CA Unpub Decisions

Mother and M.G. (Father) have three other children. (Father is not a party to this appeal.) The family has a dependency history concerning Marlena’s three siblings. The juvenile court took jurisdiction over the siblings on the basis of domestic violence between the parents and Mother’s untreated mental health issues, and the court terminated parental rights to the siblings in November 2020. Marlena was born in October 2020.
The present case began in March 2021. CFS received a referral alleging that the parents had a history of domestic violence. The reporting party was concerned that the parents were continuing to engage in domestic violence. Mother reportedly shook and yelled at Marlena often, and the parents fought over Mother’s treatment of the child.

Odero was born in Kenya in 1965 and came to the United States in 2001. On June 22, 2002, police responded to a domestic violence call to find Odero’s wife, D.O., with a laceration on her forehead. The police report stated that Odero and his wife were on the verge of divorcing, and she asked him to move out. He struck her, lacerating her forehead, and then got a knife from the kitchen and threatened to kill her. Odero was restrained by a family member, allowing D.O. to escape. Odero was arrested and charged with one felony count of domestic violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), one felony count of criminal threats (§ 422), and one felony count of assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).

The record in this case is limited. According to the register of actions, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on February 25, 2020. Wife filed her request for DVRO on August 3, 2020. The request for DVRO is not included in the record so it is not clear the reason(s) she sought the order. On August 18, 2020, Wife filed a declaration and a witness list, which is also not part of the record. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order.
The hearing on the permanent restraining order commenced on December 2, 2020. Wife testified. A witness, Martha M., testified on behalf of Wife. Wife’s testimony and Martha’s testimony have not been made part of the record on appeal. The matter was continued to December 23, 2020.
On December 23, 2020, the continued hearing on the permanent DVRO was held. Husband and two other witnesses testified on his behalf. Husband testified that he and Wife had been married for eight years.

The record in this case is limited. According to the register of actions, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on February 25, 2020. Wife filed her request for DVRO on August 3, 2020. The request for DVRO is not included in the record so it is not clear the reason(s) she sought the order. On August 18, 2020, Wife filed a declaration and a witness list, which is also not part of the record. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order.
The hearing on the permanent restraining order commenced on December 2, 2020. Wife testified. A witness, Martha M., testified on behalf of Wife. Wife’s testimony and Martha’s testimony have not been made part of the record on appeal. The matter was continued to December 23, 2020.
On December 23, 2020, the continued hearing on the permanent DVRO was held. Husband and two other witnesses testified on his behalf. Husband testified that he and Wife had been married for eight years.

During the afternoon of November 11, 2018, Richard R. parked his car next to a four-door Nissan Altima in a public parking lot. The Nissan’s rear windows were covered by sunshades that were not opaque, so Richard was able to see through them.
When Richard arrived, he noticed that there were people in the back seat of the Nissan. He noticed “[h]ead movement going up and down” near the “crotch area” of a seated man. Richard initially believed that a woman was performing oral sex on a man. Richard then exited his car and noticed “a little boy trying to climb into the front seat” from the back seat of the Nissan. The boy was the person Richard had seen moving his head up and down. The boy appeared to be Hispanic and eight to 10 years old, and he was wearing what Richard described as a blue and fluorescent green soccer uniform.
Richard later identified Flores as the man he saw that day, and John Doe as the boy he saw that day.

Clemons and Gillespie were in a dating relationship from 2006 to 2020. When they began their relationship, Clemons was 74 years old and Gillespie was 45 years old. In 2010, Clemons purchased a home in his own name on Dusk Drive in San Diego. According to Gillespie, Clemons purchased the home for her, and they had an understanding it would be her property. Clemons disputes this and contends the property is solely his.
Gillespie moved into the home and began operating a daycare center there. Her two daughters and a granddaughter also lived with her in the home.
In 2012, Clemons executed a grant deed transferring the property from himself as his sole and separate property to himself and Gillespie as joint tenants. Clemons asserts that Gillespie took advantage of their close relationship and fraudulently induced him into signing the deed by misrepresenting that it only allowed her to live in the house temporarily as a tenant.

In 2005, Earl Allen pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. The charge arose after he and three others engaged in a series of shootings that left one man dead. As the factual basis for his plea, Allen admitted he “was present, had knowledge of and aided and abetted the taking of the life of [the victim.]”
In 2019, Allen filed a petition for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which amended the “felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1 subd. (f).)

On March 24, 2021, A.S., then six years old, along with her two half siblings, were taken into custody by law enforcement when A.S.’s mother, A.T. (mother), and her boyfriend were found unresponsive and under the influence in their car, while the children were in their care.
On March 26, 2021, the Yolo County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition alleging failure to protect A.S. and her half siblings under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The petition included an allegation that A.S. was at risk in the care of father due to his failure to protect her from the conduct of mother.
On March 25, 2021, an Agency social worker spoke with father. Father informed the Agency that A.S. resided with him full time for the previous few months and had only been visiting mother for the past few weeks.

