CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Barrington Newton Green, Jr., appeals from his conviction following a plea of no contest.
Appointed counsel for appellant asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to appellant advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from appellant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to appellant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the factual and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

Appellant Raymond Donald Briones stands convicted of second degree robbery, in violation of Penal Code section 212.5, subdivision (c), and attempted second degree robbery. Briones filed a timely appeal of his convictions. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Appellant Attorney General of California appeals the superior court’s order granting respondent Jaime Rosas’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The order vacated a disciplinary decision of the California Department of Corrections (CDC) that had found respondent guilty of battery with a deadly weapon pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3005, subdivision (d)(1). We affirm because the facts do not establish battery.

Defendant Hosh Deion Thomas was convicted of assaulting Jane Doe No. 1 by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. He was convicted of raping Jane Doe No. 2 and also sodomizing and orally copulating her. He argues that the sodomy conviction should be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to show that he penetrated Jane Doe No. 2’s anus with his penis. He also argues that the court should not have admitted evidence of a prior rape conviction under Evidence Code section 1108 because the circumstances of the prior offense were dissimilar to those of the current offenses. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Jaubrae Dixon, Ladarieus Jones, and Laderrick Sutton were jointly prosecuted on charges arising from a shooting incident. Each was convicted of active participation in a criminal street gang and unlawful firearm possession. Dixon and Sutton were also found guilty of committing assault with a firearm. Jones was sentenced to a total of five years in prison. Dixon and Sutton received aggregate prison terms of 19 years and 18 years, respectively.
The claims on appeal allege instructional error and insufficiency of the evidence. Dixon, who was 17 years old at the time of the offenses, makes an additional claim of sentencing error and also argues for retroactive application of the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57). In supplemental briefing, Dixon further contends that due to the enactment Senate Bill 620, which went into effect on January 1, 2018, the matter should be remanded to allow the trial court to consider striking a particular firearm enhancement.

Defendant and appellant J.C., hereafter referred to as father, appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to the minors S.L. and G.C. Throughout the dependency proceedings, father was incarcerated in a different county, awaiting trial for the murder of an unrelated infant, and was not allowed to attend the proceedings. He was, however, represented at all times by counsel. He contends that the juvenile court violated his federal constitutional due process rights and his state statutory right to be notified about juvenile court proceedings and to be produced to attend those proceedings. He contends that his exclusion from the jurisdiction/disposition hearing was prejudicial.
We conclude that father’s contentions with respect to his absence from the jurisdiction/disposition hearing are not cognizable in this appeal because he did not appeal from the disposition order.

Defendant Jesse Meraz, Jr., who already had two strike priors, ditched a loaded revolver while running away from the police. He was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, as well as other offenses, and was sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Law to 36 years to life in prison.
Defendant appealed. We reversed his conviction on some counts, but we affirmed his conviction on others, including the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm. On remand, the trial court resentenced defendant pursuant to Proposition 36 to just eight years in prison.
That time, the People appealed. We held that defendant was not automatically entitled to be sentenced under Proposition 36; if he was entitled to resentencing under Proposition 36 at all (and it now appears that he probably is not), he had to file a petition. We reversed and remanded with directions to resentence defendant.

In 2008, in London, a battery in a handheld electronic gaming device started a fire. Previously, Planet Bingo, LLC (Planet Bingo) designed the device, had it manufactured by an independent contractor, and then shipped it to a distributor in the United Kingdom (UK). That distributor has now agreed to pay $2.6 million for the damages caused by the fire and has asserted a claim for this amount against Planet Bingo.
In this action, Planet Bingo is suing its liability insurer, the Burlington Insurance Company (Burlington). According to Planet Bingo, Burlington handled the claim for fire damages negligently and in bad faith, wrongfully failed to defend the claim, and wrongfully denied coverage for the claim. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings against Planet Bingo and in favor of Burlington, on the ground that the fire occurred outside the “coverage territory” as defined in the policy.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Michael Robert Blackburn, in two counts of committing lewd acts against his biological daughter, Doe 1. The same jury found defendant guilty in 10 additional counts of committing sex offenses against his stepdaughter, Doe 2: lewd acts in counts 3, 4, and 5 and aggregated sex offenses in counts 6 through 12, namely, forcible oral copulation in counts 6, 7, 8, and 9, forcible rape in counts 10 and 11, and forcible sodomy in count 12. The jury found true a “One Strike” law allegation that defendant committed a qualifying sex offense against more than one victim in the present case. Defendant was sentenced to 180 years to life, comprised of 12 consecutive 15-year-to-life terms. We find no merit to any of these claims and affirm the judgment in all respects.

The morning that David M. learned his wife, Sara M., was having a sexual relationship with defendant Timothy Kepley, David sent Kepley a text message saying he was going to tell Kepley's wife about the affair. David and Sara drove to Kepley's house, and David knocked on the door. Kepley retrieved a shotgun, approached David from around the side of his house, pointed the shotgun at David and cocked it, then said, "Get the fuck off my property or I'm going to blow your brains all over the sidewalk." Kepley repeated similar threats. David retreated and called 911.
Kepley was charged with assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)) and making a criminal threat (§ 422). Each count carried the allegation that Kepley personally used a deadly weapon when he committed the offense. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23).) A jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts, and found true the personal-use allegation.

A first amended information alleged that defendant Mark Ruben Mendibles committed the first degree murder of Hector Francisco Garcia (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a) & 189); that the murder was committed while defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang and was carried out to further the activities of the gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)); that the murder also was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with, a criminal street gang, with the intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. ((b)(1)(C)); and that defendant had two prior strikes (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) & 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and two prior convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). A jury found defendant guilty as charged and found the gang allegations true. The court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

A helicopter crash in Colombia on July 12, 2011, killed the pilot and passenger. The surviving heirs filed a wrongful death action against Robinson Helicopter Company, Inc., Honeywell International, Inc., and Rolls-Royce Corporation. Robinson Helicopter, Honeywell, and Rolls-Royce (collectively, cross-complainants) subsequently filed nearly identical cross-complaints against a Colombian entity and Roes 1-25. Each cross-complainant later designated petitioners Inversiones Papaluchi S.A.S. and Inversiones Protech S.A.S. (collectively, petitioners) as Roe cross-defendants.
Petitioners challenge the respondent court’s order denying their motion to quash service of summons and dismiss the cross-complaints. (Code Civ. Proc., §418.10, subd. (c).) An alternative writ was issued directing the respondent court to vacate its order, or to show cause before this court why relief sought in the petition should not be granted.

Defendant and appellant Michael Clayton Perkins (defendant) appeals from a judgment entered upon a plea of no contest to grand theft. Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. On November 30, 2017, we notified defendant of his counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file, within 30 days, his own brief or letter stating any grounds or argument he might wish to have considered. That time has elapsed, and defendant has submitted no brief or letter. We have reviewed the entire record, and finding no arguable issues that do not require a certificate of probable cause, we affirm the judgment.

In April 1994 Kevin Nigel Furr was convicted on one count of first degree burglary. Imposition of sentence was suspended, and Furr was placed on three years of probation on condition he serve nine months in county jail.
On April 20, 2017 Furr filed an application to have the felony conviction designated a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Pen. Code, § 1170.18). The trial court denied the application, finding the offense did not qualify as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. Furr filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the denial of his application.
We appointed counsel to represent Furr on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised. On December 20, 2017 we advised Furr he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. We have received no response.