CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Antonio Torres pleaded guilty to felony forgery based on his possession of blank and unfinished checks (Pen. Code, § 475, subd. (b)). Defendant was placed on probation, and his probation was later terminated.
Defendant subsequently filed a petition with the trial court pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivision (f), which was enacted as part of Proposition 47, to have his felony conviction redesignated as a misdemeanor. He contended that, because the checks were blank and unfinished, the value of the checks were under $950. The trial court determined that defendant had not made a sufficient showing of value and denied the petition without prejudice to defendant refiling a petition with the facts necessary to establish a prima facie case of eligibility for relief.

Defendant Carlos Molina Ruiz was charged in a felony complaint with assault with intent to commit a felony (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and sexual battery (§§ 242, 243.4, subd. (a); count 2). The complaint also alleged various sentencing enhancements. Defendant pleaded no contest to both counts and admitted the special allegations. Prior to sentencing, the trial court permitted defendant to withdraw his no contest plea as to count 2 only, and he then pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to that count. On February 10, 2017, the court found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity to count 2. It sentenced defendant on the count 1 conviction to 25 years to life consecutive to five years, but stayed the sentence pursuant to section 1026.2, subdivision (m). The court committed defendant as to count 2 to the California Department of State Hospitals for a maximum term of 25 years to life consecutive to five years. (See §§ 1026, 1026.5.)

Respondent Jose A. Guzman, a construction laborer, was operating a compactor when he was injured. The compactor, which is used to pack down soil, hit a rock while Guzman was working on a hillside with a 45-degree slope. The compactor rose in the air, caused Guzman to fall backwards, and then fell on top of him. The workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) determined that Guzman sustained an injury to his back and psyche, and that the psychiatric injury was caused by a “sudden and extraordinary employment condition.” (Lab. Code, § 3208.3, subd, (d).) Petitioner State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF), the workers’ compensation carrier for Guzman’s employer, petitioned for reconsideration. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) denied reconsideration.
SCIF filed a petition for writ of review. SCIF contends that Guzman failed to meet his burden of proving that his psychiatric injury was caused by a “sudden and extraordinary employment condition.” (§ 3208.

Defendant Enrique Zendejas pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine for purposes of sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378 and admitted probation violations in three other cases. The trial court stayed imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years’ formal probation subject to various conditions, including that he “[a]bstain from the use/possession of controlled substances (without a valid prescription) or alcoholic beverages, and not be present or frequent any location where those substances are present, available, or being used.”

Aurora Shasby (age 59), a five-year employee at Amalfi Semiconductor, Inc. (Amalfi, or Company), was terminated in April 2011. She sued Amalfi for age discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; the FEHA). The court granted Amalfi’s motion for summary judgment, and Shasby appeals from the judgment entered on that order.
Shasby argues on appeal that although Amalfi claimed her termination was the result of her position being eliminated due to a reduction in force, this purported reason was a pretext: The true reason she was terminated was that the Company wanted to replace her with a newly hired 33-year-old woman. Shasby contends that she presented a triable issue of fact that she was terminated because of her age and that therefore the court erred in granting Amalfi’s summary judgment motion.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b) requires the trial court to award to a “prevailing party” as “a matter of right . . . costs in any action or proceeding.” Subdivision (a)(4) of section 1032 defines the term “‘prevailing party’” to include “a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered.” After plaintiffs dismissed their entire lawsuit, the trial court found defendants to be the prevailing parties and awarded them the costs they incurred in that action. We affirm the court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion to strike or tax costs.

Antonio Vincent Dixon was charged in an information with two counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). The information also alleged he suffered a prior “strike” conviction (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and served three prior terms in state prison. The jury convicted Dixon of the robbery charged in count 1 and acquitted Dixon of the robbery charged in count 2, but convicted him of petty theft (§§ 484, subd. (a), 488; a misdemeanor) and attempted robbery (§§ 664, subd. (a), 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) as lesser included offenses of the robbery charged in count 2. Dixon thereafter admitted the prior conviction and state prison allegations.

Following a trial, during which defendant Jose Antonio Jimenez testified, a jury found him guilty of petty theft (Pen. Code, §§ 484-488). He appeals from the ensuing judgment sentencing him to 180 days in jail, with credit for time served. Although he did not object below, defendant contends the prosecutor made improper statements about his two past felony convictions for vehicle theft and claims those statements inflamed the passion and prejudice of the jury against him. Understanding we may find he waived the issue based on his failure to object below, he alternatively argues his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s arguments. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Porfirio Moises Andalco of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); all statutory citations are to the Penal Code), dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), and misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). He argues the evidence was insufficient to support his robbery conviction because his use of force was not contemporaneous with the taking of the property. He asserts People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23 (Estes), which held a theft may become a robbery where force is used after the taking to retain or escape with the property (id. at p. 28), was wrongly decided. He also contends he reached a place of temporary safety before he employed force. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from a judgment finding appellant committed misdemeanor battery. His sole contention is that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on precharging delay. We find the motion was properly denied and affirm in all respects.

At a postpermanency plan review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3) in September 2017, the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing for January 22, 2018, to consider a permanent plan of legal guardianship for then 15-year-old Amber H., the daughter of petitioner J.T. (mother). Mother initiated extraordinary writ proceedings from the setting order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450-8.452.) Meanwhile, the court vacated the section 366.26 hearing on a motion by the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) as the foster parents decided against legal guardianship. We conclude the original writ proceedings are moot and dismiss mother’s petition.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Joseph A. Kalashian, Judge. (Retired judge of the Tulare County Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
John S. Dulcich, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Louis M. Vasquez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Appellant Daniel F. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to his now seven-year-old daughter, D.F. After reviewing the juvenile court record, father’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf. This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Father filed a letter but failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

Appellant Daniel F. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s orders denying his modification petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and selecting legal guardianship as the permanent plan (§ 366.26) for his now eight-year-old daughter, P.W. After reviewing the juvenile court record, father’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf. This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Father filed a letter but failed to establish a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists on the record. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.