CA Unpub Decisions

Eddis Davenport pleaded guilty in November 1997 to one felony count of fraudulent possession of a check or money order in violation of former Penal Code section 475a (now Penal Code section 475, subd. (c)). Pursuant to a negotiated agreement the trial court sentenced Davenport to a state prison term of two years.
On March 21, 2017 Davenport, representing himself, filed an application requesting that the felony conviction be designated a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Pen, Code, § 1170.18). The district attorney opposed the application on the ground the amount of loss exceeded $950.00. The trial court denied the application, finding the conviction did not qualify as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47.
Davenport filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the denial of his application.

D.W. and Arthur B., Sr. (Arthur Sr.), parents of infant Arthur B., Jr. (Arthur), appeal from the juvenile court findings declaring Arthur a dependent of the court pursuant to a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). D.W. and Arthur Sr. contend substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (a), that their son faced a substantial risk of serious physical harm from their violent altercations. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services moves to dismiss the appeal by D.W. and Arthur Sr. as not justiciable because D.W. and Arthur Sr. do not challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision (b), based on their history of domestic violence and substance abuse, or the court’s disposition order. Because we cannot grant D.W. and Arthur Sr. any effective relief, we dismiss the appeal.

In December 2016, the Los Angeles County District Attorney charged defendant Angelo Camacho (defendant) in a three-count information with kidnapping (count 1), injuring a spouse, cohabitant, fiancé, boyfriend, girlfriend, or child’s parent (count 2), and criminal threats (count 3). The information further alleged defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of count 2. The charges were predicated on evidence that defendant forced his ex-girlfriend, R.G., to accompany him to his residence by threatening to harm her family and, once there, repeatedly struck her in the face and head.
Pursuant to an agreement with the People, defendant pled no contest to the kidnapping and injuring a spouse or cohabitant charges in exchange for the prosecution’s agreement to dismiss the criminal threats charge and to recommend the court impose an eight-year sentence, execution of which would be suspended while defendant was placed on probation.

Gerber Aviles was sentenced to six months in county jail following his conviction of simple assault, a lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy or oral copulation. Aviles’s court-appointed appellate counsel notified this court pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 that she was unable to find any arguable issues to assert on appeal. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Simona Farrise (Simona), as trustee of the KSBLAND Trust (the Trust), and individually as a beneficiary of the Trust, appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendants and appellants Rosario Bacon Billingsley (Billingsley), Andrew Billingsley, and the Law Offices of Rosario Bacon Billingsley (collectively, defendants) after the trial court granted defendants’ special motion to strike, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, all of the causes of action asserted against them. We affirm the judgment.

Valentine Rutherford and Christine Rutherford appeal from judgment for US Lease Financing, Inc., and its sole shareholder Gary Holt (collectively Holt), after a court trial (1) on the Rutherfords’ complaint for slander of title and malicious prosecution and (2) on Holt’s cross-complaint against Valentine for breach of a promissory note.
The parties have a long history of litigation arising from hard money loans secured by deeds of trust. The Rutherfords contend they should have prevailed as a matter of law because (1) Holt acted with malice when he brought an action to quiet title to a lot when earlier litigation had established that he had no ownership interest in it; (2) Holt is barred from asserting any claim on the promissory note by the doctrine of res judicata because he could have litigated it in the quiet title action; and (3) the note was not supported by consideration.

Defendant and appellant Raymond Edward Padilla was found guilty by jury of six felonies. The offenses involved various lewd acts with four different minor girls, including his niece and three of his daughter’s friends. Defendant was sentenced to six consecutive 15-years-to-life sentences pursuant to the One Strike law (Pen. Code, § 667.61).
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte with lesser included offenses as to counts 2, 5 and 6. Alternatively, defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not request a lesser included instruction as to those counts. Defendant also raises two sentencing errors. Defendant contends the trial court erred in believing it lacked discretion to impose concurrent sentences as to four of the counts, and in denying him an award of presentence conduct credits.
Respondent contends the sentence imposed is unauthorized and requests remand for resentencing.
We affirm.

