CA Unpub Decisions

In 2015, Pennypacker owned a house in Concord, but was looking for a place to rent in San Francisco while he took classes at a nearby vocational school. Pennypacker heard about an available unit from an acquaintance who was moving out of the space. Pennypacker contacted Amy and walked through the unit twice, first with his acquaintance and then later with Amy. Amy was a realtor and had purchased the property with her son in 2005 and renovated the property to add two rental units. Amy transferred exclusive ownership to her son a few years after the purchase, but continued to help with the leasing of the property. In June 2015, Pennypacker signed a lease and moved into one of these units. The rent was $1,000 a month. Pennypacker paid $15,900 in rent from June 2015 to September 2016.
A. Complaint and Discovery
In November 2016, Pennypacker filed an action against the Yuens.

On October 30, 2018, Joshi filed a Judicial Council form complaint for personal injuries against Fitness alleging one cause of action for premises liability. She alleged that on May 1, 2017, as she entered the sauna at the Club owned by Fitness on Newhall Drive in San Jose, she tripped and fell onto the heating element, suffering burns to her body. Joshi alleged that the accident occurred because of a lack of lighting caused by a burned out light bulb. She alleged two counts: that Fitness (1) was negligent in owning, maintaining, managing, and operating the premises; and (2) willfully failed to guard against or warn against a dangerous condition of the premises.
Fitness filed an answer to the complaint. In its answer, Fitness alleged, inter alia, as a defense that Joshi signed a membership agreement that included an express release of liability under which she knowingly waived any claims she might have against Fitness.

Mother and Father were married in 2011, and their child was born the following year. In 2017, the parents separated and began the underlying dissolution proceedings. Two years later, the parties entered into a February 2019 marital settlement agreement the trial court incorporated into its judgment of dissolution the following month.
In December 2020, Mother filed a declaration requesting the trial court to order, among other things, that Father "refund" her $100,000. Mother alleged that, as part of her assent to the marital settlement agreement, she agreed to accept $100,000 less in the parties' division of community assets so that Father could use the money to pay for any child support obligations the court ordered in the future.

II. The February 8, 2021, Payment Ruling
The trial court held a February 8, 2021, hearing on Mother's requests; she appeared and Father did not.

On June 10, 2021, Fresno County Sheriff’s Office (FCSO) deputies responded to a report of a baby not breathing at mother’s home. She and father were separated and she lived with her adult son, Romeo, then 17-year-old son, E.G., then two-year-old J.V., and the baby. She worked from 9:30 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. and father stayed with the children while she worked. She left the children with father at approximately 9:45 p.m. the night before and returned at 6:30 a.m. She put a blanket over the baby, who slept in a crib next to her bed, and fell asleep. She awoke around 10:00 a.m. when her sons slammed the front door. When she checked on the baby, he was cold and not breathing. It was determined he had been deceased for some time. A social worker with the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) took E.G. and J.V. into protective custody and placed them together in foster care.

On December 7, 2020, the department received a referral on behalf of the children and their two siblings after Jennifer M. (mother) left them with maternal grandmother and did not return. Maternal grandmother called child welfare services and reported she could no longer care for the children and requested that someone pick them up. During the investigation, a social worker interviewed maternal grandmother, maternal stepgrandfather, and mother’s adult son. Mother and the children had been living with the maternal grandparents for eight months, but mother left after she got into an argument with maternal stepgrandfather. Father was incarcerated. Two days after the department received the referral, the children were detained and placed in a licensed foster home. One of the children’s siblings was left in relative placement with the maternal grandparents.

In March 2021, the juvenile court adjudged, then two-year-old, Alexander a dependent child and removed him from parental custody after sustaining allegations he fell outside his home at approximately 12:30 a.m., while in mother’s care, sustained a broken femur and tested positive for amphetamine while receiving treatment at the emergency room. Mother was present with her attorney at the hearing and waived her right to a hearing on the allegations. The court ordered mother and Alexander’s father to participate in reunification services. Mother’s reunification plan required her to participate in a 14-week parenting/neglect counseling program and submit to random drug testing. The Kern County Department of Human Services (department) placed Alexander in foster care and then transitioned him to the home of a relative in May 2021.

On April 1, 1999, an information was filed in the Superior Court of Fresno County charging appellant with counts1 and 2, willfully and unlawfully using force and violence resulting in the infliction of serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), with special allegations that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on a person other than an accomplice (§§ 667, 1192.7); counts 3 and 4, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); and counts 5 and 6, willfully and unlawfully using force and violence and inflicting injury upon persons appellant knew, or reasonably should have known, were emergency medical technicians (§ 243, subd. (c)), with two prior strike convictions.
On November 2, 1999, after a jury trial, appellant was convicted of counts 1 and 2, and counts 5 and 6, and the serious bodily injury allegation was found true. He was acquitted of counts 3 and 4. The court found the prior strike convictions true.

