CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Mohammed Omar of possession and transportation for sale of khat, a controlled substance. He argues the trial court erred by admitting statements in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and he contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in closing argument. He also argues for reversal of the judgment because the record on appeal does not include documents reviewed in camera by the trial court under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). Finding no error and also no prejudice from the absent documents, we will affirm the judgment.

Sami Hayek was involved in a serious automobile accident while driving a borrowed vehicle with the permission of its owner. Settlements were reached in connection with the injuries suffered by other participants, and three insurers contributed to those settlements.
The vehicle owner’s primary automotive liability insurer, AIG Property Casualty Company (AIGPCC), contributed its entire $1 million policy limit, and the propriety of that contribution is not in dispute. This appeal arises out of a dispute between the other two insurers as to the order in which they were obligated to contribute to those settlements.
Plaintiff Mercury Insurance Company (Mercury), which issued an automotive liability policy to Sami, contributed its policy limit to each of the two settlements. However, Mercury reserved its right to seek reimbursement for its contributions from respondent Chartis Property Casualty Company (Chartis), and subsequently filed this lawsuit to recoup those payments.

In this dependency case, T.W. (mother) appeals from the May 31, 2017, juvenile court’s findings at the six-month review hearing that reasonable reunification services were provided and in failing to order that unsupervised visits commence. We affirm.

Appellant Shawn Beavers contends the trial court erred when it refused to conduct a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) after finding him not competent to stand trial pursuant to Penal Code section 1369. The People concede the error. We reverse the order committing Beavers to the state hospital for restoration of competency and remand with directions to conduct a Marsden hearing.

On August 13, 2015, in case No. F15902655, appellant Mariano Ruiz Perez pled no contest to receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen Code, § 496d, subd. (a)/count 1) and felony receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)/count 2) and admitted five prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). In case No. F15902931, Perez pled no contest to receiving a stolen vehicle (count 1) and unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)/count 2) and he admitted five prior prison term enhancements. Perez also admitted violating the terms of his postrelease community supervision (PRCS) in two unrelated cases.
On appeal, Perez contends his plea must be vacated because the trial court’s improper plea negotiations that promised leniency in exchange for his plea rendered the plea involuntary. We conclude this issue is not cognizable and dismiss Perez’s appeal.

A fire in an upstairs apartment caused injuries to several tenants—plaintiffs Agustin Leyva, Agustin Leyva, Jr., Melissa Vidal, and Jazmine Aurora Vidal—who sued their landlord—defendant Abel Garcia—for alleged negligence. It was undisputed that the heat source of the fire’s ignition was a gas wall heater in the upstairs apartment, but it was uncertain what actually caused the fire to ignite. One possibility was the heater malfunctioned; another was that plaintiffs placed combustible material too close to the heater. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground plaintiffs were unable to establish causation, an essential element of a negligence cause of action. In support of the motion, defendant provided expert opinions of two fire investigators. Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence in opposition to the motion.

Fred Gonzales appeals from his convictions for eight sex offenses against his three step-granddaughters, as well as his sentence of 502 years to life. He argues that his convictions must be reversed because the trial court erroneously admitted propensity evidence under Evidence Code sections 1108 and 352. He further argues that his sentence of 502 years to life must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing, because a sentence that exceeds human life expectancy, as his does, serves no valid penological purpose and is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. We reject both of these contentions.

Petitioner J.V. (father) previously filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (8.452), challenging the trial court’s jurisdictional finding as to his child, N.V. (the child) and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. We vacated the section 366.26 hearing; reversed the trial court’s finding that the child came within section 300, subdivision (b), with respect to father, and remanded the matter to the trial court to conduct a new disposition hearing with father as a nonoffending parent. At the new disposition hearing, father requested that the child be placed with his aunt. The court removed the child from father’s care and custody, denied father reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing.

F.C. (also known as F.M.; Father) and S.C. (Mother) appeal after the termination of their parental rights to Z.C. (Minor) at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Father had a violent criminal history. Mother, who had seven other children removed from her custody due to substance abuse, tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of Minor’s birth. Further, Father assaulted his sister, M.A. (Aunt) during the pending dependency proceedings. Father and Mother (Parents) were both denied reunification services. Parents participated in some services on their own and maintained visitation after the disposition hearing. The juvenile court denied their section 388 petitions requesting reunification services or return of Minor to their care without a hearing. The parental rights of Mother and Father were terminated at the section 366.26 hearing and Minor was freed for adoption.

Mother appeals orders which resulted in the termination of her parental rights over BA, her six-year-old daughter, and JA, her three-year-old son. She argues the trial court erred when it determined (i) the protections of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 do not apply to her children, (ii) she did not establish a change of circumstances to justify reinstating reunification services, and (iii) the parent-child relationship did not outweigh the benefits of adoption as to BA. Mother’s appeal of the trial court’s ICWA ruling presents the question: Does California Rule of Court, rule 5.484(c)(2) require social services departments to take affirmative steps “to secure tribal membership for a child if the child is eligible for membership in a given tribe,” even if the eligible child does not qualify as an “Indian child” as defined by statute? Because we conclude the answer is no and the department provided substantial evidence BA and JA, though eligible for membership.

San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department) removed K.E. (Minor) from her mother’s care in April 2012. This court addressed that removal in the case of In re A.H. (In re A.H. (July 16, 2013, E056869) [nonpub. opn.] [2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4973].) Minor was placed with her father, K.E. (Father). The Department removed Minor from Father’s care in May 2013. This court addressed Minor’s removal from Father’s care in the case of In re K.E. In June 2017, the juvenile court ordered Minor’s permanent plan be legal guardianship. Minor’s legal guardian is J.J., who is Minor’s adult half-sister. Father contends (1) he was not given proper notice of the January 20, 2017, postpermanency plan review hearing; (2) he was not given timely advisement of his right to petition for a writ following the January 20 hearing; and (3) the juvenile court erred by not granting his request for a continuance. We affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant and appellant Jamie Rozelle Harrison guilty of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, count 1), unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 3), and transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a), count 5). In a bifurcated hearing, a trial court found true the allegations that defendant had two prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and two prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that she had served one prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to a total term of 41 years four months to life in state prison.

In this case the Minor, J.L., was taken into protective custody in January 2016. A petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The Minor was removed from parental custody. Appellant Father was not located by the social worker until July 2017. Father made his first appearance in the case on September 12, 2017. By that time a permanency and planning hearing (§ 366.26) had been scheduled for October 31, 2017. Father's request for a continuance was denied. Following the section 366.26 hearing, the court terminated parental rights.

Michael Edward Ames appeals a judgment following his guilty plea to one count of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and his admission that he had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, & 668).