CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Josue David Tejada was convicted by jury in this domestic violence case of one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury; two counts of attempting to intimidate a witness; and three misdemeanor counts of violating a protective order. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it admitted evidence regarding two prior uncharged incidents of domestic violence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1109 (all undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code). He argues the court erred in admitting evidence regarding the first incident because it did not meet the statutory definition of domestic violence abuse. He contends the court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of the second incident because its prejudicial nature outweighed any minimal probative value and therefore should have been excluded under section 352.

Petitioner Steven J. LaSalvia (husband) and respondent Joan Falasco LaSalvia (wife) divorced after 34 years of marriage. Husband appeals from the judgment, challenging the court’s distribution of assets and award of permanent spousal support. Husband raised four major issues on appeal. Husband inherited significant ownership in Los Banos Abattoir (LBA), and became chief executive officer (CEO) of the company upon the death of his father in 1986. After a lengthy trial, including opinions from the parties’ respective expert witnesses, the trial court found that husband was undercompensated during the marriage by LBA in the amount of $912,000, and provided wife her community interest share of the undercompensated wages. Husband challenges the court’s finding that he was undercompensated.

On June 21, 2013, defendant Noel Mansilla shot and killed Adolfo Sandoval in Ceres, California. The primary dispute at trial was defendant’s mental state when he shot Sandoval.
On November 5, 2015, defendant was found guilty at the conclusion of a jury trial of first degree murder (Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a); count I) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count II). The jury found true allegations that defendant caused the victim’s death using a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations defendant had a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§ 667, subd. (d)) and had served a prior prison term qualifying him for a status enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

Raul Gonzalez appeals from his conviction for possession of methamphetamine for sale. He alleges the trial court erred in failing sua sponte to give an accomplice instruction and, further, erred in admitting text messages sent to him by people seeking to buy drugs. He also raises a claim of cumulative error. We conclude the trial court did not err in these respects, and, even assuming it did, the errors were harmless.
Gonzalez filed a supplemental brief after passage of Senate Bill 180, which amended Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 to abolish sentence enhancements predicated on prior convictions for various drug offenses. (Stats. 2017, ch. 677, § 1.) Gonzalez argues the amendment applies retroactively to his case, requiring us to strike the enhancement imposed by the trial court pursuant to former Health and Safety Code section 11370.2. The People concede the point, and we agree with the parties.

Defendant Tony Vasquez was charged with one count of first-degree murder; two counts of attempted murder; three counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle; two counts of illegal firearm possession; and one count of criminal threats. In connection with count 1, the information alleged the special circumstances of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle at a person outside said vehicle and carrying out the killing to further the activities of a criminal street gang (id., subd. (a)(22)).

The juvenile court terminated petitioner, W.P.’s (Mother), reunification services as to G.N. (born in September 2016), R.Y. (born in January 2009), M.M.M.1 (born in March 2005), and M.M.M.2 (born in May 2003) (collectively Minors) and set the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. In her petition, Mother contends the juvenile court erred as a matter of law in declining to grant her another six months of reunification services as to the elder three Minors. The petition is granted.

A jury convicted Nexsan Gowolo of unlawful taking and driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). He admitted two prison prior convictions, although one was ultimately stricken. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) The court denied probation and sentenced Gowolo to a split sentence in local custody pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B). Gowolo was sentenced to the upper term of three years plus one year for a prison prior. The sentence was to be served with 30 months in custody, followed by 18 months under mandatory supervision.
Gowolo appeals challenging only two of the conditions of mandatory supervision. Although Gowolo objected to two different conditions in the trial court, he did not object to the two conditions about which he currently complains. Gowolo now challenges that portion of a search waiver which includes computers and recordable electronic media.

Appellant David Alexander Culross contends his conviction for robbery must be reversed due to instructional error and prosecutorial misconduct. He also argues there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s true finding on a prior serious felony allegation. We reject appellant’s arguments and affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Mario Perez Lara, Jr. guilty of robbery (Pen. Code,
§ 211, count 1); burglary (§ 459, count 2); unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code,
§ 10851, subd. (a), count 3); and false imprisonment (§§ 236 & 237, subd. (a), count 4). The jury also found true the allegations that count 1 was committed in concert with others (§§ 212.5, subd. (a) & 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)); that count 2 involved an inhabited and occupied dwelling (§§ 460, subd. (a) & 667.5, subd. (c)(21)); and that counts 1, 2, and 4 were committed by defendant when he was vicariously armed (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
In a subsequent proceeding, defendant admitted he had suffered a prior conviction (i.e., vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated)). The court found the prior conviction qualified as a serious felony prior (§ 667, subd. (a)). At sentencing, the court struck defendant's strike prior and sentenced him to 12 years eight months in prison.

Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Susan Reese sued defendant and respondent Christopher Arnicar for personal injuries, after she was hit by a branch of a tree falling from his property. Arnicar cross-complained against a worker on his property that day, Stevin Delao and his sole proprietorship 4S Ranch Handyman, seeking equitable indemnity and other relief. The matter went to jury trial on those two pleadings, while Delao's own cross-complaint raising separate contractual indemnity issues was severed for later trial.
The jury returned a special verdict that found Reese had incurred $96,167 in economic damages and $245,000 in noneconomic damages. On comparative fault issues, the special verdict decided that Arnicar was 75 percent responsible for Reese's harm, while Delao, "as property manager associate for Russ Eskilson Real Estate," was 25 percent responsible for her injuries.

This appeal comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the orders from which the appeal is taken. We provide a brief description of the facts and procedural history. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On August 6, 2015, in case No. 15F4557, a complaint charged defendant Robert Vernon McRorie with grand theft of a backhoe (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)(1)—count 1), felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1)—count 2), and alleged five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

The People challenge the trial court’s award of presentence custody credits to defendant Billy Ray Valadez following his conviction for false imprisonment. Defendant concedes the issue. We will accept defendant’s concession and modify the judgment as to his presentence custody credits. As modified, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jack Lee Judlin appeals following convictions for inflicting bodily injury on a person with whom he had a dating relationship (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count I) and misdemeanor battery against a person with whom he had a dating relationship (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count II). In addition, the trial court found true defendant had served two prior prison terms and committed count II while out on bail. (§§ 12022.1, 667.5, subd. (b).) The court also found defendant’s December 2013 conviction for battery with serious bodily injury was a strike. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).)
On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that his 2013 conviction was a serious felony within the meaning of the three strikes law because the evidence failed to show a necessary element, i.e., that defendant personally inflicted the injuries sustained by the victim.

In People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 (Arbuckle), our Supreme Court held that as a “general principle,” a defendant who enters into a plea bargain is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea. (Id. at pp. 756-767; see also K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295 (K.R.).)
Defendant Andrew Malen Johnson appeals from the imposition of a state prison sentence originally imposed but suspended pursuant to a plea bargain, contending that under Arbuckle, the judge who presided over his last violation of probation (VOP) hearing should have been the one to sentence him. We affirm because defendant has not raised a true Arbuckle claim or shown any other grounds for error in his sentencing.