CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Corin Roy Jackson, Sr. was charged in one case with crimes arising out of his physical attacks on his wife and children. He was also charged in a separate case with a crime arising out of his physical attack on a fellow inmate in jail.
Defendant pleaded guilty to all charges and admitted all enhancements. At sentencing, however, he made a Marsden motion (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118), seeking to have new counsel appointed for the purpose of filing a motion to withdraw the plea; he asserted that his current counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by, among other things, giving him bad advice in connection with the plea. The trial court denied the motion and proceeded with sentencing.

Defendant and appellant Carlos Linares Fuentes appeals from his 135-year-to-life sentence imposed after a jury convicted him in 2016 of nine counts of forcible lewd acts that he committed on his girlfriend’s two young children over a three-year period.
Defendant argues the matter should be remanded for resentencing because: (1) the trial court believed it lacked discretion to impose a sentence of less than 135 years to life, and defense counsel failed to correct the court’s error; (2) the imposition of nine consecutive terms of 15 years to life is cruel and unusual under these facts; and (3) the court erroneously believed the $4,300 sex offense fine was mandatory despite defendant’s lack of ability to pay. As discussed post, we modify the judgment to delete the $4,300 fine, but otherwise affirm.

A jury found Ted Preston Howard guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). In a separate proceeding, the court found Howard had not established he was insane at the time of the offense. The court subsequently sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison.
Howard appeals, contending we must reduce his conviction from first degree murder to second degree murder because there was insufficient evidence to support the premeditation and deliberation elements of first degree murder. In addition, he contends we must remand the matter for a new sanity trial because the court abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance to allow him to be further evaluated for malingering his psychotic symptoms. Lastly, he contends we should direct the court to correct two clerical errors in the abstract of judgment.
We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the premeditation and deliberation elements of first degree murder.

Dorian Anguiano's appeal follows the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He contends his plea was based upon mistake because his retained counsel informed him he could withdraw his plea before sentencing. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion to withdraw the plea. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, and we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Authorized City Towing (ACT) appeals from an order granting a motion by TEGSCO, LLC, doing business as San Francisco AutoReturn (AutoReturn) for attorney fees and costs against ACT under Civil Code section 3426.4 of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (§ 3426 et seq.) (UTSA). The court awarded AutoReturn attorney fees under section 3426.4 based on its finding that ACT prosecuted its misappropriation of trade secrets claim against AutoReturn in bad faith.

Dung T. Thu Tran (Tran) and her sister, Ann F. Sorensen, disputed ownership of a home purchased by their parents in 1976. Attempting to resolve the dispute, Sorensen filed an action for quiet title, among other claims, against Tran and Tran's two children, Mae Anna Workman (Mae) and Paul Ross Workman (Paul). In response, Tran filed a cross-complaint alleging Sorensen committed fraud by fabricating and concealing various deed transfers, and asserting additional claims. The trial court bifurcated the complaint and conducted a bench trial on the cause of action for quiet title, during which the court made findings regarding the authenticity of the contested deed transfers. The court then concluded those findings would have a collateral estoppel effect on Tran's fraud claim and, thus, dismissed Tran's fraud cause of action.
On appeal, Tran asserts she was entitled to a jury trial on Sorensen's quiet title action and her own cross-claim for fraud.

Appointed counsel for defendant Timothy James Guarino filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the judgment.

On April 16, 2015, Sacramento Police Officers Wollman and Schneider were dispatched on a call of a theft of a GPS-enabled iPad. Using “Find my iPhone” application, Officer Wollman tracked the iPad to an apartment complex which had eight units. Officer Wollman was able to narrow the area to four units and the officers began knocking on those doors. D.G. lived in apartment 340. Officer Wollman explained that he wanted to search her apartment for the iPad. D.G. permitted the officers to search her two-bedroom apartment. Defendant Roger Williams walked out of the rear bedroom. Officer Wollman searched the rear bedroom and found a loaded revolver in the closet on the upper shelf. The closet contained both male and female clothing. When Officer Wollman asked defendant and D.G. about the firearm, defendant stated it belonged to a family member. Defendant denied he had a felony arrest. Defendant later stated that he had been arrested for a felony but was convicted of a misdemean

Appointed counsel for defendant Gabriel Erazo has asked this court to review the record to determine whether there exist any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant and cross-complainant Ronald Brown appeals from a default judgment, contending the trial court erred in imposing terminating sanctions for his failure to comply with the court’s discovery orders. He also appeals from the order denying his motion to vacate the default judgment, contending he demonstrated excusable neglect.
For the reasons explained below, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in imposing terminating sanctions. Accordingly, we reverse the default judgment and remand the matter.

Defendant John James Penn appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Ja. J. in violation of section 187, subdivision (a) of the Penal Code (unless otherwise set forth, statutory section references that follow are found in the Penal Code) and found to be true the allegations that defendant committed the murder while he was engaged in the commission of a robbery within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A), that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b) and that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder within the meaning of sections 1203.06, subdivision (a)(1) and 12022.5, subdivision (a).

A jury convicted Pulupaki Fifita (Fifita) and Lee Eastwood Manako (Manako) (collectively, Defendants) of the following felonies: attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a) ); assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); and shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246). In addition, the jury convicted Manako of a misdemeanor, exhibiting a concealable firearm in public (§ 417, subd. (a)(2)(A)). The jury also found true certain gang and firearm allegations. As a result, the trial court sentenced each defendant to a lengthy prison term—seven years to life, plus 20 years.
On appeal, Defendants, individually and jointly, raise almost a dozen separate arguments, only one of which we find meritorious.

Plaintiff Laura LaRocca co-founded the cosmetics company DuWop, LLC in 1999. In 2008, she sold her entire interest in DuWop to defendant Harry Haralambus’s company, LMR Partners, Inc. (fka Lambus Partners, Inc.) (LMR), for $1 million. LMR also agreed to remove LaRocca as a guarantor of DuWop’s bank loans and repay LaRocca’s personal loans to DuWop.
LMR ultimately paid LaRocca only $500,000 and did not remove her as a guarantor or repay her loans to DuWop. LaRocca sued LMR for breach of its agreements, and DuWop for failure to pay back her loans. After a nonjury trial, the trial court entered judgment in her favor in the amount of $1,214,757.95 and held that LMR and DuWop were alter egos of Haralambus.

Defendant Fesuiai Soli Fuimaono appeals from a judgment against him issued upon his conviction for multiple sexual assaults against Jane Doe when Jane Doe was a minor. He argues his conviction must be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion when it discharged a juror without conducting a sufficient investigation into possible juror misconduct. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.