CA Unpub Decisions

The family law court denied the request of appellant, Arthur Lopez (husband), for a domestic violence protective order against respondent, Cheryl Lopez (wife). Husband appeals, apparently claiming there was sufficient evidence to support issuance of the order. He also argues he was not properly served with a substitution of wife’s attorney, maintaining this is a basis for granting the order. We affirm.

This case arises out of surgeon Atif Iqbal’s exercise of professional discretion in a manner he believed was in the best interest of his patient, Deloris Moore. Believing otherwise, Deloris sued Dr. Iqbal claiming his medical negligence caused her to sustain serious injury, as well as severe pain and suffering. The doctor moved for summary judgment and presented expert evidence demonstrating his actions in treating and caring for Deloris complied with the requisite standard of care. Because Deloris failed to counter with any expert evidence of her own, the trial court granted Dr. Iqbal’s motion and entered judgment in his favor. Given that this is not a case where negligence is obvious to a layperson, we agree expert evidence was required. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Tuyen Duc Nguyen appeals from judgments and an order of dismissal entered after the court sustained without leave to amend demurrers to the second amended complaint (SAC) filed by of HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as trustee for the Certificateholders of Nomura Home Equity Loan Inc. Asset-Backed Certificate Series 2005 FMI (HSBC), Bank of America, N.A. (BofA), MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. (MERSCORP), and Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS; HSBC demurrer); Quality Loan Service Corporation (Quality; Quality demurrer); and Southland Homes Real Estate and Investment, LLC (Southland; Southland demurrer). Couched in causes of action for declaratory judgment, unlawful foreclosure, and quiet title, the SAC essentially alleges defendants wrongfully foreclosed because a note and trust deed executed by plaintiff were transferred to a securitized trust after the closing date, making the assignment void.

This negligence case arises from a tractor-trailer accident in which a commercial transport truck being driven by defendant Ahn Tran (Tran) crashed through a highway guard rail and plunged down an embankment during a very heavy rainstorm. Tran’s co-driver on the job, plaintiff Randie Gee (Gee), was asleep in the sleeping area of the truck in the early morning hours when the accident occurred. Gee allegedly suffered life-changing injuries.
After a jury found Tran was not negligent, Gee and his wife filed motions for a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the issue of negligence and for a new trial. The trial court denied the former, but granted the latter based on insufficiency of the evidence. Sitting as an independent trier of fact, the court concluded “the jury clearly should have reached a different verdict on the issue of negligence.”

A.G. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders declaring her five daughters dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), removing them from her custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c), and granting her family reunification services. On appeal, mother contends the jurisdictional findings and removal order are not supported by substantial evidence. She also contends the juvenile court erred in finding that active efforts were made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq. We reject mother’s contentions and affirm the juvenile court’s findings and orders.

J.W. (father) appeals from orders declaring his now two-year-old son, F.W., a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (e), and removing him from parental custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). Father contends these orders were an improper exercise of the juvenile court’s emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA or Act), Family Code section 3400 et seq. He further contends the juvenile court erred in making jurisdictional findings as to him and by citing the incorrect statute when denying him, a previously noncustodial parent, custody of F. Finally, he asserts there is insufficient evidence that it would be detrimental to place F. with him. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

On February 10, 2016, defendant Sergio Heredia was charged in an amended information with one count of forcible rape, in violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(2), one count of sexual penetration by force, in violation of section 289, subdivision (a)(1)(A), and one count of unlawful sexual intercourse, in violation of section 261.5, subdivision (c).
Trial commenced on February 10, 2016. On February 19, 2016, defendant pled nolo contendere to sexual battery by restraint, in violation of section 243.4, subdivision (a), and unlawful sexual intercourse, in violation of section 261.5, subdivision (c). Defendant agreed to a four-year lid, and registration pursuant to section 290. All other charges were dropped. Defendant remained on bail release pending sentencing.

Appellant Diego Vasquez was found guilty of multiple offenses after a jury trial. Vasquez appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

In this business dispute, a judgment was entered against defendants B & A International Farm Labor Services, Inc. (B&A), Ayala Farms, Inc., Piedad Ayala, Bernardo Ayala, and Central Valley Equipment Rental when they failed to appear on the date set for trial. At that time, plaintiffs FFA Farm Labor Services, Inc. (FFA), Saul Camacho, Laura Gilbert, and Imelda Moreno proceeded to prove-up their claims against defendants in defendants’ absence. Upon learning of the judgment, defendants filed a motion seeking to have the judgment set aside under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 and the court’s inherent equitable power. The trial court granted the motion, finding defendants had adequately shown extrinsic mistake warranting the requested relief. Plaintiffs appeal from the order setting aside the judgment. Because plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion, we affirm the order of the trial court.

This appeal involves an award of attorney fees in a dispute between siblings arising out of their real estate partnership. The partnership agreement stated the prevailing party was entitled to recover attorney fees “actually expended” if “litigation is instituted with respect to any matter regarding the covenants in this Agreement.” The trial court determined the sister, who won a defense verdict on three tort causes of action submitted to the jury, was the prevailing party and awarded her costs and approximately $135,000 in attorney fees. The brother appealed, arguing he was the prevailing party because the jury awarded him $12,822 on his breach of contract claim.

On appeal, Solis contends one of his second degree robbery convictions must be reduced to grand theft as the evidence is insufficient. He also contends the evidence is insufficient to uphold his convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery. Finally, he requests that we modify his sentence. We will remand for resentencing, but in all other respects affirm.

Chenot was convicted of making criminal threats and of arson of an inhabited dwelling while a state of emergency was in effect. She challenges only her arson conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject this claim. Chenot also contends the trial court erroneously imposed a prior prison term sentence enhancement. The People concede the point because the enhancement was neither pleaded in the information nor proven at trial. We agree with the parties and strike the prior prison term enhancement. Finally, Chenot argues that fines and fees imposed by the trial court at sentencing must be stricken because the court failed to orally pronounce specific fine and fee amounts at sentencing. The People respond that the trial court’s oral pronouncement to the effect that fines and fees were imposed as set forth in the probation report was sufficient.

On October 5, 2001, a jury convicted defendant and appellant, Anthony Leonard Davis, of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, count 1.) The jury additionally found true allegations defendant had committed the murder during the commission of a robbery (§§ 211, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) and personally discharged a firearm during his commission of the offense (§§ 12022.53, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). The court sentenced defendant to imprisonment for 25 years to life. The court additionally ordered defendant to pay a restitution fine in the amount of $10,000 pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b).

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Richard Allen Watson, of two counts of criminal threats (counts 1-2; Pen. Code, § 422) and one count of stalking (count 3; § 646.9, subd. (a)). The court thereafter found true allegations defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to imprisonment for 11 years four months.