CA Unpub Decisions

S.C. (defendant) was a minor when the instant case commenced. Now an adult, he appeals from a juvenile court order finding he did not satisfactorily complete juvenile probation. He argues the court’s error thereby denied him the benefits of Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, which would have allowed the juvenile wardship petition against him to be dismissed. It is true defendant was denied the benefits of section 786, but it was due to his pleading guilty as an adult to felony burglary, not due to any court error. The juvenile court correctly determined defendant’s guilty plea was a “conviction” for purposes of section 786 and that defendant therefore did not satisfactorily complete juvenile probation. Accordingly we affirm.

Patricia Jean Nichols, aka Heaven J. Nichols, appeals from an order declaring her a vexatious litigant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 391, et seq. The order came after Nichols waged a two and a half year campaign of repeated challenges to the validity of a restraining order obtained against her by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Orange (RCBO). Her arguments on appeal are largely a continuation of that effort.
However, the restraining order is not before us and consequently we cannot review either its validity or its propriety. Thus, we must disregard Nichols’ contention that the restraining order was improperly granted because the chief witness against her, Father Augustine Puchner, was her fiduciary, as well as her contention that in issuing the restraining order, the trial court failed to “apply the laws regarding sexual harassment and conspiracy.”

A jury found defendant guilty of one count of making a false bomb report. (Pen. Code, § 148.1, subd. (c).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true that defendant was previously convicted of a serious and violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and had previously served a prior qualifying prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court struck the priors and imposed a two-year prison sentence, but suspended execution of the sentence in lieu of three years of formal probation.
The issue on appeal has nothing to do with the conviction or sentence per se. Rather, defendant contends the court erred by failing to hold a hearing pursuant to section 1368 to determine his mental competency to stand trial. He contends there was substantial evidence that he lacked competency. We disagree and affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Christopher Todd Ruschaupt asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. He responded with a supplemental brief, in which he requests that we consider that at the time of his arrest he had been suffering from, and treated for, bipolar disorder for over one year. Finding no arguable issues, we affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Juan Carlos Barriga asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. He responded with a supplemental brief, in which he contends the trial court erred in imposing a $40 court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8) and a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) in case No. 4004060 because he was convicted before the effective dates of the statutes imposing the assessments. The People concede and we agree.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea in case No. F14902635, appellant James Matthew O’Neal pled no contest to one count of first degree burglary and was placed on three years’ formal probation. In case No. F16903582, pursuant to a negotiated plea, O’Neal pled no contest to one count of receiving a stolen motor vehicle and one count of operating a “chop shop.” O’Neal was again placed on formal probation. On November 7, 2016, at a probation violation hearing, it was determined O’Neal violated probation, probation was revoked, and a term of imprisonment imposed.
O’Neal filed a timely notice of appeal on November 23, 2016. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Appellant Andres Moreno Vizcarra pled no contest to lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 by force (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)/count 2), lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)/count 6) and the continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (§ 288.5, subd. (a)/count 10). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Appellant Pedro Villa, Jr., stands convicted of attempted premeditated murder and assault with a deadly weapon. It also was found true that he used a deadly weapon in the commission of the attempted murder. Villa appealed his convictions and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Henry Alvarado Rosales asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. He responded with a petition for writ of mandate, which we denied on March 9, 2017, on the ground that defendant failed to explain why his appeal is an inadequate remedy. Having reviewed the record and finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.

R.T. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders concerning her two oldest children, K.H. (age 12) and A.T. (age four). She contends reversal is required because: (1) substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction over K.H. or A.T.; (2) the dispositional orders terminating dependency jurisdiction are not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the dispositional order denying reunification services as to A.T. is not supported by substantial evidence; and (4) the dispositional order limiting mother’s educational rights was issued without proper notice and is not supported by any legal or factual basis. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

A 2016 search of defendant and the car in which he had been sleeping revealed baggies containing methamphetamine, a methamphetamine pipe, empty pill containers, a torch lighter, more than 150 small zip-top baggies, a small digital scale with white residue on it, 37 cell phones, approximately seven laptop computers, 10 sets of car keys, a small camera, a car stereo, and a fake gun.
A jury found defendant Jeremy Lee Deaton guilty of possession of methamphetamine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that he had two prior drug convictions. (§ 11370.2, former subd. (c).) The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of nine years in prison, consisting of the upper term of three years for possession of methamphetamine for sale, plus a consecutive three-year term for each prior felony drug conviction.

A jury convicted Saul Angel Valenzuela Cordova (Valenzuela) of five sex offenses involving a child 10 years old or younger based on evidence that included his own statements to police. The trial court sentenced Valenzuela to state prison for a term of 80 years to life. He appeals, claiming the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting his statements because psychological pressure rendered his confession involuntary. Having reviewed the videotape and transcript of Valenzuela’s police interview and interrogation, we conclude his confession was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. Valenzuela also argues his conviction must be reversed because his counsel provided ineffective assistance at the hearing on the motion to exclude his confession. Finding no merit to these arguments, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant Kevin Jackson raises contentions of trial error following his conviction of three drug offenses. For the reasons discussed below, the judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant and appellant Willie Crockett appeals his conviction of, among other things, robbery, aggravated assault, attempted murder, attempted robbery, and attempted premeditated murder of a police officer, with gang and firearm-use enhancements. He urges on appeal that (1) the gang enhancement with respect to one incident was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) each of the gang enhancements was based on inadmissible testimonial hearsay, in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez); (3) the jury was misinstructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine; and (4) the case must be remanded to allow the trial court to exercise sentencing discretion. For the reasons discussed below, the judgment of conviction is affirmed, and the matter is remanded for resentencing as discussed more fully in sections (4) and (5).