CA Unpub Decisions

Carmen Cordova appeals from an order following a trial on reserved issues in this dissolution action that included the characterization of certain pieces of real property. She contends the trial court erred by: (1) characterizing five rental properties and a family residence purchased in her name alone as community property; (2) awarding her former husband Mike Alex Cordova 100 percent of the value of two rental properties and 50 percent of the value of the family residence, pursuant to Family Code section 1101 ; (3) determining she breached her fiduciary duty as a spouse by defaulting on the mortgages of two jointly-owned properties after separation; and (4) requiring her to pay attorney fees to Mike as a sanction. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Defendant Erik Steven Montes pleaded guilty to felony attempted murder and admitted an allegation of personal infliction of great bodily injury and a gang enhancement. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he presented clear and convincing evidence he was unduly and improperly influenced to accept the plea bargain. Defendant also argues the case must be remanded to allow defendant an opportunity to make a record for a later youthful parole suitability hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), a point conceded by the Attorney General. We remand the matter for limited further proceedings under Franklin, and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Appellant Joseph Hannon argues his sentence of eight months for being a felon in possession of a firearm must be reversed because the court imposed a concurrent midterm sentence that was improper under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). The Attorney General agrees. Hannon also argues his sentence must be remanded pursuant to the amendment to section 12022.5, subdivision (c) to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement. The Attorney General again agrees.
Hannon further appeals the imposition of a $5,000 fine and a $250 restitution fee at sentencing, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. We conclude the record does not support a finding of ineffective assistance. We remand to the trial court for resentencing on the felon in possession count and for the court to exercise its discretion with regard to the firearm enhancement. We otherwise affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves a dispute between KIMO, Inc. (KIMO) a licensed real estate brokerage firm that operates several real estate-related businesses, and two former agents of KIMO with the status of independent contractors: Steven Pinza, who sold real estate, and Nils Ratnathicam, who generated and closed real estate loans. The sole question presented is the meaning of “postdeparture payout” provisions in the written agreements between defendant and each plaintiff relating to commissions payable to the latter for as yet unpaid work on transactions that were unresolved or unclosed at the time plaintiffs’ relationships with KIMO ended.
The case largely turns upon the propriety of the trial court’s interpretation of materially identical provisions pertaining to commissions set forth in the written agreements between the parties. As we agree with the court’s interpretation of those provisions, we shall affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, appellant Eric von Renegar was found guilty of felony hit and run. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegations that appellant had been previously convicted of a violent felony and had previously served five prior prison terms. The trial court denied appellant’s motion to strike the prior conviction and sentenced appellant to six years in state prison. On appeal, appellant contends his conviction is not supported by substantial evidence. He further contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor. We affirm.

In this anti-SLAPP case, Mark Adams purports to appeal from two orders, one granting David Galli’s special motion to strike and the other awarding attorney fees and costs to Galli as the prevailing party. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Adams, however, voluntarily dismissed the case before the trial court had made a definitive ruling on the special motion to strike. We dismiss the appeal because this case lacks an appealable judgment and order.

H.R. (father) appeals from the judgment terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all statutory citations are to this code) to his son Cyrus. He contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his section 388 modification petition without an evidentiary hearing because he demonstrated a prima facie case of changed circumstances, and returning Cyrus to his physical custody or reinstating reunification services would be in Cyrus’s best interests. Mother, who did not receive reunification services, joins in father’s brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200 (a)(5); In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 208.) We discern no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff David Gayosso appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the court sustained defendant Wells Fargo Bank’s (Wells Fargo) demurrer to his second amended complaint (SAC) without leave to amend. According to the SAC, Gayosso’s home was foreclosed upon after he made payments under a forbearance agreement. Wells Fargo had offered him a loan modification, but it required a second lien holder to subordinate the second lien to the modified loan. The second lienholder refused, and Wells Fargo, in turn, denied the request for a modification. Gayosso contends Wells Fargo was obligated to offer him an unconditional loan modification. The forbearance agreement, however, states otherwise: “The lender is under no obligation to enter into any further agreement, and this [forbearance agreement] shall not constitute a waiver of the lender’s right to insist upon strict performance in the future.” We affirm the judgment.

Seeking to recover approximately half a million dollars loaned to Defendant Mohamed Abouelmagd, Plaintiff Debra Newell appeals from a judgment dismissing her second amended complaint after the court sustained defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend. The court concluded her claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. In doing so, the court rejected plaintiff’s assertions that the statutes of limitation had been tolled during defendant’s absence from the state, and that defendant should be estopped from asserting the limitation period as a defense.

Appellant Van S. (father) appeals following the denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment entered in child support proceedings instituted by respondent, Fresno County Department of Child Support Services (County). Father contends he was not served with County’s complaint and that the court did not properly calculate the amount of support. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Appellant Monica G. (mother) appeals from a recent order in her ongoing custody dispute with her ex-husband, appellee Rafael G. (father), that did not award her custody of their minor children. Mother and father are both proceeding in propria persona. Although father attempted to file a responsive brief, this court struck it, following an objection, for failing to comply with court rules. Father received an opportunity to correct the errors, but submitted no further briefing. In addition, mother only filed one reporter’s transcript, for the February 24, 2014, hearing referenced below. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

On August 23, 2015, defendant Bobby Dan Jackson used threats of violence to keep two victims inside a vehicle in Kern County. A jury acquitted him of two counts of kidnapping for ransom and two counts of kidnapping, but found him guilty in these four counts of the lesser included offense of false imprisonment (§ 237). He was also found guilty of making a criminal threat. The jury acquitted him of two counts of robbery and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court found prior conviction allegations to be true. The court denied defendant’s Romero motion to strike a 14-year-old prior conviction. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 12 years 4 months. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in permitting evidence regarding his alleged prior bad acts. He also raises a claim of instructional error. Finally, he contends the court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion. We affirm.

Based primarily on the eyewitness identifications of the two shooting victims, a jury convicted appellant Tabarri Maurice Townsend of two counts of premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2); two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 3 & 4); shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 5); and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 6). Various firearm enhancements were found true. Appellant received an aggregated prison term of 80 years, which included sentences of 15 years to life for the two counts of premeditated attempted murder.
On appeal, appellant raises claims primarily surrounding the alleged unreliability of the victims’ eyewitness identifications and the introduction of gang evidence at his trial.

Defendant David Anthony Rodriguez appeals from his conviction on multiple counts related to threatening and harassing behavior directed toward his former wife, who is identified in the trial court record as "Jane Doe." Rodriguez was convicted of one count of stalking, in violation of Penal Code section 646.9, for conduct directed at Doe during the period between August 12, 2014 and June 25, 2015, and one count of making a criminal threat, in violation of Penal Code section 422, as a result of threatening comments that he made to Doe in 2012, in addition to other offenses.
On appeal, Rodriguez challenges only his convictions on these two counts. With respect to his conviction for stalking, as alleged in count 4 of the charging document, Rodriguez raises a number of contentions.