CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
M.E. appeals juvenile court orders terminating her reunification services at the 12-month permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.21, subdivisions (f) and (g) concerning her daughters, Y.E., L.E., and I.E. M.E. contends: (1) insufficient evidence supports the court's finding that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) provided her reasonable reunification services, and (2) the court erroneously found there was no reasonable probability the children would return to her by the 18-month review. We affirm the orders.
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Juan Hernandez filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivisions (f)–(g) requesting that the trial court re-designate as a misdemeanor a prior felony conviction that he suffered for receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)) in case No. SCS190587 (SCS 190587). On the same day that Hernandez filed his petition, the trial court summarily denied it on the ground that "[t]he petition seeks relief on an ineligible conviction – PC 139." The record indicates that the trial court mistakenly believed that the petition pertained to a separate conviction that Hernandez suffered for dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 139) in case No. SCS194788 (SCS 194788).
On appeal, Hernandez requests that the trial court's order be reversed and the matter be remanded so that the trial court may properly consider his petition. |
Defendant Joseph Paul Becker exercised his constitutional right to represent himself at trial and during sentencing. He was convicted by a jury on one count of issuing a criminal threat. (Pen. Code, § 422.) The jury also found true allegations defendant had previously served 6 prior prison terms (§ 667.5) and had previously been convicted of 26 serious felonies (§§ 667, subds. (b)(i), 1170.12, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 25 years to life plus 7 years in prison.
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Defendant Tony Marshall Cox appeals from multiple criminal convictions arising out of confrontations with his former wife and her boyfriend. He contends (1) insufficient evidence supports his conviction for robbing his former wife’s cell phone; (2) the jury instruction for robbery erroneously described the crime’s elements, and his counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not objecting to the instruction; and (3) the trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing sua sponte on expert witness opinion. We affirm the judgment with directions to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment.
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At a selection and implementation hearing for Myles P., Myles’s alleged father Dominic B. requested a DNA paternity test. The juvenile court ordered the test and continued the hearing pending the results. The court told Dominic, if the test results showed he was Myles’s genetic father, it would appoint counsel for him at the next hearing; if the paternity test was negative and he did not wish to participate in the dependency proceedings, he need not appear at the next hearing. The court advised Dominic the DNA results would be mailed to him and to the court and advised him of the date of the next hearing. The DNA test results confirmed Dominic’s paternity, but Dominic did not appear at the scheduled hearing. After finding notice of the hearing and the paternity test results had been properly given, the court terminated Dominic’s parental rights.
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The trial court denied Marco Santistevan’s petition for recall of his sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act, finding under the preponderance of the evidence standard that Santistevan was ineligible for relief because he acted with the intent to cause great bodily harm during the commission of the offenses for which he was convicted. Santistevan appeals, and we reverse and remand with instructions.
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Raul De La Cruz (De La Cruz) challenges a condition of his probation authorizing the warrantless search of electronic devices, such as cell phones and computers, under his control. De La Cruz challenges the search condition as unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). We agree that the search condition is invalid under Lent and strike the condition. De La Cruz also contends that the search condition is unconstitutionally overbroad. Because we hold that the condition is invalid under Lent, we do not reach this issue.
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This is an appeal from a judgment following a de novo review of an award by the Labor Commissioner pursuant to Labor Code section 98.2. Plaintiff Pedram Soleimani contends he was an employee of defendant Sherbank Aziza Dental, Inc. for purposes of the Labor Code. Defendant contends plaintiff was an independent contractor. Following trial, the court applied the employment factors set forth in S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 (Borello), and concluded plaintiff was an independent contractor. We affirm.
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Following the trial court’s ruling granting summary judgment against plaintiff and appellant Randhir S. Tuli, he entered into a stipulation with cross-complainants and respondents Specialty Surgical Center of Thousand Oaks LLC (SSCTO) and SymbionARC Management Services, Inc. (SymbionARC) (collectively Cross-Complainants) to dismiss their cross-complaint against him without prejudice subject to a tolling agreement. The trial court entered judgment in favor of all the defendants, and Tuli filed an appeal.
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Back in 2001, a woman quit her corporate job so she could help her then-boyfriend with his fledging business as a sculptor. Over the next several years, they grew the business and had a child together. In 2013, the sculptor ended the romance; in 2014, he ended the business partnership. The woman sued for, among other things, (1) breach of contract based on the sculptor’s promise to support her for life if she provided him her professional and household services, and (2) quantum meruit. The jury returned a special verdict finding that the parties had a contract that the sculptor had fulfilled and also awarding her $780,000 under quantum meruit for the same services that underlie the contract the jury found to exist and to be fulfilled. The trial court granted a new trial on the ground that the special verdict was inconsistent. Both parties appeal. We conclude the trial court’s grant of a new trial was appropriate.
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In this dispute between a law firm and its former client, the trial court imposed terminating sanctions against defendant Sue Tsang due to her recalcitrance during discovery. It then entered judgment awarding a portion of certain settlement funds to plaintiff Franceschi Law Corporation (the law firm) and the balance to Tsang. Tsang appealed the judgment. Acting without an attorney, Tsang did not provide a complete clerk’s transcript and her briefs do not adequately address the salient issues or include sufficient citations to the record. Because she failed to carry her burden to demonstrate reversible error, we affirm.
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Petitioner David Sanchez is charged with murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and various drug and firearms offenses. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court challenging respondent superior court’s order setting his bail at $1,000,000. The Attorney General agrees that Sanchez is entitled to a new bail hearing. As we explain, we will treat the petition as one for a writ of mandate and order issuance of a peremptory writ.
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Appellants Richard C. (Father) and W.H. (Mother) challenge the finding that their teenaged daughter Alexandria C. was subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court after she tried to commit suicide and testified that she felt unsafe in her home. The parents also argue that the case should be remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., ICWA) even though neither one has ever claimed Indian ancestry. We reject the parents’ arguments and affirm.
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