CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Arvan Hernandez appeals after the trial court revoked his probation and executed a previously imposed sentence. His counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court for an independent review of the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant has been apprised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief, but he has not done so.
A jury convicted defendant of attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664) and found true an allegation that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Defendant admitted an allegation that he was previously convicted of a serious felony.

Defendant John David Johnson drove while intoxicated at twice the legal blood alcohol limit, with his six-year-old son in the backseat. Nobody was hurt when he ran into a truck in an intersection on the city streets of Vallejo, California, nor thereafter when he drove away from the scene, inebriated, with his child still in the car. Johnson was subsequently convicted after a jury trial of felony child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)), and he now appeals.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports his conviction. We also reject his other two claims of error: that the trial court failed to respond properly to several jury questions about one element of that offense, and also that, in response to another jury question, it misadvised the jurors about the order in which they were permitted to deliberate on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor child endangerment.

Defendants Joseph and Michele Alioto (the Aliotos) appeal from several orders entered in this unlawful detainer action and the judgment. We shall affirm the orders and the judgment.

Appellant Bryan Mazza appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36 or the Act). (Pen. Code, § 1170.126.) The court found Mazza was not eligible because his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm brought him within the provisions of section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2), which makes defendants who were armed during the commission of their current offenses ineligible for resentencing under the Act. We reverse and remand for the trial court to consider whether Mazza is eligible for resentencing under the standards set forth in People v. Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225 (Frierson).)

This action arises out of a physical altercation occurring on August 9, 2014, in which Daniel Gunther (Gunther) allegedly assaulted Henry Pinheiro (Henry) and damaged the truck owned by Henry and his wife, Cindy Pinheiro. (Collectively, Henry and his wife are referred to as the Pinheiros.) The incident occurred as Gunther was leaving the San Jose residence of his girlfriend, Shirley Williams (Williams), the Pinheiros’ next door neighbor. In November 2014, the Pinheiros brought suit against Gunther (as a Doe defendant) and Williams. As against Williams, the Pinheiros asserted a claim for negligence, alleging that she (1) invited Gunther to her home, (2) knew or should have known of his propensity for violence, (3) was aware of previous conflicts between Gunther and Henry, (4) was aware of Gunther’s having previously threatened Henry, and (5) stood by and watched as Gunther assaulted Henry.

A jury convicted defendant Marcus Casillas of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), & (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by finding the prosecution did not commit any discovery violations and by denying his requests for various sanctions for the claimed discovery violations. Defendant also contends the trial court erred by precluding him from introducing evidence of third party culpability. Further, defendant contends this court should remand the matter to the trial court so he can “have an opportunity to make a record for a youthful offender parole hearing.”

A.A. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights to her now two-year-old son, Joshua A., at the permanency placement hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Mother maintains the court erred by finding the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), parental bond exception did not apply to avoid termination of parental rights. After failing to reunify with Joshua after 22 months, Mother maintains they share a “substantial positive emotional attachment,” and the minor should not be adopted by the family he has bonded with. Mother also appeals the juvenile court’s denial of her petition for modification under section 388, asking the court to return Joshua to her custody or provide her with additional reunification services. We conclude Mother’s contentions on appeal lack merit, and we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Maria Del Carmen Uribe of second degree robbery; attempted kidnapping; attempted carjacking; felony elder and dependent adult abuse; and misdemeanor elder and dependent adult abuse, as a lesser offense to felony elder and dependent adult abuse. The jury also found true sentence enhancement allegations that the robbery was committed against vulnerable victims.
The court found true sentence enhancement allegations defendant had suffered two prior serious or violent felony (“strike”) convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(2)(A), all undesignated statutory references are to this code); two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)); and three prison prior convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

The parties to this appeal, appellants Suzanna and Jason Haughey, and respondent Henry Flores, are all involved in the T-shirt industry. The other participants in this dispute also make and sell T-shirts.
There is an empty chair, which should be occupied by one Chad Schoeman. Schoeman has disappeared, leaving a trail of debts and unsatisfied judgments behind him. Flores has a substantial judgment against Schoeman that he has been unsuccessful in collecting from the judgment debtor himself. Flores therefore directed his collection efforts against entities that owed Schoeman money.
The appellants in the present appeal, the Haugheys, became involved in Flores’ collection efforts when they unwisely joined forces with Schoeman in 2011. At that time, the Haugheys incorporated a new business, MM4U, Inc., and engaged Schoeman to sell T-shirts designed by Jason Haughey. In June 2012, Schoeman sold a trademark he owned – Mob Inc. – to MM4U and the Haugheys for $1,500.

Defendant Jose Sotero Gonzalez was convicted of 10 counts relating to sexual assault of an eight-year-old girl, A.L. He challenges three of the counts under Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) on the basis of lack of evidence of specific intent. He also asserts that the sentences imposed for another three counts should have been stayed pursuant to section 654. And he wants the abstract of judgment corrected to reflect the fact that the court imposed only one $1,000 victim restitution fine on him, not two.
The Attorney General does not dispute Gonzalez’s position regarding the application of section 654 to the three counts he has identified for this appeal. The Attorney General also does not dispute that the court imposed only one victim restitution fine. The only disputed issue on appeal is, therefore, the sufficiency of the evidence of specific intent for three of his convictions under section 288, subdivision (a).

Plaintiff Bann-Shiang Liza Yu appeals from a judgment entered by the court in favor of defendant West Bend Mutual Insurance Company despite her demand for a jury trial. Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract, bad faith, and equitable contribution, indemnity, and subrogation, all based on assignments of rights by parties and their insurers with whom she had settled an underlying construction defect action.
Plaintiff claims the court violated her right to a jury trial by entering judgment in favor of defendant without using a proper procedural vehicle. She also argues the court erroneously interpreted the underlying settlement agreements and assignments of rights. Finally, she contends the court erroneously dismissed her peremptory challenge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6; all further statutory references are to this code.)
We agree there was no proper procedural vehicle for the court to enter judgment in favor of defendant.

The trial court reduced Susan Kim’s (Susan) spousal support from $2,447 to $850 per month. In her appeal, Susan asserts the order must be reversed because
(1) there was insufficient evidence of a material change of circumstances to justify the modification, and (2) the trial court improperly determined what the marital standard of living (MSOL) was in 2012 when there was a stipulated judgment. Finding these contentions have merit we reverse the order and remand for a new hearing on spousal support and attorney fees.

On November 1, 2016, the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) filed a juvenile dependency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 to remove five children from the custody of Anna M. (mother). An amended petition was filed on November 2, 2016. The petition alleged neglect caused by mother’s chronic drug abuse, and it sought to have no reunification services for the mother under the bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13).
Mother executed a waiver of rights and admitted the allegations in the petition. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on February 8, 2017, the juvenile court obtained an express waiver of mother’s right to contest the hearing, found the allegations in the amended petition true, and detained the children. The court further found the bypass provision set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) applied and denied mother reunification services. The court ordered visitation.

The Tulare County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging Erik V., a minor, (1) willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer in the performance of his duties (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)); and (2) was within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, former subd. (a)). Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the court found Erik violated Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1). At the disposition hearing, Erik was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation while in the custody of his parents. The terms and conditions of his probation included the requirements he (1) be at his place of residence between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., unless he was with a parent or received prior permission from his probation officer; and (2) pay all or part of the costs associated with drug testing.
On appeal, Erik challenges the home curfew and payment conditions.