CA Unpub Decisions

Aaron Joshua Wilson was convicted of a range of offenses, including conspiracy to commit carjacking, two counts of carjacking, two counts of robbery, evading, driving the wrong way on a highway while evading, and several misdemeanors. He was sentenced to 33 years eight months in prison. Wilson does not challenge his convictions. Rather, he raises a number of claims related to his sentence. He argues that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to apply Penal Code section 654 to stay the sentences on his two robbery convictions. He further argues that a prior prison term sentence enhancement imposed by the trial court must be stricken because, after his sentencing, the prior conviction underlying the enhancement was reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47. We agree with both of these contentions.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of defendants and appellants L.A. (Mother) and C.L. (Father; collectively, Parents) to their daughter, N.L. (Minor). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) Parents contend the juvenile court erred by finding the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to be inapplicable because the Department’s ICWA investigation was inadequate, which resulted in an inadequate ICWA notice. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant William Henry Steele pleaded no contest to committing a lewd or lascivious act on his daughter, who was under the age of 14 at the time, in violation of Penal Code section 288. Because of that conviction, defendant is under a lifetime requirement that he register as a convicted sex offender. (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (c).) Decades later, defendant petitioned the superior court for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon, so that he will no longer be required to register.
The trial court denied defendant’s petition because the statute that governs the relief defendant seeks—Penal Code section 4852.01—specifically excludes persons convicted under Penal Code section 288.

N.T. (Mother) appeals a juvenile court's order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition to modify the prior court order denying her reunification services with her son, C.B. We affirm.

In a joint trial at which dual juries were empaneled, David Gonzalez was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) of Salvador Cendejas; and Jaime Lopez was convicted of second degree murder (ibid.) of Cendejas. As to Gonzalez, the jury further found that Gonzalez personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in committing the murder (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), and the trial court made a true finding that Gonzalez incurred a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12., subd. (c)(1)).
The trial court sentenced Lopez to prison for an indeterminate term of 15 years to life, and sentenced Gonzalez to prison for an indeterminate term of 75 years to life and a consecutive determinate term of five years.

Defendant Cody Ross Stone Vancamp appeals from his convictions for felony simple assault, a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon, which the court reduced to misdemeanor battery at sentencing, and misdemeanor vandalism. The victim told a deputy sheriff that defendant struck her with his hands multiple times, hit her in the face with a flashlight, and pushed her onto the floorboard of her vehicle and held her there. Defendant argues the trial court erred by not instructing the jury, sua sponte, that it had to unanimously decide which of the above acts constituted simple assault. In addition, defendant argues his trial attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by not requesting the trial court give a unanimity instruction to the jury. We find no error.

A jury convicted Lisa Shepard of possession of methamphetamine (meth) for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). Shepard was sentenced to a split term in local custody (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B)). Shepard was sentenced to 18 months in custody to be followed by 18 months of mandatory supervision. A number of conditions of mandatory supervision were imposed without objection by the defense.
Shepard now challenges several of the conditions contending they are constitutionally overbroad and must be stricken, and that she was not required to raise any objections in the trial court to preserve the issues for appeal. We will find all of the challenges have been forfeited by failure to object below. Given Shepard's long and dismal history of criminal offenses, substance abuse and violations of probation we will find this appeal does not raise legitimate facial challenges to the conditions.

Plaintiff Karen Michaelson appeals a judgment in favor of defendants V.P. Condominium Corporation, Daniel G. Little, and Little & Sons Property Management (collectively, V.P. Condo) following an order granting their motion for summary judgment. Michaelson is the successor-in-interest to her father, Nicholas Mosley, and trustee of the Nicholas A. Mosley Living Trust. Mosley filed suit against V.P. Condo to quiet title to the extra 12th garage in his 11-unit condominium development and obtain damages based on V.P. Condo's allegedly wrongful conduct in denying his exclusive right to use the garage. Mosley died during the lawsuit, and Michaelson was substituted in his place.

K.A., mother of minor M.W., appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her petition for modification. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 395.) She contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her petition for modification and that the judge showed bias in questioning her at the hearing. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant James Arturo Diaz of first degree burglary, possession of a deadly weapon, receiving stolen property, and possession of burglar’s tools. The trial court found that defendant’s prior Texas conviction for aggravated assault was a strike and sentenced defendant to 25 years to life, plus 11 years four months. Defendant now contends (1) there is insufficient evidence that he possessed burglar’s tools; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained from a search incident to defendant’s arrest because there was no probable cause to arrest him; and (3) controlling law prohibits reliance on facts beyond the least adjudicated elements of his prior conviction to establish that the prior conviction qualifies as a strike in California.
We will reverse the trial court’s determination that defendant’s prior Texas conviction qualifies as a strike and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120 (G

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of mother, T.Q., and presumed father, E.V., to their seven-year-old daughter, A.V., freeing the child for adoption by her current caretakers. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Only mother appeals, contending the court’s failure to initiate notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) as to father’s potential Indian heritage compels per se reversal. We disagree and affirm.

The juvenile court adjudicated then-two-month-old A.U. a dependent child and removed him from the custody of his mother, M.H. (Mother), based in part on her mental and emotional problems that inhibited her ability to regularly care for her very young son. The court fashioned a disposition order providing Mother with reunification services, including a psychological evaluation and individual counseling. At a later progress hearing, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) informed the court it could not afford to continue funding individual counseling with Mother’s then-current therapist and was referring Mother to another low-cost provider. We consider whether, as Mother contends, the change to low-cost individual therapy establishes the Department failed to provide Mother with reasonable reunification services.

N.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order regarding D.P. (minor) based on Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d). She asks us to exercise our discretion to review the sufficiency of the evidence for certain subdivision (d) findings. According to mother, there was insufficient evidence that she knew minor was being sexually abused or was at risk of sexual abuse. Also, she claims there was insufficient evidence that she failed to protect him from sexual abuse.
We find no error and affirm.

Gregorio Gomez Lopez appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of two counts of forcible sexual penetration by a foreign object, two counts of forcible oral copulation, and two counts of forcible sodomy. As to each count, the jury found true an allegation that appellant had kidnapped the victim. This allegation is commonly known as “[t]he one strike aggravated kidnapping circumstance.” The circumstance required the imposition of an alternative sentence of 25 years to life for each offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 125 years to life, consisting of five consecutive terms and one concurrent term of 25 years to life. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the aggravated kidnapping circumstances. We affirm.