rule announced in Riley v. California (2014) __ U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473] (Riley), and all evidence obtained as a result of the search must be suppressed. There is no dispute that the warrantless search of Hurd’s cell phone was unconstitutional under Riley, but we conclude the police’s search conformed with binding appellate precedent when the search occurred in 2009. Thus, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and the evidence need not be suppressed. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant Abelino Bonilla was found guilty of possession for sale of a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and unauthorized entry into a dwelling (Pen. Code, § 602.5, subd. (a)) . The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously found that his inculpatory statements were not obtained in violation of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda)). He asserts that the trial court impermissibly prevented the jury from considering relevant evidence surrounding his “confession,” which violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant also maintains that there were multiple instances of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Since we discern no error, we will affirm the judgment.

J.S. (Father) is the father of now 13-year-old P.S., 11-year-old A.S, six-year-old H.S., and five-year-old L.S. (collectively, the children). In August 2016, the children were taken into protective custody. The juvenile court held a 12-month review hearing after which the court found that the return of the children to Father would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being within the meaning of section 366.21, subdivision (f) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.) The court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a permanency hearing under section 366.26 for March 7, 2018.
Father filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the court’s order. He argues the juvenile court erred by finding that the return of the children to Father would create a substantial risk of harm to them.

Defendant Manuel Alexis Alvarez was convicted of two counts of mayhem and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon—a broken beer bottle—arising out of his involvement in a street fight. He appeals from the ensuing judgment, arguing the court erred by (1) excluding from evidence his spontaneous exculpatory statements; (2) refusing his suggested pinpoint jury instructions pertaining to “third party liability”; and (3) failing to instruct on “attempted mayhem” in connection with one of alleged mayhem counts.
We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Annette C. (mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to her now ten-year-old son, Jason. After reviewing the juvenile court record, appellant’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. This court granted mother leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Mother filed a letter, but failed to address the termination findings or orders, or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

Appellant James V. appeals from the order reappointing the Public Guardian of Kings County as conservator of his person and estate under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act), pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5000 et seq. James contends hearsay was admitted at the hearing, trial counsel failed to act in his best interests, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the one-year LPS Act conservatorship has terminated by operation of law, we cannot grant any effective relief. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

This action arises out of appellants’ purchase of commercial property at a tax sale auction conducted by respondent, County of Fresno (County). After the purchase, appellants discovered the property was contaminated. They filed the underlying complaint for breach of written contract alleging the County breached a provision in the binding terms of the auction promising to give notice of contaminated or possibly contaminated properties of which it was aware.
The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer without leave to amend. The trial court concluded appellants could not state a cause of action because purchasers at tax sales take the property “as is” and the County is immune from liability for any patent or latent conditions of property sold at a tax sale, whether known or unknown. Further, tax sale purchasers are limited to statutory remedies.

Appellant/defendant Ernest Weathers was charged and convicted of assault by the personal use of a deadly weapon, a car, on Ronja Stanberry, his girlfriend (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), based on evidence that he used his car to repeatedly hit the rear of Stanberry’s car. Stanberry lost control of her car, it went into a spin and hit a guardrail, and she suffered bruised ribs. Defendant was sentenced to three years, plus seven years for prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On appeal, defendant raises numerous evidentiary and instructional issues. We will remand the matter for resentencing and otherwise affirm.

Defendant and appellant C.Y. (Father) is the father of G.K., who was 18 months old at the time of the challenged order. Father appeals from the court’s order that G.K. remain placed in a foster home instead of moving him to the paternal aunt’s home in Tennessee. The aunt came forward when G.K. was one year old and G.K. had been in the foster home since he was one month old. At that time, the mother’s reunification services had not yet been terminated; Father did not receive reunification services. Father argues the court erred when it applied a generalized best interest standard and failed to consider the factors set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3.
After looking at the factors set forth in section 361.3, which includes a consideration of G.K.’s best interest, we affirm the court’s ruling.

Defendant and appellant Curtis Douglas Thomas appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18 (Proposition 47). We reverse, based on People v. Hernandez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 192.

On October 5, 2015, defendant and appellant B.N. (Minor) admitted to willfully, unlawfully and maliciously setting fire to a structure and forest land under Penal Code section 451, subdivision (c); and willfully, unlawfully and maliciously setting fire to and causing injury to the person, structure, forest land and property of another under Penal Code section 451, subdivision (d). The trial court deferred entry of judgment and granted Minor probation for a period not to exceed three years, subject to certain terms and conditions.

Plaintiff and appellant Rosa Elena Sahagun filed a petition under the civil harassment statute Code of Civil Procedure section 527.16 (Petition) to enjoin defendant and appellant Rogelio V. Morales from contacting or harassing her and seeking a stay-away order. It alleged one cause of action of harassment, which was based on conduct by Morales posting threatening messages on her Facebook page and for using Facebook accounts under the name of Cali Rave Cartel to post threatening messages. In response, Morales filed his special motion to strike petition for civil harassment restraining orders pursuant to section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP motion). The trial court stated that it was “granting” the anti-SLAPP motion in part and denying it in part. It found that posts by Morales himself were protected communication but found that posts from Cali Rave Cartel were not protected communication.

On the first day of jury trial, defendant and appellant Christopher Patrick Labriola moved to discharge his court-appointed attorney and substitute retained counsel. After a hearing where the trial court questioned new counsel’s availability, the court denied defendant’s motion.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of attempted first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 664/459). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted he had suffered two prior prison terms, one prior serious felony conviction, and one prior strike conviction. Defendant was sentenced to a total term of seven years in state prison with credit for time served.

On May 16, 2016, a first amended information alleged that defendant and appellant Jason Andrew Barr committed assault with a deadly weapon under Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count 1); trespass under section 602.5, subdivision (a) (count 2); receiving a stolen trailer under section 496d, subdivision (a) (count 3); receiving a stolen truck under section 496, subdivision (a) (count 4); and receiving stolen property under section 496, subdivision (a) (count 5). The information also alleged that defendant committed counts 3 and 4 while on bail (§ 12022.1), and that defendant previously served a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).