CA Unpub Decisions

Carol Coronado was charged with three counts of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder in connection with the deaths of her two year old, one year old, and infant daughters. Coronado entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. After a court trial, the court found Coronado guilty of first degree murder and legally sane during the commission of the crimes. She was sentenced to three terms of life without parole.
On appeal, Coronado makes the following arguments: (1) she was improperly arraigned when she purported to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity; (2) there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation; (3) the evidence was insufficient that she was sane at the time she committed the crimes; and (4) she received ineffective assistance of counsel.
We find there was sufficient evidence of first degree murder and of Coronado’s sanity.

Defendant John David Johnson appeals from the denial of his post-judgment motion under Code of Civil Procedure sections 206 and 237 seeking to compel the disclosure of personal juror identifying information. We affirm.

Defendant David Olivier engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior with his adopted daughter, Jane Doe, when she was a teenager. A jury convicted him of four felony counts of lewd acts upon a child aged 14 or 15 years based on “prolonged” kissing to which he confessed in a pretext call, but it was unable to return a verdict on the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced him to two years and eight months in prison, which was a paper commitment based on his presentence custody credits.
On appeal, Olivier contends that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 and violated his federal due process rights by admitting evidence of his prior conduct with teenage girls. He also claims, and the Attorney General concedes, that an order to pay attorney fees must be stricken. We strike the order to pay attorney fees but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Rory V. Parker appeals from her convictions by plea of no contest to one count of conspiracy (Pen. Code, § 182), two counts of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), one count of nonpayment of contributions under the Unemployment Insurance Code (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2108), and one count of tax evasion (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706), together with an aggravated white collar crime enhancement (§ 186.11, subd. (a)). As a consequence of her plea, she was placed on five years’ formal probation. She raises a single issue on appeal, claiming a probation condition prohibiting her from owning, using or possessing any deadly or dangerous weapons while on probation must be modified to include an express knowledge requirement. Because the Supreme Court has definitively rejected that argument since Parker’s opening brief was filed, we affirm.

Angelina Nessinger (Angelina) appeals from a judgment entered in her dissolution of marriage action against her former husband Edward Nessinger (Ed). She contends the trial court: (1) distributed the parties’ property using an improper method; (2) made various property valuation errors; (3) violated the doctrine of res judicata by reconsidering another judge’s prior rulings; (4) erred in applying the mediation privilege to exclude Ed’s financial disclosure documents from evidence; and (5) abused its discretion in issuing sanctions against her. Ed cross-appeals and contends the court abused its discretion in awarding spousal support to Angelina. We reject both parties’ contentions and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Joel Guerrero-Jasso of four counts of sexual assault against his two minor daughters, found true special multiple victim allegations, and the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 55 years to life plus a concurrent three-year determinate term. On appeal, Guerrero-Jasso claims the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting his postarrest statements to police, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
Because his Miranda advisement was in English, and English is not his native language, he maintains the advisement was faulty, his waiver was therefore involuntary, and the trial court’s admission of his subsequent statements to police was reversible error. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Marjorie Page sued Mission Hospital for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Page was injured when Mission Hospital employees subdued her and shackled her to a gurney when a physician determined Page needed a psychiatric evaluation and treatment. The trial court sustained a demurrer to Page’s second amended complaint without leave to amend. We affirm.

Plaintiff Aaron Bornstein appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to certify a class action as to his single remaining claim against SAI Long Beach B, Inc. and Sonic Automotive, Inc. (defendants) for invasion of privacy. Bornstein asserts that during his employment at an automobile dealership (the dealership), defendant owners monitored or recorded some incoming telephone calls to the dealership without obtaining the consent of participants to such conversations. The trial court, in a detailed and thorough written order, denied Bornstein’s motion to certify a class action as to his claim on three separate and independent grounds. The court decided that Bornstein failed to meet his burden of showing the ascertainability of his proposed class, that common issues predominate over individual issues, and the superiority of class action treatment of his claim.
We affirm.

A jury convicted Ernesto Parraguirre of sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b) [count 1 - Stephanie]; all statutory citations are to the Penal Code), lewd act on a child under age 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a) [count 2 - Stephanie]), criminal threats (§ 422 [count 3 - Cindy]), first degree residential burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a) [count 4]), and assault with intent to commit a sexual offense during the commission of first degree burglary (§ 220, subd. (b) [count 5 - Cindy]). The jury also found he committed first degree burglary while a nonaccomplice was present in the residence (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). Parraguirre contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by denying his posttrial motion to substitute appointed counsel, prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on flight (CALCRIM No. 372), and erred by failing to provide a unanimity instruction concerning the offense of sexual pen

Appellant Alfonso Cuevas appeals from his conviction following a plea of no contest.
We provide the following brief description of the factual and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.) On March 16, 2017, appellant was charged by complaint with willful assault with a deadly weapon upon an officer, wherein he knew or should have known that the victim was a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)), count 1; identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)), count 2; second degree commercial burglary (§§ 459/460, subd. (b)), count 3; and false impersonation for bail or surety (§ 529, subd. (a)(1)), count 4. The complaint further alleged appellant had served five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

Appellant Michael Paul Owens appeals from his conviction following a plea of no contest.
Appointed counsel for appellant asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to appellant advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from appellant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to appellant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the factual and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

The court adjudged appellant T.M. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after it sustained petition allegations charging him with first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count 1), first degree robbery (§ 211; count 2), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 4).
On appeal, appellant contends: (1) the court used the wrong standard in finding he aided and abetted the commission of the assault with a deadly weapon and battery with serious bodily injury offenses; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the court’s finding that he aided and abetted the commission of these offenses. We affirm.

After the sixth Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was found true against appellant Desmond V., the juvenile court committed Desmond to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Desmond appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Petitioners, bring this writ petition, requesting that this court issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling petitioners’ demurrers to Jane Doe’s first amended complaint, and to enter a new order sustaining their demurrers. Petitioners’ demurrers were based on Doe’s failure to present a government claim to petitioner school district (district) before commencing her judicial action against petitioners. The trial court concluded Doe’s claim was statutorily exempt from the claim presentation requirement. We are called upon to interpret the interaction of two provisions of the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810, et seq.; “the Act”) to determine whether they required Doe to present a government claim to a local public entity on her cause of action for childhood sexual abuse under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 prior to filing suit on that claim. This presents a question of first impression.