CA Unpub Decisions

On a dark, windy morning in March 2016, police found 25-year-old Johnathon Stanfield in the backyard of a house in Orange, crouching by the downstairs master bedroom French doors. He was wearing dark clothes and gloves. He was arrested on suspicion of attempted burglary.
His defense was that he was riding his bicycle back from his girlfriend’s house that morning when two thugs approached him and said they were going to take his bike. He panicked, threw his bicycle at them, and ran to hide. In his desperation he made his way to the backyard where he was found.
When police found Stanfield he had no burglary tools. In fact he had nothing with which to carry off any loot. Nor were his fingerprints found on the lever to the door of the master bedroom. Nevertheless, he was convicted of attempted burglary, and given probation.

Appellant Chance Randel Warnock appeals from the imposition of a sentence of 120 days in custody following an admission of violation of probation.
Appointed counsel for appellant asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to appellant advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from appellant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to appellant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the factual and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

Appellant Joseph Alfredo Mendoza contends the trial court failed to award him the correct number of presentence custody credits. As the People point out, this issue was not raised in the trial court either at the time of sentencing or any time thereafter. We dismiss the appeal as barred under Penal Code section 1237.1.

Defendant and appellant Abraham Dionicio Munoz tried to steal a vehicle from a car dealership. A jury convicted defendant of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), possessing a forged driver’s license to facilitate a forgery (§ 470b), attempted grand theft of a 2007 Cadillac (§§ 664, 487, subd. (d)(1)), and possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). Defendant appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing and to reduce his current offenses of second degree burglary, possessing a forged driver’s license to facilitate a forgery, and attempted grand theft of a vehicle to misdemeanors under the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). (§ 1170.18.) We find no error and affirm the order.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Jose Noel Saucedocuevas, of three counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (counts 1-3; Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)); one count of the attempted, premeditated murder of a police officer (count 4; §§ 664, 187); and one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle (count 5; § 246). In addition, the jury found true allegations defendant personally used a firearm in each of the offenses. (§§ 667, 12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 46 years four months to life.
After defense counsel filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent defendant.

In 2005, defendant and appellant Lynda Pichel was convicted of first degree murder and kidnapping. She was subsequently sentenced to a term of eight years, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life in state prison. In addition, defendant, along with her codefendants, was ordered to pay restitution of $7,500 to reimburse the Victim Compensation Board for funeral and burial expenses provided to the victim’s family pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f). In January 2017, defendant requested the trial court to modify her abstract of judgment to clarify the restitution liability imposed was joint and several, so that she would be credited for any payments made by her codefendants toward the total restitution. The trial court summarily denied defendant’s request on February 8, 2017. This appeal followed.

Defendant and appellant Eric Norman Olsen served a mere five years in prison after he admitted to committing lewd acts on children while working as a substitute teacher at elementary schools and pled no contest to six counts of lewd acts on a child. (Penal Code, § 288, subd. (a).) Defendant appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to vacate under section 1473.6. We affirm.

As Robert Wood was getting off a friend’s boat, which had pulled up to a concrete boat launching ramp at Lake Elsinore, Robert injured his leg as his foot landed in a submerged pothole. Robert Wood and Christina Wood (the Woods) filed a premises liability lawsuit against the City of Lake Elsinore (the City) and Roadrunner R.V. Park, LLC (Roadrunner).
The Woods appeal from judgment entered against them following an order granting Roadrunner’s motion for summary judgment (MSJ). The Woods contend Roadrunner failed to meet its initial burden of proving nonliability. The Woods further assert they provided sufficient evidence of the location of the dangerous condition, consisting of a pothole on the ramp. The Woods also argue that triable issues exist as to whether Roadrunner breached a duty to inspect and maintain the ramp, and whether Roadrunner was on notice of the existence of the dangerous condition.

