CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiffs Vladimir Raicevic and Imelda Raicevic, individually and as trustees of their respective family trusts (together, the Raicevics), appeal an order denying their motion to add defendant Alan L. Geraci as a judgment debtor in their successful fraud action against defendants Stephen F. Lopez and the law firm of Geraci & Lopez, a general partnership (Partnership). In a prior appeal in this case, we reversed a previous order granting the Raicevics' motion to amend the judgment to add Geraci as a judgment debtor, concluding that the trial court misconstrued applicable law and did not exercise its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 187. We remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Raicevics' motion, made specific findings of fact in its statement of decision, and denied the motion to amend the judgment to add Geraci as a judgment debtor.

Anthony Duane Little pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). He also admitted to a prior conviction of possessing drugs for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2). Under the provisions of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B), the trial court sentenced Little to a split sentence of six years, with three years in county jail followed by three years of mandatory supervision.

In the present case (case No. SCD261604), Coleridge Bernard Stroud pleaded guilty to carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); count 1), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 2), robbery (§ 211; count 3), evading officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.2, subd. (a); count 4), and misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1); count 5). Stroud admitted the allegations that he committed the counts 1 through 4 felonies while released from custody on bail (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)) and he had suffered a prior felony conviction as well as two prior strike convictions under the "Three Strikes" law (§ 667 subds. (a); (b)-(i)). In exchange, the People dismissed the counts against Stroud in cases Nos. SCE348887 and SCD265623. The court sentenced Stroud to 38 years to life in state prison. Stroud contends the court abused its discretion by denying his motion to strike his prior strikes under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Alonzo Joseph asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment (order).

Two-year-old N.B.’s foot was severely burned after being left in the care of defendant Joseph Reginald Zeno, her mother’s boyfriend. A jury found defendant guilty of felony child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)), and also found true an attached allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily harm on a child under the age of five (id., § 12022.7, subd. (d)). Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of nine years in state prison consisting of the midterm of four years for the abuse offense and a consecutive midterm of five years for the personal infliction of great bodily injury enhancement.
On appeal defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of a prior uncharged domestic violence or abuse incident under Evidence Code section 1109.

Alexander Berry with receiving stolen property with a value exceeding $950 (count 1; Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a) [statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code]) and misdemeanor exhibiting a firearm (count 2; § 417, subd. (a)(2)).
On October 21, 2015, defendant entered pleas of no contest to both counts. According to the probation report, stipulated as the factual basis for his plea, on the night of September 19, 2015, police officers were sent to an apartment complex to respond to a report of a man brandishing a firearm. They found defendant with a woman who turned out to be his mother. After the two were taken into custody, defendant’s mother admitted defendant had been in possession of a firearm and directed the officers to where the firearm was hidden. The officers found a loaded .45 semiautomatic handgun, which turned out to be stolen.

This appeal having been taken from a nonappealable order is dismissed.

Defendant and appellant Henry Boger (Boger), in propria persona, appeals an order denying his motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by plaintiff and respondent Hollywood Sky Entertainment, Inc. (Sky).
As discussed below, Boger has not demonstrated any error in the trial court’s refusal to set aside the default judgment. Therefore, the order is affirmed.

This appeal involves a commercial property that was sold by cross-defendants Michael J. Hayden and Michele H. Wilson (the Haydens), as trustees of a trust, to defendant and cross-complainant Lin Ma DDS Inc. (DDS). The Haydens were represented in the transaction by their real estate agent, cross-defendant Christopher Larimore, and his brokerage, cross-defendant Lee & Associates Commercial Real Estate Services, Inc.—City of Industry (L&A; we will refer to Larimore and L&A collectively as the Brokers). DDS did not have an agent or broker; its principal, Dr. Lin Ma, handled the transaction on behalf of DDS.

In this bail forfeiture case, Accredited Surety & Casualty Company (Accredited) appeals from the trial court’s order denying relief from bail forfeiture and granting summary judgment on the amount of its bond, plus costs. Accredited contends that the judgment must be reversed because Accredited was entitled to relief from forfeiture under Penal Code section 1305, subdivisions (g) and (j). In the alternative, Accredited contends that it was entitled to an additional 13-day extension of time under section 1305.4 before summary judgment was appropriate. We conclude that Accredited failed to satisfy subdivision (g), that subdivision (j) is irrelevant as to whether subdivision (g) was satisfied, and that although the trial court’s rationale in denying an additional 13-day extension was incorrect, the ruling was correct on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant an extension. We therefore affirm.

This appeal involves the interpretation of an exception to the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ. Code, § 1954.50 et seq. (Costa-Hawkins)), a statute that, among other things, generally exempts condominiums from local rent control. The exemption, however, does not apply to apartments that have undergone condominium conversion until such time as the units have “been sold separately by the subdivider to a bona fide purchaser for value.” (§ 1954.52, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).) Here, in a single day, plaintiff Golden State Ventures, LLC purchased each of the four condominiums contained in a recently converted apartment building, utilizing four individual sales contracts. The building’s existing tenants were then subjected to a 125 percent rent increase.

This is an appeal from a trial court order granting a demurrer without leave to amend in favor of respondent Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (Kaiser Health Plan or Kaiser). The appellant was and is a self-represented litigant. Kaiser Health Plan is the lone defendant sued by appellant Richard Fee in the case. We have reviewed the record in the matter and agree with the decision of the trial court. We therefore affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Jason Soletti of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, three counts of custodial possession of a weapon, and one count of resisting an executive officer based on three separate incidents that occurred while Soletti was incarcerated at the Martinez Detention Facility. On appeal, he contends that the two assault convictions must be reversed, because (1) there was insufficient evidence he committed assault with an implement that qualified as a “deadly weapon” and (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of that term. We affirm.

A jury found David Alan Marchant guilty of three counts of attempted robbery, and four counts of robbery. The trial court sentenced Marchant as a third strike offender and applied various sentencing enhancements, resulting in a total sentence of 148 years to life in prison. Marchant appeals. First, Marchant contends the court violated his due process rights by admitting evidence of a pretrial identification that was “the product of an unreliable, unduly suggestive identification process.” Second, he argues there was insufficient evidence he was the person who attempted to rob Tan’s Donuts, or that he attempted to rob both persons inside the shop. Third, he contends there was insufficient evidence he robbed one of the two victims at a Shell gas station, and, with regard to the same charge, he contends the court should have instructed the jury that attempted robbery was a lesser included offense. Fourth, he argues the court was unaware of its discretion under the three strike