CA Unpub Decisions

Mary W. (mother) appeals from a finding of dependency jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 over her four minor children. Mother contends her past drug use and depression do not constitute a current risk of harm to any of the children, and therefore the court erred in sustaining the jurisdictional allegations against her. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant appeals from the denial of his application under Penal Code section 1170.18, which sought to reduce his felony convictions to misdemeanors.
In November 2005, defendant deposited via an ATM a counterfeit check in the amount of $24,981.82, purportedly drawn on a business, into a bank account in the name of Daniel DuBois. He appeared at the bank, the next day, and attempted to withdraw $24,000 from the account in a cashier’s check. He presented a fake driver’s license in the name of DuBois, and filled out a withdrawal slip in that name. The bank did not process the withdrawal. Instead, bank employees contacted police, who arrested defendant. There is a Daniel DuBois – the driver’s license is not his, he never had an account at the bank, and he does not know defendant.

Ulises Carcamo appeals from a judgment which sentences him to 50 years to life in prison for the first degree murder of Aniya Knee Parker. Carcamo contends there is insufficient evidence to prove he shot and killed Parker with premeditation or deliberation. Alternatively, he seeks remand for the opportunity to create a record of information to be considered at a future youth offender parole hearing for which he is newly eligible under recently amended Penal Code section 3051. He further seeks remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (h), which became effective on January 1, 2018. We remand for the limited purposes requested by Carcamo, but otherwise affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Christopher J. Gardner of forgery relating to a bill, note, or check exceeding $950 in value, in violation of Penal Code sections 476 and 473, subdivision (a); defendant subsequently admitted he suffered a prior conviction of a strike offense within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (d) and 1170.12, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to a total term of 32 months in state prison, and appeals from the judgment of conviction. We affirm.

Father V.O.N. appeals from the order declaring his two sons dependent children. He argues that the juvenile court deprived him of due process by denying his request to call his older son as a witness at the jurisdictional hearing. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the order.

Daniel Josue Ramirez was convicted by jury on one count of second degree murder. The jury also found true gun and gang allegations. Appellant contends his confrontation clause rights were violated under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). He also challenges the jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter and the failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication. Appellant also contends his sentence of 40 years to life violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm the conviction but remand for the trial court to hold a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), and for the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike the Penal Code section 12022.53 firearm enhancement under newly-enacted Senate Bill No. 620, which amended section 12022.53, subdivision (h).

M.B. (Mother), along with fathers G.P. and R.G., petition for extraordinary relief under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, asking us to set aside the juvenile court’s orders terminating family reunification services and scheduling a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and implementation of a permanent plan for the parties’ four children. Mother is the mother of three of the children, R.G.-B., E.G.-B., and G.P.-B. G.P. is the father of the two younger children, L.A. and G.P.-B. R.G. is the father of the two older children R.G. B. and E.G.-B. The parents contend that (1) substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s orders terminating reunification services, (2) substantial evidence does not support the court’s findings that reasonable services were offered, and (3) the court abused its discretion with respect to its visitation orders. We find the parents’ arguments unavailing and deny the

This writ arises from dependency proceedings involving siblings Z.M., a girl born in October 2015, and G.V., a girl born in September 2016. Z.M. and G.V. were removed from parental custody at different times, in part because of domestic violence between their presumed father, C.M. (Father), and their mother, T.P. (Mother), which had resulted in the removal of the parents’ older children from their custody. Following overlapping reunification periods, the court terminated reunification services to both parents and set a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.

A jury convicted Melvin Herrera of 57 counts of sexual assault against his stepdaughters—55 counts against Jane Doe 1 and two counts against her little sister, Jane Doe 2. The charges include 2 counts of lewd act on a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a) ), 32 counts of forcible lewd act on a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)), 22 counts of rape and forcible oral copulation of a child under 14 (§ 269, subd. (a)(1)), and a single count of lewd conduct with a child of 14 or 15 (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)). On appeal, Herrera challenges the admission at trial of expert testimony discussing child sexual assault accommodation syndrome (“accommodation syndrome”), and the jury instruction allowing the jury to consider this testimony in evaluating the girls’ credibility. He also challenges evidentiary rulings the court made during cross-examination of Jane Doe 1 that, he argues, effectively prevented him from eliciting her motive falsely to accuse him of molestation. Finally,

Defendant Antonio Maxfield appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of two counts of committing a lewd act upon Jane Doe 1, a child aged 14 or 15 years, in 2011 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1), counts one and two) and two counts of committing a lewd act upon Jane Doe 2, a child under the age of 14, in 2008 (§ 288, subd. (a), counts three and four). The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of six years for count three, a consecutive two-year term for count four, and consecutive eight-month terms for counts one and two, for a total term of nine years and four months. Defendant’s sole challenge on appeal is to the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for counts one and two.

At bottom, this litigation started life as a civil case. The merits of the original dispute have not been at issue for years. Nevertheless, the passage of years has done nothing to diminish the parties’ enduring animosity and tenacity in resisting each other. The latest visit to this court, as has been true for quite a time, involves the extended efforts by John J. Hartford to collect on a judgment against Elizabeth Karnazes, with whom he used to practice law. Evidence of the Dickensian history of this case is the register of actions, which comprises 147 pages, and is by itself a separate volume of clerk’s transcript. We have repeatedly referred the parties’ “ ‘campaigns of scorched earth litigation tactics.’ ” (Karnazes v. Hartford (June 27, 2014, A139421) [nonpub. opn.], quoting Karnazes v. Hartford (Feb. 10, 2014, A136400) [nonpub. opn].)

Appellant J.M., the father of Ju. M. and Ja. M., appeals from an order following a six-month review hearing. He contends that the juvenile court erred when it found that the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) had complied with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). The order is affirmed.

Mike, a self-represented litigant, contends on appeal that the court erred in denying his requests to modify spousal and child support and to reduce or eliminate support arrearages. He also challenges the court’s imposition of sanctions, its failure to order the Santa Clara County Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) to cease all collection efforts, and the court’s refusal to extend the stay of the suspension of Mike’s driver’s license.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mike’s requests to modify spousal and child support and to reduce or eliminate support arrearages. We also hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs as sanctions to Christina. We conclude further that the court did not err in denying Mike’s requested relief relative to the DCSS’s collection efforts and the stay of suspension of his driver’s license. Accordingly, we will affirm.

Defendant Morgan Charles Sippel pleaded no contest to second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) and prowling (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (i)). The trial court placed defendant on probation and ordered him to pay various fees and fines, including a $129.75 criminal justice administration fee (“booking fee”).
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of the booking fee, contending he lacked the ability to pay the fee and that there was no evidence of the actual cost of booking him into jail. Defendant also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on the ground that there was no evidence of the actual cost of his booking. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the order of probation.