A “personal management agreement” between an entertainer and a management company provides that “[a]ny dispute hereunder shall be submitted to binding arbitration.” The issue presented in this appeal is whether the arbitration agreement applies to those portions of a civil complaint alleging that the entertainer committed various torts, including assault and battery, defamation, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These tort claims plainly are not covered by the arbitration agreement, as the trial court correctly ruled.

When you cancel an insurance policy during its term, you get a refund from your insurer of some of the premium you paid for the insurance. For example, if you cancel a one-year policy after six months, you might expect the insurance company to return 50 percent of the annual premium you paid. Or, if you cancel after three months, you might expect the insurance company to return 75 percent of your annual premium. You might think that whenever you cancel an insurance policy, you should get a pro rata or proportionate refund.
But, at least for the policies involved in this case, you would be wrong. Instead, you get something called a “short rate” return of the premium you paid, which is something less than a pro rata or proportionate refund. And that may be okay, if the insurer disclosed to you when you purchased the policy that if you cancel you get a short rate return of the premium and explained to you what a short rate is and how the insurer calculates it.

Defendant Arthur Eugene Lindsey was convicted by a jury of multiple sexual offenses, including rape and oral copulation of an unconscious person. The trial court sentenced Lindsey to 50 years to life plus an additional determinate term of 52 years and four months.
Lindsey contends the trial court erred by denying his post-verdict Marsden motion and argues the court’s instructional errors require reversal. In addition, Lindsey claims the trial court erred by finding that both of his prior Indiana convictions qualified as serious or violent felonies for purposes of the three strikes law. He also argues the court erred by imposing multiple serious felony enhancements on his determinate and indeterminate sentences. We find no Marsden or instructional error but agree the sentence was erroneous. Consequently, while we affirm the judgment of conviction, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

Christina C. (mother) is the mother of five-year-old Brody G. (Brody), who was taken into protective custody in June 2015. In December 2017, the juvenile court held an 18-month review hearing and found that the return of Brody to mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety, protection, or well-being within the meaning of section 366.22, subdivision (a)(1) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a permanency hearing under section 366.26. The permanency hearing is scheduled for February 22, 2018.
Mother filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the court’s order, arguing the juvenile court erred by finding the return of Brody to her would create a substantial risk of harm. She also contends the court should have extended reunification services for another six months under section 366.22, subdivision (b). She requested a temporary stay of the permanency hearing.

Appellant Gabriel Palladino challenges the trial court’s 85-day extension of a temporary domestic violence restraining order as an abuse of the court’s discretion. In response, his former spouse, Catherine Harris Palladino, filed a request for sanctions against Gabriel for having filed a frivolous appeal. The expiration of the temporary domestic violence restraining order has rendered Gabriel’s appeal moot. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. While we question the merits of Gabriel’s appeal, we deny Catherine’s motion for sanctions.

Defendant Andrew Phillip Kingsbury shot Juan Gonzalez in the neck. He was charged with attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). At trial, Kingsbury explained he fired his weapon in self-defense, but the jury found him guilty of attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a felon.
Kingsbury argues the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury on the law of self-defense, and his counsel provided ineffective assistance. Kingsbury also requests that his case be remanded for resentencing in light of recent legislation giving the trial court discretion to strike the firearm enhancement. We deny his request for resentencing and affirm.

After a multiple-day crime spree involving assaults with firearms, the unlawful taking of a vehicle, hostage taking, and the attempted murder of a sheriff’s deputy, defendant Tomas Orona was convicted by a jury of 10 felonies involving multiple victims. He raises four issues on appeal: was there insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted premeditated murder, did the trial court err in not instructing the jury on the effect of voluntary intoxication in deciding whether he acted with intent to kill and with deliberation and premeditation, did the trial court commit sentencing error in applying Penal Code section 654, and should the case be remanded in any event to allow the trial court to consider the application of newly enacted Senate Bill No. 620, which gives trial judges discretion in imposing sentencing enhancements for firearms. We remand the matter for further consideration of the two sentencing issues and otherwise affirm the judgment.