CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Darryl Glenn Brownlee, an African-American, of one count of making criminal threats under Penal Code section 422, but found untrue the weapon allegation—use of a knife—under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motion. Defendant also contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his criminal threats conviction in light of the untrue finding on the weapon allegation because defendant’s words were not sufficiently sustained and unequivocal.
Because we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the criminal threats conviction and the denial of the Batson/Wheeler motion was proper under the three-step analysis in People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158 (Gutierrez), we affirm.

Joshua Alexander Rodriguez pled no contest to one count of child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)), and admitted an allegation that he inflicted great bodily injury on a child under the age of five (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)). He admitted a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (d)(1)) and a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to 18 years in state prison: the middle term of four years on the child abuse conviction, doubled because of the prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)); a consecutive five years on the great bodily injury allegation; and another consecutive five years on the serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
Rodriguez filed a request for a certificate of probable cause (§ 1237.5), which the trial court granted. He contends counsel provided ineffective assistance at various stages of the proceedings. We affirm.

U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc. (USBI) and Charlene Spero appeal from an order denying a petition to compel arbitration. Because the record contains no evidence Serafin and Ernestina Loza, who speak and understand only Spanish, were prevented or precluded from obtaining a translation of or otherwise learning the contents of the contract they signed, we reverse.

Shelly Albert and Craig Albert, as Trustees of the Seymour Albert and Henrietta Albert Revocable Trust (the Trustees), appeal the July 15, 2016 judgment entered against them and in favor of respondent, Robert Dubin (Dubin), following the grant of Dubin’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm, determining that the Trustees lacked standing to sue to enforce the 1997 judgment entered in favor of their deceased parents.

Citizens for Open and Public Participation (COPP), an unincorporated association, filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint in the superior court challenging certain actions by the City of Montebello (the City) that enabled real party in interest Cook Hill Properties, LLC (Cook Hill) to pursue a residential development project (the project). The trial court denied the petition and entered judgment for the City and Cook Hill. COPP appealed.
COPP contends: (1) the court abused its discretion by striking portions of COPP’s opening brief in support of its petition; (2) the City violated the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.) (the Brown Act); and (3) the City’s approval of the project violated the Planning and Zoning Law (Gov. Code, § 65000 et seq.). We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment.

Leqwone Q. Russell and Anthony Meru Blue walked into a gas station convenience store at 2:20 in the morning and robbed the store. Both defendants were convicted after a jury trial. Russell and Blue argue the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for kidnapping to commit robbery. Blue also seeks resentencing in light of the recent passage of Senate Bill No. 620, which provides the trial court with discretion to impose or strike the firearm enhancement.

Appellant Jesse Alan Tucker was convicted of assault upon a police officer, resisting an executive officer, driving a stolen vehicle, and other crimes. He contends the judgment of conviction must be reversed for a new trial due to the improper exclusion of evidence; in addition, he contends there was sentencing error. We reject these contentions, with the exception of the sentencing error. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant and appellant Samuel Alonzo Simmons (defendant) appeals from his conviction of assault with a firearm. He contends that the gang enhancement must be reversed because the gang expert’s opinion was based on hearsay in violation of state law and the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant also contends that reversal and remand for sentencing is required because the trial court imposed unauthorized firearm and recidivist sentence enhancements, and the court should be allowed to exercise its discretion under the recent amendment to the firearm enhancement statutes. Defendant also requests the correction of clerical errors in the minutes and abstract of judgment. We find no hearsay error or confrontation violation, and no error in imposing a recidivist enhancement. We conclude that though the firearm enhancement was properly imposed, it must be stayed, but no reversal or remand for sentencing is required.

Jan Charles Biro appealed from a civil harassment restraining order in favor of Geoffrey R. Keyes, M.D. We affirm the court’s order.

A jury convicted defendant Armando Saucedo of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and found true allegations that he intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), & (d)) and that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)). He was sentenced to state prison for 40 years to life. He appeals from the judgment, contending: (1) the trial court erred in precluding his trial counsel from cross-examining a jail informant about compensation he received in other cases, and (2) that under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), the case must be remanded for defendant to make a record for a later youthful parole suitability hearing, and (3) the case should be remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion under newly-enacted section 12022.53, subdivision (h), whether to strike the 25-year-to-life enhancement imposed under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). We disagree with

Plaintiff and appellant Mauro Pazienti appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Paula J. Whiteman, M.D., an emergency room physician at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Cedars-Sinai), on his claim for medical negligence. Pazienti claims Dr. Whiteman negligently failed to diagnose and treat him for an impending heart attack while he was her patient in the emergency department. Because plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of material fact exist on the question of whether Dr. Whiteman breached the duty of care, and Dr. Whiteman failed to meet her initial burden of production to demonstrate the nonexistence of a material fact regarding proximate cause, we reverse.

Following a trial at which Centia Renee Martin represented herself and did not testify, a jury convicted Martin of first degree murder and found true an allegation she personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense. Martin argued the trial court erred by initially denying her request under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 to represent herself. Martin also contended the trial court violated her right to testify by denying her request to play a video recording of her post-arrest police interrogation in lieu of live direct testimony.

In this juvenile writ proceeding, Andrea A. (mother) seeks extraordinary relief from the juvenile court order terminating her reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 with respect to her young son, M.A. Although not a model of clarity, mother’s petition appears to challenge the juvenile court’s setting order on three separate grounds. Specifically, she asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s refusal to return M.A. to her physical custody at the contested 18-month review hearing. She further maintains that she was not provided with reasonable reunification services and that the juvenile court erred in refusing to grant her additional reunification services. Upon review, however, we see no reason to disturb the juvenile court’s setting order. We therefore affirm.

S.W. is the mother of T.W., born in May 2014, and M.T.1, born in May 2015. M.T. is the father of M.T.1. Mother and father separately appeal from orders (one as to each child), dated April 27, 2017, in which the juvenile court denied mother’s request, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, for a reinstatement of reunification services, and terminated parental rights, thereby freeing both children for adoption. Mother seeks reversal of the termination orders, arguing that the juvenile court should have granted her section 388 request for reinstatement of her reunification services. Father presents no substantive argument, but contends that if mother is successful on her appeal and the orders terminating her parental rights are reversed, then the orders terminating father’s parental rights must also be reversed. Having considered mother’s substantive argument and finding no error in the court’s denial of her section 388 request for reinstatement of reunification s