CA Unpub Decisions

Respondents Vin A. Fichter and his firm, The Law Office of Vin A. Fichter, obtained a judgment against appellant Tyrone Byrd for attorney fees owed by appellant to respondents. Appellant, acting in pro. per., seeks reversal of the judgment on multiple grounds, including lack of substantial evidence to support it. However, appellant did not supply a reporter’s transcript or any equivalent. Accordingly, we cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence. We do address other grounds for reversal raised by appellant and conclude his due process rights were not violated, Fichter did not violate procedure or defraud the court by including the law office as a separate party, and the trial court did not err in refusing to impose terminating sanctions on respondents for failing to comply with the final status conference order. We agree with appellant, however, that costs were added to the judgment prematurely and without authority. Accordingly, we strike the costs, but otherwise affirm.

In an effort to resolve litigation, the City of Palos Verdes Estates (the City), the Palos Verdes Homes Association (the Association), the Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District (the School District), and one Palos Verdes Estates homeowner, Robert and Dolores A. Lugliani (the Luglianis), entered into a multifaceted and complicated settlement agreement that resulted in exchanges of money and certain real estate. Plaintiff John Harbison (Harbison), a neighbor of the Luglianis and Palos Verdes Estates homeowner, disapproved of the settlement, prompting him and Citizens for Enforcement of Parkland Covenants (CEPC) to file suit, challenging the transfers in that settlement. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs that the settlement violated deed restrictions governing the subject land and entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against the City, the Association, and the Luglianis.

Defendant Tyrone G. Byrd appeals from several orders and a judgment. Plaintiff Old United Casualty Company, doing business as Vantage Casualty Company, issued two marine insurance policies to defendant. Plaintiff filed a complaint and amended complaint seeking, inter alia, rescission of the insurance contracts for defendant’s failure to comply with the insurance contract terms and for filing a false claim for theft. Defendant cross-complained, alleging bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (implied covenant breach).
Plaintiff subsequently moved for summary adjudication of the rescission cause of action and defendant’s cross-complaint for the implied covenant breach. Defendant demurred to the complaint and filed a number of motions, including a motion to dismiss, a motion to quash service, and a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied all of defendant’s motions.

15-year-old A.T. (appellant) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders finding he committed felony grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c) ) and committing him to a rehabilitation facility. He contends the court’s felony grand theft finding must be reduced to misdemeanor petty theft (§ 490.2) because there was no evidence that the value of the stolen item was greater than $950. The Attorney General concedes—and we conclude—that there was insufficient evidence to support a grand theft finding. We therefore reverse and remand the matter as set forth below.

Petitioner Joaquin Leon Padin was convicted of second degree murder in 1996 and is serving a life sentence. Denied parole after a hearing in 2016, he contends the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) violated his constitutional right to due process by conducting a procedurally flawed hearing and failing to consider all relevant statutory factors bearing on the parole decision. We conclude the hearing was indeed flawed and therefore vacate the Board’s decision and remand for a new parole suitability hearing.

Defendant Timothy William Pettett received a five-year sentence after being convicted by a jury of receiving a stolen vehicle and admitting that he had suffered prior convictions. On appeal, defendant claims the court erred in failing to obtain a personal waiver of his right to a jury trial before accepting his admissions that he had suffered the prior convictions supporting sentence enhancements. The People concede that the court erred. Accordingly, we shall reverse the sentence enhancements and remand for further proceedings on the prior conviction allegations.

Appellant Eugene Schneider, an attorney, filed a declaration in a probate matter seeking $11,200 in attorney fees pursuant to Probate Code section 10810. An objection was filed, asserting that “[a]ny statutory fees the attorney is entitled to are to be shared with Duane Leonard.” Following a hearing, the probate court awarded Schneider $7500. We affirm.

After a jury trial, defendant Nicholas Daniel Stiles was convicted of misdemeanor disobeying a civil protective order (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a) ), misdemeanor contempt for violating a criminal protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)) and stalking while a protective order was in effect (§ 646.9, subd. (b)). After the first jury hung on a charge of felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)), the People elected to retry defendant on that charge, and the jury in the second trial convicted him. Defendant makes two arguments on appeal: first, the charges of disobeying a civil protective order and stalking while a protective order was in effect are not supported by substantial evidence, and second, the trial court erred by imposing concurrent sentences on his convictions of disobeying the civil protective order and violating the criminal protective order, and should have stayed those sentences under section 654.

This is the second appeal in this case and the latest manifestation of a series of legal proceedings that commenced almost eight years ago.
On April 14, 2010, appellant Francisco Carrascal filed a complaint in the San Mateo County Superior Court alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and unfair business practices against the same parties that are defendants and respondents in this appeal: Deanna and Eugene Avakian, PNC Bank, N.A. (PNC), Bank of America, Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association (Freddie Mac). The allegations of the complaint all related to appellant’s purchase of properties in Stockton and related home-purchase and refinance loan transactions in 2006 and 2007, and the foreclosure of certain properties. Appellant alleged causes of action for fraud against all defendants and breach of fiduciary duty, various forms of negligence, and unfair business practices against certain defendants.

Appellants Fiscal Funding Co., Inc. and Calvin Grigsby appeal from: (1) that portion of an order filed on September 11, 2015, in which the superior court denied appellants’ request for a determination of their rights and liabilities for the payment of attorney fees and costs awarded to respondents Alan Dones and John Guillory under certain provisions of the parties’ contract; and (2) an order filed on September 16, 2015, in which the superior court granted the motion of respondents for an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in defending against an appeal and in arbitration. We affirm.

Defendants David W. Greene, Jeanne Lawrence, Stephanie Lawrence, John Baldwin, K. Michael Forrest, Nhu Forrest, Tanya Powell, and Doris Dubois (Tenants) appeal the judgment of possession entered in favor of plaintiff Park Lane Associates, L.P. (Park Lane) following a jury trial in five consolidated unlawful detainer actions filed under the Ellis Act (Gov. Code, § 7060 et seq.). Tenants contend reversal is required because the trial court committed prejudicial error by excluding relevant evidence, and approving a flawed special verdict form. We shall affirm the judgment.

Wilma Liao appeals from the dismissal of her wrongful foreclosure action. She contends the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. We affirm.

Defendants Richard Ravanesh Singh and Jordan Luis Killens appeal following a jury trial in which Singh was convicted of two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and Killens was convicted of one count of first degree murder. As to both defendants, the jury found true lying-in-wait special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), and as to defendant Singh, the jury found true a multiple murder special circumstance (id., subd. (a)(3)). As to each murder conviction, the jury also found true allegations under section 12022.53 that defendants personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury or death. Both defendants were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the murders, with consecutive terms of 25 years to life pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (e).

The juvenile court found it had dependency jurisdiction over now 16 1/2-year-old C.S. (child) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect; section 300(b)(1)) and (c) (serious emotional distress; section 300(c)). It ordered child removed from parental custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c) (section 361(c)).
V.V. (father) argues there was no evidence he failed to protect child or that he had caused her serious emotional damage. He further asserts the evidence shows the child would not be in danger if placed with him.
We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support jurisdiction and the disposition and affirm.