CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
Defendant Ethan Harper appeals his conviction by jury verdict of driving under the influence of alcohol, driving with a suspended license, and three additional counts, all arising from a single-car accident that left his car stuck in a ditch next to a highway. Harper’s sole contention is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to object to certain testimony and argument presented by the prosecutor.
We affirm. |
Defendant Larry Cheatham pleaded nolo contendere to a count of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, former spouse or former cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)). He was placed on probation for a term of one year. On appeal, defendant’s counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has declared that defendant was notified that an independent review under Wende was being requested. We advised defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. Thirty days have elapsed, and defendant has not submitted a letter brief. Pursuant to Wende, we have reviewed the entire record and have concluded that there are no arguable issues. We will provide “a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed.”
|
Defendant Johnny Melendez Cordova petitioned for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (enacted by Proposition 36), and the trial court denied him relief on the ground that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. A different panel of this court reversed, concluding the matter should be remanded for the trial court to apply the definition of unreasonable risk of danger contained in the Safe Neighborhood and Schools Act (enacted by Proposition 47 in 2014). (People v. Cordova (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 543, 547 (Premo, J., dissenting), review granted on August 31, 2016, S236179, and cause transferred to Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, with directions.) After granting review, the Supreme Court decided People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 356, which held that the Proposition 47 definition of unreasonable risk of danger does not apply to Proposition 36 resentencing proceedings.
|
Marjorie Page sued Mission Hospital for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Page was injured when Mission Hospital employees subdued her and shackled her to a gurney when a physician determined Page needed a psychiatric evaluation and treatment. The trial court sustained a demurrer to Page’s second amended complaint without leave to amend. We affirm. Page’s complaint was subject to the statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, which requires that an action arising out of an injury caused by the professional negligence of a healthcare provider be filed within three years of the date of the injury, or one year from the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably could have discovered the injury, whichever comes first. In this case, the one-year-from-discovery date occurred before the three-year-from-injury date, so that is the applicable statute of limitations.
|
Russell Eugene Dunbar appeals from his criminal conviction on 48 counts of embezzlement, forgery, and falsifying records. The prosecution presented evidence that Dunbar had, over a period of several years, diverted more than $5 million from his employer, Fields Piano, Inc., into his own bank account. The diversion was discovered several years after Dunbar had left his job at Fields Piano.
Dunbar challenged his conviction and sentencing on several grounds. He first claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not request a jury instruction on the claim of right defense. He also contended his prior felony conviction for insurance fraud was improperly allowed as impeachment after he chose to take the stand. Finally, he asserted that he should have received only one sentence for all the embezzlement counts and that the court abused its discretion by imposing a restitution fine of $10,000 without inquiring about his ability to pay. |
Appellant Veronica H. (mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to her now one-year-old daughter, Jasmine. After reviewing the juvenile court record, appellant’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. This court granted mother leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Mother filed a letter but failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal. |
Miguel Zaragosa (appellant) appeals from the judgment entered after he committed a violation of probation. Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that Penal Code section 654 barred the imposition of multiple punishment for his felony conviction of driving while having 0.08 percent or higher blood-alcohol and his misdemeanor conviction of driving when driving privilege suspended or revoked. Finding merit in appellant’s contention, which the People concede, we will modify the judgment to stay, pursuant to section 654, the sentence imposed for appellant’s conviction of driving when driving privilege suspended or revoked. In all other respects, we will affirm the judgment.
|
A jury convicted appellant Andrew Esteban Rodriguez of possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)/count 1). In a separate proceeding, Rodriguez admitted a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.
|
Suzanne Rivera competed in a bicycling race organized by Velo Promo, LLC (Velo Promo) and sponsored by respondent, USA Cycling, Inc. (USA Cycling). During the race, a support vehicle operated by Velo Promo stopped to assist a rider and parked the vehicle in the roadway. The support vehicle completely blocked the lane designated for the cyclists on a downhill, curved section of the course. Suzanne Rivera was killed when she crashed into the back of the support vehicle.
Suzanne Rivera’s heirs, appellants Donald Scott Rivera, Suzanne Rivera’s husband, and his minor children, Nicholas Rivera and Kate Rivera, filed the underlying wrongful death action against Velo Promo, USA Cycling, and Richard Ciccarelli, the driver of the support vehicle. Velo Promo and Ciccarelli moved for summary judgment based on primary assumption of risk. The trial court granted the motion finding that defendants were not grossly negligent. |
Suzanne Rivera (decedent) competed in the Mariposa Women’s Stage Race, a bicycling race coordinated and organized by respondents Velo Promo, LLC and USA Cycling, Inc. (USA Cycling). During the race, a support van operated by Velo Promo stopped to assist a rider and parked the vehicle in the lane of the road designated for the cyclists on a downhill, curved section of the course. As the support vehicle was stopped, a pack of riders from the next heat, including decedent, rounded the blind turn with only a few seconds to avoid the parked vehicle. Other riders in the pack avoided the vehicle by swerving into the opposite lane of the road, which was open to motor vehicle traffic traveling in the opposite direction. Decedent was not able to avoid the support vehicle, crashed and succumbed to her injuries. The heirs of decedent sued defendants Velo Promo, USA Cycling and Richard alleging a single cause of action for negligence.
|
Daniel O. (Father) filed a petition for extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) challenging an order of the dependency court terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. We deny the petition.
|
In this dependency appeal, D.T. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s order, made at the six-month review hearing, denying her unsupervised visitation with her daughter, Natalie W. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e).) She contends the court abused its discretion by basing its decision on an inference not supported by the evidence. We disagree and affirm.
|
W.W. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s order exercising jurisdiction over his son E.W. (born July 2013). The juvenile court sustained identical factual allegations of domestic violence in E.W.’s presence under both Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). On appeal, father concedes substantial evidence supported the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), but argues the same evidence is insufficient to satisfy section 300, subdivision (a). Because we can grant father no effective relief, we dismiss his appeal.
|
David Anthony Ortega appeals from the judgment entered following his guilty plea to one count of second–degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c), and his admission of a gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(c)). Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441 (Wende), raising no issues, and asked this court independently to review the record. Appellant filed a supplemental brief. He contends that: (1) the prosecution failed to disclose material information regarding anticipated trial testimony of a prosecutorial witness; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the trial court violated his constitutional rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments by denying a continuance, leaving appellant with “no choice but to go to trial with [an ineffective] lawyer.”
|
Actions
Category Stats
Regular: 77268
Last listing added: 06:28:2023