F. testified at trial that she and her husband M. had rented their residential property multiple times over the course of 30 years to defendant Douglas James Guy and his mother, most recently for a few months starting in 2016. During the most recent tenancy, F. and M. received complaints about defendant from the neighbors which caused them to evict defendant and his mother in May 2017. On the day of the eviction, defendant and his mother showed up unannounced at F.’s rental property, even though police had said they needed to make an appointment to retrieve their belongings. Defendant started yelling at F., so she called the police. Defendant grew so mad that he jumped over the gate, threatened to kill F. if she touched his belongings, pushed her, and tried to grab her phone. Defendant and his mother then left.
In October 2020, defendant called F. and left a voice message calling her names, saying she was “begging for it” and was “gonna burn in hell.”

The underlying facts of the case are irrelevant to the issue on appeal and we do not recite them.
In February 2020, the People charged defendant with felony theft of utility services (Pen Code, § 498—count 1), felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)—count 2), cultivation of more than six cannabis plants (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358, subd. (c)—count 3), and possession of cannabis for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, subd. (b)—count 4). Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Prior to the close of evidence, the court proposed instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 2375, the instruction for possession of more than 28.5 grams of cannabis, as a lesser included offense on counts 3 and 4. The court asked if there were any objections and defense counsel responded: “That’s fine. And then just so the record’s clear, I’m personally not requesting the lesser.
“THE COURT: Yeah. I have to give it as a matter of law. But we’ll note your objection.” The court in

On February 1, 2007, defendant pled no contest to first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and admitted the enhancement allegation that a principal in the crime was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)).
A. Plea and Sentence
The factual basis for defendant’s plea was as follows:
On November 21, 2005, “defendant . . . along with her codefendants Simona Saechao, Y[e]ng Yang, and Bee Vue went to the Gold Star motel. [¶] There was a plan for the four of them to commit a robbery on . . . Mai Vang and . . . Bee Lee. [¶] When they arrived at the motel, the victim, Mai Vang, was seated in a pick-up truck. [¶] Mr. Vue and Mr. Yang . . . approached the vehicle with guns. Mr. Vue . . . contact[ed] . . . the victim, Mai Vang, [and] demanded his wallet. [¶] When Mr. Vang said he did not have a wallet, Mr. Vue pulled Mr. Vang out of the car, at which time a struggle ensued over the gun. Mr. Vue shot the gun three times, killing the victim, Mr. Vang.

The parents have two children together: daughter born in 2013, and son born in 2014. In 2015, the juvenile court took dependency jurisdiction over the children, finding that mother left them with maternal grandmother without making an appropriate plan for their ongoing care, mother’s unmedicated bipolar disorder endangered the children, and father failed to protect the children from mother’s known mental health and emotional problems. During the pendency of the case, father failed to complete court-ordered programs. In December 2015, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and awarded primary physical custody of the children to mother.
By 2018, mother was living with her new boyfriend in a car and using drugs. Meanwhile, the children were splitting time between maternal grandmother’s home and paternal grandparents’ home, where father lived.
In 2019, mother gave birth to M.C. (mother’s boyfriend is M.C.’s father).

In 2000 Vernita acquired title to a house on Sylvan Street in Van Nuys, California. Vernita did not live in the house, nor did she pay any of the purchase price for the home or make payments on the home loan secured by a deed of trust on the property. Vernita had allowed the property to be taken in her name—and had presumably signed a promissory note and deed of trust encumbering the property to obtain a home loan—on behalf of her friend who had poor credit and could not qualify for a home loan herself. The friend lived in the house and initially made the payments on the home loan.
By the time Vernita and Anthony began dating, Vernita’s friend had ceased making payments on the home loan, and the lender had initiated foreclosure proceedings. Although the house had fallen into disrepair, Anthony told Vernita he could renovate it and they could live in it. Vernita agreed and borrowed money from her father to avoid foreclosure.

AnnaMarie Reynaud appeals a victim restitution order following her conviction of diversion of construction funds (Pen. Code, § 484b), a felony; obtaining services/money by false pretenses (§ 532, subd. (a)), a felony; and contracting without a license (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7028, subd. (a)), a misdemeanor.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, Reynaud pled guilty to various offenses, including diversion of construction funds, obtaining services by false pretenses, and contracting without a license. She also admitted that she diverted property of a value exceeding $200,000 and defrauded residential property owners.
Reynaud was placed on probation and ordered to pay restitution to her victims, Ron and Laura Dinning, who had paid Reynaud money to build a house for them. We conclude, among other things, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution in the amount of $2,598,917. We affirm.