CA Unpub Decisions

This appeal arises from a corporate governance dispute between two factions within the congregation of the Sikh Temple Turlock, California (Temple). In the trial court, each faction claimed to be the Temple’s duly elected board of directors.
The congregation elected cross-defendants and respondents to the Temple board in August 2011 (First Board). Appellants claimed that an April 2013 election placed them on the board (Second Board). In June 2013, appellants entered the Temple office, changed the lock, and took over running the Temple.
The Temple, through the First Board’s directors, filed the underlying action against appellants seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages for trespass. Appellants filed a cross-complaint requesting a judicial determination of the validity of the April 2013 election. As an alternative remedy, appellants requested the court to order and supervise a new election.

Defendant Andrew James Washington-Silva was convicted by no contest plea of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (b)) with the special allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). On appeal, he contends the probation condition that requires that he not be out of the county for more than 48 hours without his probation officer’s permission is unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm.

Respondent, the City of Dinuba (City), filed an unlawful detainer action against appellant, Universal Biopharma Research Institute, Inc. (Biopharma), Universal, Inc., and Kuldip Thusu for failure to pay rent under a commercial lease. The lease agreement did not name Biopharma as a party. The lease listed Universal, Inc., a nonexistent entity, as the tenant. Thusu, Biopharma’s president and chief executive officer, signed the lease, describing himself as the president of Universal, Inc. Thusu also signed a personal guarantee of the lease. A jury found Biopharma was not a party to the lease and thus was not liable to the City.
After obtaining this defense verdict, Biopharma moved for attorney fees under the lease. The attorney fees provision states that, in the event of legal proceedings brought by either party, the prevailing party “may” be entitled to recover attorney fees.

Defendant and appellant, M.S. (Mother), appeals from the juvenile court’s orders (1) denying her petitions to return her three-year-old twin sons, P.S. and K.S., to her care pursuant to a family maintenance plan, or for reinstated reunification services and liberalized visitation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388) and (2) terminating parental rights to the twins and selecting adoption as the twins’ permanent plan (§ 366.26). Mother claims only that the court abused its discretion in denying her counsel’s request for a 30-minute continuance or delay in conducting the hearings, in order to allow Mother additional time to arrive in court. We find no abuse of discretion in the order denying Mother’s counsel’s request to continue or briefly delay the hearings until Mother arrived in court. We further find that any error in denying the request was harmless.

The juvenile court took jurisdiction over E.N. because of her parents’ general neglect and cruelty and E.N.’s serious emotional damage. Plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), placed E.N. with a foster family. In May 2017, after E.N. had been with her foster family for nearly two years, the court terminated the parents’ reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing. In June 2017, the juvenile court authorized CFS or its delegate to obtain a passport for E.N. so that she could travel to Costa Rica with her foster family/prospective legal guardians for a two-week vacation in July 2017. Defendant and appellant, K.N. (mother), challenges the court’s order authorizing the passport and travel for various reasons. We agree with CFS that the case is moot and dismiss this appeal.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Charles Joseph Caldon, of (1) oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years of age or younger and (2) sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger. (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subds. (a), (b).) The court sentenced him to a total of 40 years to life in state prison. Defendant is the maternal grandfather of the victim, A.P. He argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged sexual offenses against A.P.’s mother under Evidence Code section 1108. We affirm.

A jury convicted Rick Alexander Perez of failure to register as a sex offender and failure to advise of a change of address, and also found true he suffered a prison prior for his underlying sex offense. The trial court sentenced him to a total of three years in state prison. Perez raises three challenges on appeal. First, he argues his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a limiting instruction regarding his prior sex offense conviction. Next, he argues and the People agree the imposition of a sentence for count 2 violates the ban against multiple punishments for single criminal acts. (Pen. Code, § 654; unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) Finally, he argues the trial court’s order he reimburse his appointed attorney $750 in fees is not supported by substantial evidence. As we explain, we agree with his last two contentions.

Advocates for Better Community Development (ABCD) appeal the trial court order denying their petition for a writ of mandate, which challenged the decision of respondent City of Palm Springs (the city) to approve changes to a planned development in downtown Palm Springs proposed by real parties in interest and respondents Wessman Development Company, Inc. and Palm Springs Promenade, LLC (the developers).
At bottom, ABCD’s arguments attempt to challenge the city’s approval of changes to the development plan that allow the developers to swap uses between two parcels, one of them originally designated to be open space, the other for commercial development. ABCD argue approving the changes violated land use provisions in the Government Code because they are inconsistent with the specific plan. (Gov. Code, §§ 65455 & 65867.5, subd. (b).)

Defendant and appellant, Jonathan Mendez appeals from the judgment entered following jury convictions for oral copulation with a child 10 years old or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b); counts 1-3) and lewd acts upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); counts 4-5). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 10 years, plus 45 years to life.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the pretrial statements of the victim, S.C. Defendant argues the statements were not sufficiently reliable to qualify as a hearsay exception under the Evidence Code section 1360 hearsay exception. Defendant also argues the statements were inadmissible under section 352 and the confrontation clause. We reject defendant’s contentions and affirm the judgment.

Lawrence Leone appeals from an order of the superior court denying his request for recalculation of his release date. Leone's brief on appeal, filed by appointed appellate counsel, presents no argument for reversal, but invites this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Leone did not respond to separate invitations from appellate counsel and from this court to file a supplemental brief. After independently reviewing the entire record for error as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.

Defendant Bennie Edward Dickinson appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 petition to redesignate his felony conviction for receiving stolen property. He contends the trial court erred in failing to take evidence regarding the value of the stolen property. Finding defendant was afforded the opportunity to present evidence of value but did not present any, we shall affirm.

After a jury found defendant Peter Brian Shearer guilty of elder abuse, assault with a deadly weapon, and making criminal threats against his neighbor, he moved for a new trial based on a newly discovered police report that concerned a mental health episode the neighbor suffered in 2000. The trial court denied the motion finding the police report merely constituted impeachment evidence, it was cumulative to other evidence that already showed the neighbor’s mental instability, and it was unlikely the jury would have reached a different result had the report been presented. The court sentenced defendant to serve 14 years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying his new trial motion because the police report showed the neighbor, the prosecution’s primary witness, suffered from delusions thus making it likely the jury would have acquitted him had his counsel had the opportunity to use the report during cross-examination.

Plaintiff and appellant Hank R. Pritchard appeals from a judgment entered following the trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer to his second amended complaint without leave to amend. In sustaining the demurrer, the trial court concluded that Pritchard’s claims were time-barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 339, subdivision 1 (hereafter section 339(1)). We agree and shall affirm the judgment.

A.C. appeals a $4,629.50 victim restitution order imposed after the juvenile court sustained a petition for forcible rape of a victim under 14 years of age. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2).) Appellant contends, and the Attorney General agrees, that the trial court erred in ordering appellant to pay $900 restitution to the victim’s parents for his cell phone and clothing expenses. (§ 730.6, subds. (a) & (h).) We reduce the victim restitution award from $4,629.50 to $3,724.50 and affirm the judgment as modified.