CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Joseph Anthony Miranda appeals from the trial court’s order revoking his parole. We reverse and remand with directions to hold a new hearing.

Steven Parker appeals his plea of guilty to all charges and allegations against him for an indicated sentence of 19 years. Parker admitted committing second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1) and grand theft (§ 487, subd. (d)(2); count 2). He also admitted committing both counts as a principal in a crime where another principal used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)) and for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and admitted committing count 1 as a principal while he and another principal were armed with firearms (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Finally, he admitted three prior prison convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) that was also a strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).

Hadeer Shamoun appeals from an order denying his application for restoration of sanity pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2. A criminal defendant, such as Shamoun, who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI defendant) may file an application for restoration of sanity if the defendant wishes to be released from governmental supervision. (Id., subd. (a).) In order for the defendant to establish that his sanity has been restored, the defendant must prove that he is "no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder." (Id., subd. (e).)

Howard Jerome Edwards appeals from an order of the superior court (1) denying Edwards's motion to dismiss or modify that part of his sentence in which he was ordered to pay $675,000 in victim restitution to LandSafe Title Company (LandSafe), and (2) amending a victim restitution order of $560,000 to Countrywide Home Loans (Countrywide) to require payment to Chicago Title Insurance Company (Chicago Title) following Countrywide's assignment of its victim restitution order to Chicago Title. Edwards contends that Penal Code section 1202.4 does not authorize either of these rulings. As we explain, because Edwards did not meet his burden of establishing that the trial court abused its discretion, we will affirm the trial court's order.

Edgar Lopez-Frausto (Lopez) appeals from two judgments entered after separate jury trials. In the first case (the Kidnap/Murder Case), the jury convicted Lopez of kidnapping Ricardo L. (Camaron) for ransom with the infliction of great bodily harm (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (a), count 5) and murdering Camaron. (§ 187, subd. (a), count 6). The jury returned true findings on the gang allegations and on the kidnapping, torture, and street gang special circumstances. The court declared a mistrial on four additional murder charges (counts 1 to 4) due to jury misconduct. The court sentenced Lopez to prison for two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole.

Appointed counsel for defendant Raoul Leyva asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

On January 10, 2017, defendant Juan Manuel Langerica Pena was charged with gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and vehicular manslaughter with an allegation that he fled the scene of the crime. He was also charged with driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury within 10 years of a prior DUI offense and driving with a 0.08 percent blood-alcohol content causing injury within 10 years of a prior DUI offense, including an allegation that he personally caused great bodily injury to the victim.

A jury found defendant Joshua McClain guilty of, inter alia, criminal threats. (Pen. Code, § 422.) On appeal, he contends that conviction was not, under the circumstances, supported by substantial evidence. We will affirm.

Respondent John Alfonso sought a restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 to restrain his neighbor, appellant Carol Moran, from harassing him. The trial court granted Alfonso’s petition, ordering Moran, among other things, not to harass or intimidate Alfonso.
Moran appeals the civil harassment restraining order, arguing insufficient evidence established the necessary elements under section 527.6. She contends no evidence showed Alfonso suffered “substantial” emotional distress. Alternatively, she argues even if Alfonso was personally distressed, no reasonable person would have suffered distress under the circumstances. Given that the record on appeal omits a reporter’s transcript, we are bound to presume sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s order. We affirm the civil harassment restraining order after hearing.

A jury found defendant Mark Allen Thompson guilty of burglary and two counts of robbery. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the special allegation that defendant had a prior foreign conviction that qualified as a strike under California’s three strikes law. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 22 years eight months in state prison.

Michael Dale Clark (Clark), a state prison inmate, sued the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, two of its Secretaries, and several employees (collectively, the Department). Clark alleged claims based on theories of negligence regarding his in-prison classification decisions, and breach of contract pertaining to his transfer from and return to California pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact (Compact) (see Pen. Code, § 11189). After venue was changed from Sacramento County to Lassen County--where Clark was housed--the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend.

This appeal has consumed nearly seven years of administrative and judicial resources in the pursuit of an untenable litigation position. Plaintiff Cal Fire Local 2881 (plaintiff) is an employee association that acts as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit of personnel in various classifications in the civil service who work throughout the state for appointing power Cal Fire (which is not a party to this case). Plaintiff appeals from the denial of its petition for a writ of mandate directing defendant Public Employment Relations Board (the PERB) to issue a complaint on the unfair labor practice charge that plaintiff filed with it against real party in interest State Personnel Board for failure to meet and confer with plaintiff over the changes the State Personnel Board effected in the regulations governing its procedures for adjudicating disciplinary hearings and appeals, which apply uniformly to all employees in the civil service.

Nicholas Harris, appellant appearing in pro. per., appeals from an order denying his request for a three-year restraining order that would have prohibited his ex-girlfriend and housemate from harassing him. Appellant has filed a 61-page opening brief that is rambling, irrelevant, and largely unintelligible. Unfamiliar with the principles of law governing the trial court’s ruling and the limited scope of appellate review, appellant does little more in his brief than express frustration with his ex-girlfriend, the trial court, and the Domestic Violence Protection Act.

Defendant Bobby Jan Phommachanh was convicted of multiple crimes following an incident in which he fired multiple gunshots in a bar thereby injuring two people. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court erred by instructing the jury with a “kill zone” instruction with respect to charges of attempted murder, (2) he cannot be convicted of multiple counts of shooting at an occupied building, (3) he should have been awarded more presentence custody credit, and (4) we must remand to the trial court to state the statutory authority for a $500 surcharge imposed. The People oppose some of defendant’s contentions, concede others, and request remand to the trial court for clarification of yet another aspect of sentencing. On rehearing, following our issuance of an opinion on remand, defendant additionally contends he is entitled to remand for resentencing to permit the trial court to exercise its newly acquired discretion to strike his firearm enhancement. The People argue that thoug