CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant's counsel has filed a brief under the procedures set forth in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441–443 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 744 (Anders). We have given defendant, William Roy, the opportunity to file a brief on his own behalf and he has declined to do so. We affirm the trial court's judgment sentencing Roy to two years in prison, with a recommendation that he be placed in fire camp.

Plaintiff West Coast Air Conditioning Company, Inc. (West Coast) appeals the court's October 26, 2016 postjudgment order denying West Coast's request for attorney fees under the "private attorney general" theory codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. West Coast contends the court erred in refusing to award it reasonable attorney fees after West Coast (1) successfully challenged by ordinary writ of mandate
(§ 1085, subd. (a)) the award of a public works contract by defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to real party in interest Hensel Phelps Construction Co. (HP), and (2) obtained a permanent injunction preventing HP from performing any additional work under that misawarded contract.

This appeal arises from a wrongful foreclosure action filed by Elena A. Loucks against various defendants. Loucks appeals a judgment of dismissal entered against her pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 583.420, subdivision (a)(1), for delay in prosecution when "[s]ervice is not made within two years after the action is commenced against the defendant." Loucks contends she properly served the defendants or they made general appearances. She also appears to challenge an order denying her request for a temporary restraining order to prevent the sale of her home. We conclude we are precluded from reviewing the order denying her request for a temporary restraining order because she did not timely appeal that separately appealable order.

We consider in this case whether plaintiff West Coast Air Conditioning Company, Inc. (West Coast) was entitled to recover under a promissory estoppel theory its bid preparation costs in the stipulated amount of $250,000, after it successfully challenged the award of a public works contract by the State of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to real party in interest Hensel Phelps Construction Co. (HP).
The court found HP's bid to update the Ironwood State Prison Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (subject project) illegal and nonresponsive as a matter of law. As a result, the court granted West Coast's request for a permanent injunction, preventing HP from performing any additional work on the subject project.

The minor C.G. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders modifying probation at a hearing to accept transfer of his delinquency case from San Francisco County. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602, 750, 775.)
He contends the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to modify probation conditions at the transfer-in hearing, and various gang related conditions added by the juvenile court were unconstitutional and unreasonable. We conclude (1) the juvenile court had jurisdiction, and (2) the conditions in question did not violate the minor’s constitutional rights, and were reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

A jury found defendant John Henry Riley guilty of vehicle theft for stealing a car from the victim not long after he sold her the car. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in responding to a jury question regarding the definition of ownership. He also contends the trial court erred in imposing two enhancements for his prior prison terms. The People concede error as to one enhancement. We agree with the People and will strike one of the enhancements and otherwise affirm.

Defendant Enrique Torres was convicted by jury of first degree burglary. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant was previously convicted of a serious felony offense (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)) qualifying as a strike under the three-strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and also served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Following an unsuccessful motion to strike defendant’s prior strike conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), the trial court sentenced him to serve 15 years in state prison.

We take the facts from the sparse information presented in pleadings filed below. In 2000, Oscar Vargas Macias and a co-defendant were convicted of two counts of murder and three counts of attempted murder. (Pen. Code, § 664/187, subd. (a).) We affirmed Macias’s conviction on appeal.

Kiansi Boni appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, defendant’s Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen), demurrer to appellant’s First Amended Complaint for breach of a loan modification agreement. We affirm.

Defendant David Galvez appealed from the trial court’s postjudgment order denying resentencing under Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller) and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. During the pendency of this appeal, defendant additionally sought to remand the matter to the trial court for a record development hearing in light of People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and a resentencing hearing under newly enacted Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h).
The appeal from the order denying resentencing under Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 and the Eighth Amendment is dismissed as moot: Section 3051, subdivision (b)(4) has provided defendant with the 25-years-to-life sentences he sought. Defendant’s request for remand for further proceedings under Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 is denied as defendant already has had the opportunity to present evidence necessary for a future youth offender parole hearing.

Minor Jackson B., through his counsel, appeals from the juvenile court’s decision to recognize his mother’s boyfriend as his presumed father and to order reunification services for the boyfriend. Jackson is now almost five years old. His counsel contends the court erred because the boyfriend did not meet the statutory requirements for presumed father status and there was not sufficient evidence that ordering services for him was in minor’s best interests. We affirm the court’s orders.

Defendant Manuel Ramirez appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation, contending the court impermissibly relied on inadmissible hearsay. We conclude the hearsay was admissible as spontaneous statements and affirm.

Clarence Thompson III was convicted by jury of felony first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a)), five counts of felony burglary of a motor vehicle (§ 460, subd. (b)), felony identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3)), misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(a)). Thompson admitted having suffered three prior felony convictions and having served three prior prison terms.
Thompson asserts Batson/Wheeler error in the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory challenge to an African-American member of his prospective jury panel. He also challenges the sufficiency of evidence to sustain his conviction for first degree burglary. We reject both contentions and affirm.

A jury found defendant Donte Marquee Smith guilty of first-degree murder with the special circumstance of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, attempted murder, and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence that gun paraphernalia unrelated to the murder was found in his room months before the shooting. He also claims certain sentencing errors and identifies errors in the abstract of judgment. The Attorney General concedes the prison term imposed for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle must be stayed under Penal Code section 654 and the abstract of judgment must be amended.
Accepting the Attorney General’s concessions, we will modify the judgment, and otherwise affirm.