CA Unpub Decisions

James R. Stout appeals from an order denying his request to modify his child support obligations. The trial court calculated the presumptively correct child support amount pursuant to the statewide uniform guideline formula set forth in Family Code section 4055. Although that amount was lower than James’s current child support obligation, the court determined special circumstances warranted deviating from the guideline amount and leaving in place the amount of the existing obligation.
Among the reasons given for the court’s decision was its concern that James had been inappropriately withdrawing and spending tens of thousands of dollars of his children’s money from custodial accounts which he managed as custodian. Specifically, James readily admitted to using his children’s custodial account money for expenses such as child support, spousal support, spousal support arrears, and attorney fees to litigate support issues.

This is an appeal after trial in a medical malpractice case. The only issue plaintiff Naomi Naeimeh Gilanshahi raises on appeal is whether there was informed consent for surgery. Unfortunately, due to an entirely inadequate record, there is simply no way for this court to evaluate plaintiff’s arguments. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Mother Miriam U. appeals from a May 25, 2017, juvenile court dependency order temporarily suspending visitation between her and her two youngest children, Luis U. and Kevin M. Mother contends the finding of detriment is not supported by substantial evidence and the corresponding order was therefore an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

Appointed counsel for appellant asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to appellant advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from appellant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to appellant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the factual and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

A jury convicted defendant Wilfredo Lara of two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, two counts of assault with a firearm, and discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle. It also was found true that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of each count and had a prior strike and serious felony conviction. Defendant appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
In our original opinion filed October 25, 2017, we corrected an error in the sentence and otherwise affirmed. On November 1, 2017, defendant filed a petition for rehearing, asking to address the application of Senate Bill No. 620 to his case. On November 9, 2017, this court vacated its opinion in this case and ordered briefing on whether Senate Bill No. 620 applied to defendant’s case.

The sole contention raised by defendant and appellant C.G. (Father) is that plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family Services (CFS) failed to provide accurate notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). CFS agrees with Father.

Defendant and appellant J.C. (mother) is the mother of A.L., D.L., and T.G. Defendant and appellant S.G. (father) is the father of T.G. Both mother and father (parents) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother’s sole contention is that notice pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) was insufficient. Father challenges the court’s finding that T.G. is generally adoptable. We reject father’s contention, but agree with mother’s. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In this dependency case, the juvenile court took jurisdiction over the minor, S.O., based on substance abuse and domestic violence by defendant and appellant, Sh.O. (father). Father appeals from the court’s orders terminating his parental rights and denying his petition to reinstate his reunification services. He based his petition on evidence that he had completed a 90-day drug treatment program and had been clean for several months. He contends the court erred in finding no “change of circumstance” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388, subd. (a)) and concluding that renewed reunification services were not in S.O.’s best interests. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Ignacio Vega, pled guilty to unlawful possession of marijuana for sales. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359; count 1.) Pursuant to the plea bargain, the court sentenced defendant to a 16-month split sentence, nine months in custody and seven months on mandatory supervision.
On appeal, defendant requests that this court independently examine the sealed affidavit in support of the search warrant, the search warrant, and the sealed in camera hearing on his motion to unseal the affidavit and warrant below to determine whether the court erred in not disclosing more of the affidavit to defense counsel. We have independently examined the affidavit and hold that the court properly redacted the portions of the affidavit relating to the confidential informant before releasing the affidavit to defense counsel below. As such, we hold the court properly determined that probable cause supported issuance of the search warrant.

This is an appeal in an ongoing marital dissolution action between Blas and Christina Rivera. The family court ordered Blas to pay pendente lite attorney fees of $60,000 to Christina and ordered her to pay $3,000 as sanctions under Family Code section 271. Blas contends the court erred in (1) denying him the right to cross-examine Christina at the hearing on these issues, and (2) imposing only $3,000 rather than $37,000 in sanctions, as he requested. We affirm.

Law enforcement officers attempted to stop appellant, Moises Delarosa, when he was riding a bicycle on the sidewalk within a gang injunction “safety zone.” Delarosa fled, and during a chase attempted to discard a loaded firearm. The officers recovered the firearm and arrested Delarosa.
A jury convicted him of two felonies, being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and being a prohibited person in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)). The jury found Delarosa had the firearm and ammunition for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and the trial court enhanced each felony sentence (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)), although it stayed the sentence and the enhancement for the ammunition charge under section 654. Overall, the court imposed a state prison sentence of four years four months.

A jury convicted appellant, Joshua Santino Estrada, of several counts of assault, criminal threats, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In one incident, Estrada confronted a neighbor by pointing a gun in his face and verbally threatening him. In another, Estrada confronted four men on the street with a gun and fired an errant shot at one before running off. The jury hung 11 to 1 in favor of conviction on an attempted murder charge. The jury found Estrada committed the assaults in the second incident and the gun-possession offense for the benefit of his gang, the predicate for a sentence enhancement.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Kendall Shawn Mosely, of first degree residential burglary, and the court sentenced him to a 13-year prison sentence. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a).) Defendant argues the court erred in refusing to give CALCRIM No. 315, relating to the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. We disagree and affirm. The parties did not truly dispute the accuracy of the eyewitness identifications placing defendant at the scene, and defendant argued he was merely “at the wrong place at the wrong time.” The trial turned on the credibility of an accomplice who declined to identify defendant. Under the facts of this case, CALCRIM No. 315 was not required.

Defendant Gina Castillo appeals from an order granting a motion to vacate a judgment entered in her favor and against plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company ("Deutsche Bank" or "the Bank"). The trial court entered the judgment after Deutsche Bank did not appear on the scheduled trial date because of its mistaken belief that the court had entered the voluntary dismissal of its action against Castillo when, in fact, the court clerk had rejected the request due to an error on the submitted form.
After discovering the judgment over a year and a half after it was entered, Deutsche Bank moved to vacate the judgment. The trial court found that the judgment was erroneously entered after Deutsche Bank's counsel's mistake deprived it of a fair hearing and that Deutsche Bank acted diligently to have the judgment set aside once it discovered the mistake. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to vacate the judgment.