The maternal grandparents of BW (Grandparents) appeal from a 2015 postjudgment order (2015 Order). The order denied their request for modification of a 2012 judgment (2012 Judgment) awarding joint legal and physical custody of BW to BW’s natural parents. Grandparents argue that the trial court erred in not transferring custody from BW’s parents to Grandparents, or to Grandparents and Mother jointly. BW had lived in Grandparents’ home since her birth in 2006 and Grandparents had been a stabilizing force in parenting BW throughout her life. The trial court concluded there had not been a significant change in circumstances to warrant modifying the custodial status as regards Grandparents. Grandparents also contend the trial court erred in diminishing their rights provided in the 2012 Judgment, rather than maintaining the status quo.
We reject Grandparents’ contentions and affirm the 2015 Order.

Plaintiff and appellant Cynthia Tenpas, a tenured faculty librarian and former college administrator, sued her employer, defendant and respondent Riverside Community College District (the District), for damages on two theories of retaliation for protected conduct. (Cal. Fair Employment & Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; Lab. Code, § 1102.5 [unlawful for employer to retaliate against employee for disclosing to superior/agency the employee's reasonable beliefs that unlawful conduct is occurring at workplace].) Tenpas sought to prove that her administrative position as an associate dean at one of the District's campuses was eliminated through an administrative reorganization that was actually carried out as a pretext for retaliating against her for taking medical leave for disability, or reporting a hostile workplace environment. (§ 12940, subds. (h), (m).)

In January 2012, defendant used a knife and caused traumatic injury to the father of her child. She pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court suspended execution of sentence and placed defendant on three years’ formal probation. After multiple probation violations, proceedings were suspended because of doubts about defendant’s competence to stand trial. In October 2016, she was found incompetent to stand trial. In April 2017, she was found to have regained her competence. Defendant then admitted violating probation.
The trial court denied reinstatement of probation and sentenced her to two years in state prison for her assault with a deadly weapon conviction. The trial court deemed the sentence served based on presentence custody credits.

On the evening of June 16, 2016, Wynn Chilton was sitting at a computer in the computer room of the housing complex where he lived. He looked through the glass wall of the room and saw another resident of the complex, defendant Dennis Watkins, pull a wooden planter box in the courtyard down onto the ground. There were four such wooden planters in the courtyard. Residents who liked to garden planted herbs and strawberries in the boxes and tended the plants. Chilton saw Watkins destroy one planter. Five to 10 minutes later, Chilton went into the courtyard and saw that two more planter boxes had been destroyed. Surveillance video showed Watkins pulling down and destroying one or more of the boxes. That same evening, Los Angeles Police Department patrol officer Marco Salas was driving his patrol car in the area. Watkins flagged Salas down. Watkins told Salas that another tenant in the apartment complex had been harassing him. Watkins wanted Salas to speak to the manager.

Frank Ultimo filed a breach of contract action alleging City Lights Financial Express had failed to pay him $35,000 in real estate sales commissions. After two years of litigation, the parties settled Ultimo’s claims for $25,000. The parties further agreed that Ultimo was the prevailing party, and was entitled to file a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717.
Ultimo subsequently filed a motion seeking approximately $260,000 in fees and costs. The trial court awarded Ultimo only $20,000, concluding that the amount of his request was unreasonable given the amount that had been involved in the underlying litigation. Ultimo appeals, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount of the fee award. We reverse.

This appeal arises out of long-running litigation between appellant Sargon Enterprises, Inc. (Sargon) and the University of Southern California (USC). Sargon prevailed in that litigation, and a judgment for damages of $433,000, plus attorney fees of $4 million, was entered in Sargon’s favor in 2007 and affirmed on appeal.
Meanwhile, in 2011, USC interpled the attorney fee award, naming as defendants Sargon, appellant American Equity Insurance Company (AEIC), and respondent Browne George Ross LLP (BGR), among others. At issue in the present appeal is the $440,469 interpleader judgment for AEIC, from which both Sargon and AEIC have appealed.