On November 7, 2018, Victoria came to the attention of the department after a law enforcement officer found her three-year-old half sibling wandering down a road wearing only a soiled diaper. As a result of this incident, the department discovered that mother and father’s homes were unsafe and unsanitary. Thereafter, the department filed a dependency petition on behalf of Victoria and placed her in protective custody. That same day, father and mother verbally declared that they did not have Indian ancestry.
On November 9, 2018, father and mother each completed a Parental Notification of Indian Status form (ICWA-020) indicating they had no known Indian ancestry.
On January 16, 2019, Victoria was found to be a person described by section 300.
On January 29, 2019, at the disposition hearing, Victoria was ordered returned to mother’s custody on a family maintenance plan and father was ordered to participate in family reunification services.

On August 31, 2018, the Fresno County District Attorney charged defendant with 29 counts alleging crimes occurring on 16 separate dates. The information further alleged defendant had suffered a prior “strike” conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On December 3, 2020, defendant pled no contest to domestic violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 1) and conspiring to dissuade a victim or witness (§ 136.1, subd (c)(2); count 15), and he admitted personally using a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in the commission of count 1 and having suffered a prior strike conviction. His plea was in exchange for a stipulated 18-year sentence.

Appellant’s convictions are based on a series of armed robberies involving 13 different victims. We need not discuss the facts underlying appellant’s conviction in detail because they are not relevant to this appeal.
At appellant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court awarded the following presentence credits: 823 days for time spent in actual custody, plus 117 days of conduct credits pursuant to section 4019, plus 677 days for time spent on presentence electronic monitoring, for a total of 1,617 days. Because appellant was convicted of a violent felony within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c), his accrual of conduct credits was limited pursuant to section 2933.1, subdivision (a) to “no more than 15 percent.”

Around midnight in late October 2019, a female called 911, reported a domestic disturbance, and hung up. Madera County Sheriff’s Department deputies were dispatched to the residence. Deputy Bangerter, who was in uniform and driving a marked vehicle, arrived first. He proceeded cautiously because it was very dark, and there were several residences and vehicles on the property.
The lights were on in only one house at the rear of the property and Deputy Bangerter heard male and female voices yelling from inside. Bangerter saw a male, whom he identified as defendant, come outside, look at him, and go back inside the house. Prior to and after seeing defendant, Bangerter announced himself and told the residents to come outside. Bangerter positioned himself behind a vehicle and when a woman, identified as Maria, came out, he directed her to come to him. She complied, he asked if there were any weapons in the house, and she said yes.

On May 28, 2019, the Kings County District Attorney filed an information, charging defendant with making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 1), misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and misdemeanor trespassing (§ 602, subd. (q); count 3). As to count 1, the information further alleged that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) which also qualified as a serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)).
On August 26, 2019, defendant filed a motion to set aside all counts of the information (§ 995). On September 9, 2019, the trial court granted defendant’s motion as to counts 2 and 3, but denied the motion as to count 1.
On October 25, 2019, the trial court held a change of plea hearing. Before changing his plea, defendant inquired regarding his prison custody credit earning capacity.

Defendant attempted to make an unlawful U-turn across double yellow lines from the right-hand shoulder in front of Singh, causing a motor vehicle accident at approximately 10:30 p.m. A distinct odor of alcohol was coming from defendant; his eyes were red and watery, and his speech was thick and slurred. A preliminary alcohol screening test was administered, and defendant’s blood alcohol was 0.134 percent at 11:03 p.m. He was placed under arrest for driving while under the influence and causing injury to another. A subsequent blood test collected at 12:50 a.m. showed defendant’s blood sample contained 0.142 percent alcohol.
Singh, who was 79 years old, initially appeared to be fine and in good health after the accident. Although Singh had some blood on his face, which appeared to be from a bloody nose, he was talking and able to stand and walk around.

On or about October 27, 2011, appellant was an inmate at Valley State Prison for Women and a participant in mental health services. A correctional officer saw an object fall from appellant’s waistline and seized the item. The object was a lock placed inside of a sock, something commonly used as a weapon inside the prison.
Insanity Finding and Commitment
On October 10, 2012, a first amended information was filed in the Superior Court of Madera County charging appellant with count 1, unlawful possession of a weapon, “a lock in a sock,” while confined in a penal institution (§ 4502, subd. (a)) with one prior strike conviction and one prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, and the court appointed experts to examine her.
On November 9, 2012, appellant waived her right to a jury trial and submitted the matter on the experts’ reports. The parties stipulated that a “lock in a sock” was a weapon.