CA Unpub Decisions

In 2006, David James Wieder entered into an agreement to acquire business assets from Andrew Lee. A portion of the purchase price was paid through a promissory note calling for monthly payments over a term of 11 years. In 2013, Wieder stopped making payments on the note and filed suit against Lee in Sonoma County Superior Court, alleging Lee had violated the agreement. Lee cross-complained, alleging default on the note and seeking acceleration of the remaining principal and interest due. A jury returned special verdicts finding neither party performed significant obligations required under their contract and denied relief to both parties. The trial court granted in part Lee’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), holding the amounts then outstanding on the note remained due.
Wieder appeals from the partial grant of Lee’s JNOV motion, and Lee cross-appeals, asserting errors in the admission of evidence against him at trial. We affirm in all respects.

C.R. (Minor) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court finding he made a criminal threat (Penal Code, § 422) and committed petty theft (§ 484, subd. (a)). At the time of the incident, Minor was 11 years old. On appeal, he makes three arguments. First, he contends there was insufficient evidence he made a criminal threat. Second, he argues the juvenile court’s section 26 finding—that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct—was “mistaken on the law.” Third, he contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s section 26 finding. We affirm.

Defendant Krystal Starr Evans appeals from her conviction of, among other things, felony conspiracy to commit forgery. Her sole contention on appeal is that her conspiracy conviction must be reversed because, pursuant to the provisions of Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014 (Proposition 47), the prosecution was limited to charging her with misdemeanor shoplifting. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Joshua W. Gilbert appeals from certain fee orders made by the trial court at sentencing upon placing him on probation. He contends that although his defense counsel properly objected, the trial court ordered him to pay two probation fees and a booking fee without first fulfilling the requirements that it determine whether or not he had the ability to pay these fees. The People argue defendant has forfeited his claim about the probation fees and that in any event the trial court made an implied finding that he was able to pay them, and that the booking fee was reasonable. We agree with defendant. We vacate the trial court’s orders regarding the challenged fees and remand this matter to the court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant Sergio Oliveros appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of 12 counts of oral copulation or digital penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)) and five counts of lewd or lascivious acts against a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a)). After defendant admitted as true allegations of prior convictions, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 517 years to life.
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of uncharged sexual offenses. He also asserts the court committed instructional error by incorrectly describing the burden of proof; alternatively, he claims ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to object to the challenged instruction. We affirm.

Plaintiff Waters Contracting, Inc. (Waters) appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of defendant Point Arena Joint Union High School District (the District) (Case No. A138573) and from a post-judgment order awarding attorney fees to the District (Case No. A139717). The judgment followed the trial court’s orders granting summary adjudication and later summary judgment in favor of the District. We conclude that the construction contract between the District and Waters was entered in disregard of the District’s prescribed method of contracting and, thus, is void, that Waters is not otherwise entitled to further compensation for work it performed on the underlying construction project, and that the attorney fees award was proper. Accordingly, we affirm both the judgment and the post-judgment attorney fees order.

J.M., the father of Ju. and Ja., appeals from an order terminating his parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He contends that the juvenile court erred when it found that the parental relationship exception did not apply. We find no error and affirm the order.

Defendant Mathew Lewis Virak appeals from a judgment after he pleaded no contest to lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), possessing, publishing, producing matter depicting a person under the age of 18 engaging in or simulating sexual conduct (§ 311.11, subd. (a)), and lewd or lascivious acts by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of bodily injury (§ 288, subd. (b)). Appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436 (Wende) on behalf of defendant. Defendant was notified of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf, but he has failed to avail himself of the opportunity. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Roberto Ramos of orally copulating a child. In this appeal, defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted his confession. Defendant contends that during the first part of a police interview he was subject to a custodial interrogation without the protections of Miranda. Defendant further contends that the police engaged in a deliberate two-step strategy designed to undermine the protections of Miranda. (Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 (Seibert).)
We disagree and affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from a judgment after a bench trial. According to the complaint, the underlying dispute arose out of the operation of a food court in a grocery store. Defendant Parviz Arefian owned defendant Paak Foods, Inc., which operated the food court in a grocery store owned by plaintiff Wholesome Choice Market, Inc. (Wholesome Choice). There was a dispute about money defendants owed, and the parties signed a settlement agreement setting forth a particular amount owed. Defendants failed to pay it. Wholesome Choice sued on the settlement agreement, and defendants cross-complained, arguing they signed the agreement under economic duress and that plaintiff had committed fraud. After a bench trial, the court adopted Wholesome Choice’s position and rejected Arefian’s claims and defenses. Arefian appealed.

During a fistfight, defendant Anthony Alfredo Stremple pulled out a knife and stabbed the victim multiple times in the chest and abdomen. On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction for attempted murder.
Defendant argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3472, which provides that a person has no right to self-defense if he or she provokes a fight intending to create a reason to use excessive force. The trial court fully and correctly instructed the jury regarding self-defense and imperfect self-defense. The prosecutor did not argue self-defense was unavailable to defendant as a defense, and there was no evidence that the victim used sudden and deadly force against defendant during the fight. There was no instructional error.

Appellant A.R. (mother) appeals from the orders of the juvenile court after a hearing terminating her parental rights to Faith K. (now two years old) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. At the hearing on April 11, 2017, the juvenile court denied mother’s motion to modify prior orders of the juvenile court pursuant to section 388 and found by clear and convincing evidence that Faith was adoptable. Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that Faith was likely to be adopted in a reasonable time. We disagree and affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

Defendant Robert Lewis Sorensen was convicted by a jury of sodomy with a child 10 years or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); count 1), oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child 10 years or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); count 2), and three counts of committing a lewd act on a child. (§ 288, subd. (a), counts 3-5). The trial court vacated defendant’s sentence on count 2. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term in state prison of 35 years to life.

V.Y. (father) is the father of K. (born in 2011), J. (born in 2012), and S. (born in 2015). The children came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) when it received a referral alleging that father was using and/or selling drugs. The juvenile court found that it had dependency jurisdiction based on the father’s history of drug use and domestic violence, along with the poor condition of his home and the fact that the children were missing school and not receiving development services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b). ) The court granted custody to K.L. (mother). Father appeals, contending: (1) the court failed to comply with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) by failing to recognize either Indiana or Pennsylvania as the only states with jurisdiction to alter the original custody order; and (2) there was insufficient evidence that the children were at risk for substantial physical harm. We affirm.