CA Unpub Decisions

After pleading no contest to possession of a controlled substance for sale, the trial court imposed drug education program and crime lab fees, and attendant penalty assessments. Defendant Jesus Cruz Torres appeals the imposition of the penalty assessments, contending the drug education program and crime lab fees are not fines, and are not subject to penalty assessments. We affirm the judgment.

After foreclosure on three properties owned by members of the Alizadeh family, the Alizadehs and defendants Union Bank and Unionbancal Mortgage Corporation (collectively the Bank) entered into a settlement agreement under which plaintiff AZA Properties (AZA) would purchase the properties from the Bank. When that agreement was not consummated, AZA brought suit against the Bank, alleging the Bank prevented the closing of the transaction. AZA appeals from the judgment entered after the Bank’s successful motion for summary judgment. AZA contends the trial court erred in (1) sustaining the Bank’s objections to a declaration offered in opposition to the summary judgment motion, (2) denying a continuance, and (3) denying a motion for reconsideration. We find no error and affirm.

Appellant S. H., mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding and dispositional order adjudging the minor a dependent child of the court and bypassing her for reunification services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.) / On appeal, mother contends there was insufficient evidence of serious physical abuse or serious emotional damage, or the risk of either, for the minor to fall within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), or (c), or to bypass her for reunification services. We affirm.

In an ethnically diverse nation where the consideration of race in the enforcement of laws is tightly circumscribed by legal doctrine and policy directives, and where no one dare acknowledge even a trace of bias, transparency is a challenge, and difficulties abound in determining whether law enforcement actions on a particular occasion were impermissibly influenced by a suspect’s race. We consider here the rules that have evolved for the review of claims that law enforcement judgment was clouded by racial factors so that an ensuing criminal investigation and prosecution should be set aside. Because the prosecution is based largely on the outcome of a search of the minority defendant’s vehicle, we consider rules applicable to evaluating a claim of pretext in connection with a traffic stop and the resulting vehicle search as well as rules governing a defendant’s request for discovery of information that might assist in establishing pretext.

Juan C.R. (Father) challenges orders of the juvenile court terminating family reunification services and setting a permanent plan hearing regarding his minor child. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c).) We deny his petition for extraordinary writ.

David Vera signed an agreement with US Bankcard Services, Inc. for services relating to processing credit card transactions for Vera’s small businesses. US Bankcard itself did not provide credit card processing services; instead, another company, Elavon, Inc. provided those services. US Bankcard recruited merchants such as Vera who wanted credit card processing services, and sold Elavon’s services to those merchants.
In the context of the parties’ transaction, Vera signed a “Merchant Application,” which included a reference to Elavon’s “Terms of Service” located on the Elavon website. Vera was never provided a copy of the Terms of Service. In that document, there was an arbitration provision stating that all controversies were to be submitted to arbitration in Georgia and would be subject to Georgia law.

Nearly a decade ago, appellants Thomas and Toni Schultheis defaulted on an $8 million home loan secured by a deed of trust. They avoided foreclosure by declaring bankruptcy. They obtained a bankruptcy discharge in 2014 by promising to make partial loan payments and sell their house by 2016.
Appellants did not sell their house. Instead, they brought this lawsuit claiming that their loan and trust deed were improperly transferred among financial institutions. Respondents are the current lien holder and loan servicer, and the former trust deed beneficiary and foreclosure trustee.

Robert J. Albrecht (Albrecht) filed a request for elder abuse restraining order seeking protection for his 92-year-old mother, Ruth B. Albrecht (Ruth) from Joyce Pearson (Pearson). Although Albrecht signed the request both as Ruth’s attorney and as the “person filling out [the] request,” the court later appointed him as Ruth’s guardian ad litem. Two months after granting a temporary restraining order, the court denied the request for a permanent restraining order, and, finding Pearson to be the prevailing party, ordered Albrecht to pay Pearson’s attorney’s fees and costs. Albrecht contends, inter alia, that, because he appeared in the proceeding as Ruth’s guardian ad litem, the court had no authority to order him to pay fees and costs. We agree and reverse the order.

In an information filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, defendant and appellant Trajon Michael Thomas was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The information also alleged that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and that he had served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

Angel Santana appeals after a jury convicted him of two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder. Santana contends that the trial court: (1) erred by failing to give a curative instruction after the prosecutor misstated the law regarding provocation; (2) erred in admitting Facebook messages regarding a firearm transaction; (3) should have imposed a minimum parole eligibility term (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(5)) instead of a 10-year gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) on the murder counts; and (4) should have stricken the prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). We modify the judgment to correct sentencing errors, but otherwise affirm.

Angel Baudel Guerra appeals a judgment following his conviction for rape of an intoxicated woman (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(3) ), forcible rape (id., subd. (a)(2)), and rape of an unconscious woman (id., subd. (a)(4)). We conclude, among other things, that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on evidence the People introduced about an uncharged sexual offense. We affirm.

Maged L. Karas appeals the denial of his petition to recall and resentence. He argues that Proposition 47 applies to his felony conviction for second degree burglary of a vehicle. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 1170.18, subd. (f).) We conclude that vehicle burglary is not an offense reclassified as a misdemeanor by Proposition 47. We affirm.

Jonathan Ramirez appeals from his conviction for assault with intent to commit rape, arguing insufficient evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that he intended to rape his victim when he assaulted her. We affirm.

Taran Wilkerson was suspected of involvement in a large scale drug transaction. He fled from police officers resulting in a high speed chase during which his car flipped over and a pedestrian was killed. At his criminal trial, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of the drugs he was transporting and went on to focus his defense on a charge of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The jury acquitted him of that charge, but convicted him of gross vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(1)), evading an officer causing death (Veh. Code, § 2800.3, subd. (b)), two counts of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death (id., § 20001, subd. (a)), possessing cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), selling, transporting, or offering to sell cocaine (id., § 11352, subd. (a)), and three counts of hit-run driving (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)). The jury also found true special allegations that after committing the manslaughter appellant fled the scene of the cri