CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Oyuki Acosta appeals from the court’s revocation of her probation. The court found defendant in violation of her probation for failing to report to her probation officer and ordered her to serve her previously-suspended sentence. Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion by revoking probation based on a technical violation and ignoring defendant’s circumstances. We affirm.

A jury convicted Carlos Monge of attempted murder in violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a) (count 1), and of shooting from a motor vehicle in violation of section 26100, subdivision (c) (count 2). The jury found the attempted murder to be premeditated and also found true a criminal street gang enhancement allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) and a personal firearm enhancement allegation (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) (e)). After finding true prior conviction allegations under sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), the court sentenced Monge to an aggregate term of 39 years to life. Monge filed a timely notice of appeal.

Mother, Gillian P., appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her then two–year–old daughter, Juliana P. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends the trial court erred in prematurely setting a selection and implementation hearing, and in summarily denying her section 388 petition seeking reunification services because, although her whereabouts were unknown at the start of the dependency process and at the time the selection and implementation hearing was set, she appeared in court on the date set for that hearing. Mother claims the court erred, as a matter of law, in prematurely setting the section 366.26 hearing, and abused its discretion by failing later to correct that legal error.
We conclude that the juvenile court erred, and that the order terminating parental rights must be reversed. We will remand the matter to the juvenile court with options as to how the court may proceed.

Juan Carlos Delgado (defendant) appeals following a resentencing hearing held by the trial court on February 8, 2017. The hearing occurred after this Court affirmed defendant’s 2014 conviction but struck the true finding on a Penal Code section 186.22 gang enhancement allegation and remanded the matter for resentencing. Defendant’s counsel on appeal contends that because this case is not yet not final, the case must be remanded to permit the trial court to exercise the discretion provided by changes to the firearm enhancement statute effective January 1, 2018. Respondent agrees that the changes in the law apply retroactively to cases that are not yet final on January 1, 2018, but opposes remand on the ground that the record demonstrates that on remand, the trial court would not exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement. The record does not demonstrate that remand would serve no purpose.

RDO Equipment Co. (RDO) appeals from a judgment awarding The Altman Law Group (ALG) certain funds that had been interpleaded by a third party. The judgment is based on the court’s determination that ALG’s engagement agreements with its clients created a lien against the interpleaded funds superior to RDO’s claim to the same funds. We review the court’s interpretation of the agreements independently and come to the same conclusion. We therefore affirm the judgment.

The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in interpreting defendant 13359 Corp.’s offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 (998 offer) to pay a “total sum” of $12,500 “exclusive of reasonable costs and attorney[ ] fees, if any” as preserving plaintiff’s right to seek attorney fees and costs in a subsequent motion. The subject of the 998 offer was plaintiff Timed Out LLC’s statutory and common law misappropriation claims; plaintiff’s statutory claim sought an award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party under Civil Code section 3344, subdivision (a). The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in interpreting defendant 13359 Corp.’s offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 (998 offer) to pay a “total sum” of $12,500 “exclusive of reasonable costs and attorney[ ] fees, if any” as preserving plaintiff’s right to seek attorney fees and costs in a subsequent motion.

Appellant Azariah Ellington, one of Ethel Ellington’s sons, challenges the trial court order invalidating the Ethel Ellington Living Trust, imposing a constructive trust on the assets appellant marshaled and collected on behalf of the trust, and directing appellant to deliver these assets to the personal representative of the Estate of Ethel Ellington. Appellant raises several issues which are not pertinent to this appeal, but instead involve other cases in the probate court. He also argues, and we agree, that there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s order invalidating the trust. For that reason, we reverse the order.

Appellant was charged by information with fleeing a police chase while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2). It was further alleged she had suffered two prior prison sentences (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subds. (b), (e)(1)) that also were felony convictions under Penal Code section 1203. On August 6, 2015, a jury convicted appellant as charged. The People declined to proceed with a court trial on the two prison priors, and the parties agreed that appellant would be sentenced to a midterm of two years to be served concurrent with prison sentences in two other cases. The court sentenced appellant in accordance with the parties’ agreement.

Defendant William James Secrest, Jr., pleaded no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Per the parties’ agreement, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of eight years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We conclude the totality of the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that defendant was armed, and the brief, limited patdown search was justified. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and Appellant Jonathan Arvizu sued the City of Pasadena after he fell over a retaining wall located beside a recreational trail in the City’s Arroyo Seco Natural Park, resulting in devastating personal injuries. Arvizu had entered the Park in the dark, pre-dawn hours, while it was closed, in order to go “ghost hunting” with a group of friends. While taking a shortcut to reach the trail, he lost his footing, careened across the trail, and fell over the wall.
He appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Appellant Kenneth Roberts (Roberts) appeals from an order granting the motion of respondent Oliver Wolfgang Ruehr (Ruehr) to set aside, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, subdivision (b) and 473.5, a default and a default judgment entered against Ruehr. After a hearing, the trial court found service was defective and granted the motion. The hearing was unreported and the trial court denied Roberts’s motion for a settled statement. Roberts failed to challenge the denial of his motion by means of a writ petition. He thus has not provided us with a record adequate for our review. Because we must presume that the court’s findings, both express and implied, support its ruling, we affirm the order.

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s Under Policy No. N330039 11 54826 (Lloyd’s) appeal from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained demurrers filed by CPE HR, Inc. (CPE) and Joshua Sable without leave to amend. We independently conclude that the causes of action in Lloyd’s complaint were not assignable and that they were time-barred. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lloyd’s leave to amend its complaint. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendants and appellants Victoria Ali-Ahmad and Mazen Ali-Ahmad (Tenants) appeal a judgment in favor of plaintiff and respondent Silver Horse Equities, LLC (formerly known as Tenth Street Venture, LLC) (hereafter, Landlord), insofar as the judgment awarded Landlord its attorney fees in the sum of $95,197.50.
Tenants contend Landlord was not entitled to an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party because it did not attempt to resolve the matter through mediation before filing suit, as required by the lease agreement.
We conclude the record supports the trial court’s determination that Landlord duly attempted to resolve the dispute through mediation before commencing litigation and that the failure to mediate was attributable to Tenants. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

In a single trial, a jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, which arose out of a shooting that occurred in June 2005, as well as assault with a firearm, criminal threats, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of ammunition by a felon, all of which arose out of an incident that occurred in May 2014. Defendant argues: (1) insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation; (2) the court abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecution to join the June 2005 murder charge with the charges arising out of the May 2014 incident; and (3) even if the court’s ruling joining the two sets of charges was proper when it was made, the joinder of the charges nevertheless violated defendant’s due process rights.