CA Unpub Decisions

This case comes to us following the successful demurrer without leave to amend of defendant Myers Power Products, Inc. (Myers). Plaintiff Blocka Construction, Inc. (Blocka) was the prime contractor on a public works construction project owned by the Department of Water Resources (DWR). Blocka entered into an agreement with Independent Electrical Supply (Independent) to supply electrical equipment. Independent, in turn, entered into an agreement with Myers to supply electrical equipment. Blocka filed this action after it tried and failed to get Myers to provide documentation that Blocka needed to get paid for change orders.

Katrina K., the mother of three-year-old M.F. (Minor), appeals from a series of juvenile court orders. We dismiss the appeal pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 843, 866, and In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.

Petitioner C.G. (Father), father of one-year-old P.G., seeks review by extraordinary writ, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, of the juvenile court’s orders terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Father contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) provided him with reasonable services. We shall deny the petition for extraordinary writ.

Following a no contest plea, defendant Genove Alvarado was convicted of felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) within 10 years of a prior felony DUI offense, felony driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or more within 10 years of a prior felony DUI offense, misdemeanor providing false identification information to a police officer, and misdemeanor driving on a license that had been suspended or revoked for a DUI conviction. Defendant also admitted enhancement allegations alleging that he had committed the present offenses with a blood-alcohol level of 0.15 percent or more.
Relying on two purported factual misstatements by the trial court at sentencing, defendant argues that the denial of probation constituted an abuse of discretion. We conclude defendant waived his right to object to any factual errors by failing to object to them in the court below and, further, that any such errors were not prejudicial. Accordingly, we affirm.

Patrick Daniel Cohen appeals from a judgment placing him on felony probation after a jury convicted him of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant and making criminal threats. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, 422.) He contends the trial court violated his rights under the confrontation clause by admitting into evidence the recording of a 911 call made by the victim, who was found to be unavailable and did not testify during the trial. Appellant also contends the trial court erred by imposing a $20 “security fee” that was duplicative of additional fees imposed under Penal Code section 1465.8. We agree the $20 fee must be stricken, but otherwise affirm.

Laura Amy Fearn appeals from an order reducing her child support award from Jimmy Le Vu, and an order denying her request that Vu pay for some of her attorney fees. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the orders challenged by Fearn. We therefore affirm.

Appellants James K. (father) and S.C. (mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s orders terminating their parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to their now 15-month-old son, James. After reviewing the juvenile court record, appellants’ court-appointed counsel informed this court they could find no arguable issues to raise on appellants’ behalf. This court granted appellants leave to personally file letters setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix).)
Appellants filed letters but failed to set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss their appeal.

Appellant C.G., a mentally disordered offender (MDO), previously was subject to an involuntary medication order. He contends substantial evidence does not support the superior court’s July 3, 2017 order that he be involuntarily medicated. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant Kevin Michael Westenberger pled no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm (count 1/Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and he admitted allegations that he had a prior strike within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm. However, during the review of the record we found certain errors in Westenberger’s abstract of judgment that we will direct the trial court to correct.

Appellant Rumaldo Andrew Carrillo was placed on probation after being found guilty of possession of marijuana for sale and cultivation of marijuana. He argues the electronic search condition imposed by the trial court as a condition of probation is unconstitutionally overbroad, and violates his constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. We reject his constitutional challenges because Carrillo failed to object to the condition in the trial court and thereby forfeited the right to argue on appeal the condition is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, we address and reject the contention on the merits.

Appellant Jedediah Richard Conelly stands convicted of second degree burglary, grand theft of personal property, receiving a stolen vehicle, unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, and petty theft. He contends his sentence for receiving a stolen vehicle must be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654 because it was part of one indivisible act of burglary. He also contends the abstract of judgment does not reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence. We reject both contentions and affirm.

The court adjudged appellant, Jacob K., a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after it sustained allegations in a wardship petition charging him with deterring an executive officer through force or violence (Pen. Code, § 69). On appeal, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the court’s true finding that he committed this offense. We affirm.

Defendant William Clifford Smith was convicted by jury trial of felony driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)). The trial court found true allegations that defendant had suffered four prior strike convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a) (d)). Defendant raised a Romero motion, requesting that the trial court exercise its discretion to dismiss three of the four prior strike conviction allegations pursuant to section 1385. The court denied the motion. The court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison on the felony count. On the misdemeanor count, the court gave defendant credit for time served.

In this matter, the People challenge the trial court’s decision to place defendant and real party in interest Hossain Sahlolbei (Dr. Sahlolbei) on probation, despite his presumptive ineligibility for probation as a result of his conviction. We have determined that the matter must be remanded for resentencing.