CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Christopher Charles Thyne stabbed Miguel Marquez several times one night outside a drug store. A jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187), and found true the allegations that he personally used a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant’s appellate arguments all relate to a single question the prosecutor asked during the direct examination of a police detective: “Does [‘chiva’ (a Spanish word for snitch)] come up a lot in gang cases?” Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to strike the question or to have the jury admonished, and that the trial court erred by denying his mistrial and new trial motions. For the reasons stated here, we will affirm the judgment.

This appeal presents challenges to several common probation conditions. Defendant Javier Rosales pleaded no contest to a charge of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), and was granted probation. He contends that three of the probation conditions imposed by the trial court are invalid: (1) an order that he stay 100 yards away from the victim, and the victim’s residence, vehicles, and place of employment; (2) a proscription on obtaining any new tattoos; and (3) a requirement that he obtain permission from his probation officer or the court before moving to a residence out of the county or leaving the state. Under the circumstances presented here, we find the challenged conditions comply with applicable legal standards. We will therefore affirm the judgment.

On February 6, 2011, defendant Norberto Serna and several other men broke into Gary Wise’s house, beat him, and robbed him of valuables stored in two safes. Following a police investigation, defendant and his accomplices were arrested. Serna was charged with 10 counts, including kidnapping to commit extortion (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (a)), kidnapping to commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)), and torture (§ 206). Serna, who was tried separately from his codefendants, was convicted by a jury of all 10 counts and was sentenced to a term in prison of life without the possibility of parole.

A jury convicted Jose Manuel Reyes-Toledo of criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a); all statutory citations are to the Penal Code), and felony vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)). Reyes-Toledo appealed, and his appointed counsel filed a brief under the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Reyes-Toledo did not file a supplemental brief. Because our review of the record discloses no arguable issues, we affirm the judgment.

A jury found Jesse Rodriguez guilty of several vehicle-related felonies after he drove recklessly while under the influence of marijuana and caused great bodily injury to another person. The trial court sentenced Rodriguez to five years’ formal probation. On appeal, Rodriguez maintains the trial court improperly prevented him from presenting a defense by limiting the scope of his expert’s testimony regarding how marijuana impairs driving. In addition, he states the court erroneously conditioned probation on the payment of several court fees. Finding merit in only the latter contention, we affirm but modify the judgment and remand to the trial court with directions.

A jury convicted Jackee Jamar Jeffries of one count of domestic battery with infliction of corporal injury (count 2, Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and one count of aggravated assault (count 4, Pen. Code, § 345, subd. (a)(1)) committed against W.D. As to count 2, the jury found true the allegation under Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) that Jeffries used a deadly and dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced Jeffries to the middle term of three years on count 2, a consecutive one year term on the deadly and dangerous weapon enhancement, and a concurrent three year term on count 4, execution of which was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.

Plaintiffs Jeff and Sandra Schwartz appeal from an order denying their motion to vacate the dismissal of their complaint. Plaintiffs argue the trial court had no discretion to deny their motion to set aside the dismissal order under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), because the motion met all the requirements for mandatory relief under that statute. They contend that because Jeff, an attorney who is representing himself and his wife in this case, filed a declaration under penalty of perjury stating his failure to appear for two successive hearings on an order to show cause regarding dismissal (OSC re: dismissal) was inadvertent, the court was required to grant them relief from the ensuing dismissal.

Appellant Shana C. (“Mother”) contends the trial court erred in concluding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply. (See Welf & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We disagree and affirm the order terminating her parental rights as to Sa.C., Si.C., and Cl.C.

A jury convicted appellant Rajwinder Singh Bassi of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1) and found true a personal use of a knife enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Respondent Brett Garvin became obsessed with the notion that he was having lustful thoughts that were in conflict with his religious beliefs. Through a series of confessions about his thoughts and feelings to his wife, appellant Elizabeth Garvin, he caused her to become persuaded he was dangerous to her and their children. They separated. Elizabeth obtained a temporary restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) and requested a permanent restraining order.

Defendant Rakime Lindel Jones was found guilty at the conclusion of a jury trial of first degree robbery in concert (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A); count 1), first degree burglary (§ 459; count 2), and dissuading a witness (§ 136.1; count 3). The jury found true an allegation in count 1 that defendant personally used a firearm pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b); and allegations in counts 2 and 3 that defendant personally used a firearm pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivision (a)(1). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted a prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subds. (a), (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of nine years, doubled to 18 years pursuant to the three strikes law, a consecutive term of 10 years for the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) gun use enhancement, and a consecutive term of five years for the section 667, s

Defendant and appellant Eduardo Garduno Bravo was charged by amended information with willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a), count 1), assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4), count 2), attempted kidnapping (§§ 664, 207, subd. (a), count 3), and false imprisonment (§ 236, count 4). The court subsequently dismissed count 3. A jury found defendant guilty on counts 1 and 4. It found him not guilty on count 2, but guilty of the lesser included offense of assault. (§ 240.) The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on formal probation for 36 months.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.

A jury found Flavio Ernesto Munoz guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1). In a separate proceeding, Munoz pleaded guilty to driving without a valid driver's license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count 2). The court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison for the second degree murder conviction and a concurrent determinate term of six months for the driving without a valid driver's license conviction.

Plaintiff and appellant Francisco Andrade appeals from a judgment of dismissal in favor of defendants and respondents Thomas Morrissey individually and as trustee of the Morrissey Family Trust, Laurie Morrissey, AM Contracting, Inc. and T. Morrissey Corporation (TMC), after the trial court sustained without leave to amend defendants' demurrer to Andrade's January 2016 complaint and ordered that complaint stricken on grounds Andrade had another action pending against the same defendants based on the same primary rights. Andrade contends the trial court erred in its ruling, as his two actions are based on distinct claims with differing primary rights: the first action asserting individual claims and the other asserting derivative claims seeking to recover on behalf of and for the benefit of TMC. Andrade further argues that if this court finds the claims to be identical, the proper order is not to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend, but to abate the second action until