CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted appellant Marcus Charles Biddle of possession for sale of methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378, for which he was placed on three years formal probation, with 234 days to be served in county jail. Biddle appeals, challenging the admission of a confession he made to the police on grounds it was involuntary. He also requests that this court conduct an independent review of the trial court’s denial of his Pitchess motion following an in camera hearing. (See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).) We see no error in the admission of his confession but we find the record inadequate to conduct meaningful review of the court’s denial of the Pitchess motion and will conditionally reverse on that basis.

Defendants Joseph and Michele Alioto (the Aliotos) appeal from several orders entered in this unlawful detainer action and the judgment. We shall affirm the orders and the judgment.

Defendant Johnny Lee Hicks, after having been previously convicted of second degree robbery, was released from prison on parole in March 2015. After he failed to comply with an order that he report immediately to the Salinas parole office and participate in an outpatient drug treatment program, the court found defendant to have violated parole after a contested hearing on October 29, 2015. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed the order of the trial court. (People v. Hicks (Oct. 25, 2017, H043000) [nonpub. opn.] (Hicks I).)

In March 2015, the principal of Martin Murphy Middle School in Morgan Hill recommended that M.N. (then, a 13-year-old boy in the seventh grade) be expelled. The recommendation was based upon allegations that M.N. had committed sexual assault or sexual battery upon a 13-year-old female student on multiple occasions while the two of them were riding on a School bus. An administrative panel of the Morgan Hill Unified School District conducted an evidentiary hearing and recommended that M.N. be expelled from the District for one calendar year, finding that he had committed or attempted to commit sexual assault or committed sexual battery, and also committed sexual harassment. The District’s Governing Board (Board) adopted the panel’s recommendation. M.N.’s administrative appeal to the Santa Clara County Board of Education (County Board) was denied.

Plaintiff and appellant Erlend M. Olson (plaintiff) filed an action against defendants and respondents Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Roger Grad, and Mark Ziemba (collectively Snell) for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent transfer, and conversion allegedly committed by plaintiff’s estranged wife, Jana Olson (Olson). Snell demurred to the aiding and abetting causes of action on the ground they were barred by the statute of limitations and also failed to state a cause of action. The court sustained Snell’s demurrer without leave to amend on the former ground and did not rule on the latter argument. Plaintiff appeals, arguing neither Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d) (section 338(d)) nor Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a) (section 340.6(a)), on which the court relied, is the applicable statute of limitations.

Defendant Jose Loreto Campuzano-Garcia appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of committing the offenses of continuous sexual abuse, assault of a minor with the intent to commit a sexual offense, and lewd act upon a child. Defendant contends on appeal the unanimity instruction created ambiguity. We reject defendant’s contention and affirm.

Defendant Jose Sotero Gonzalez was convicted of 10 counts relating to sexual assault of an eight-year-old girl, A.L. He challenges three of the counts under Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) on the basis of lack of evidence of specific intent. He also asserts that the sentences imposed for another three counts should have been stayed pursuant to section 654. And he wants the abstract of judgment corrected to reflect the fact that the court imposed only one $1,000 victim restitution fine on him, not two.
The Attorney General does not dispute Gonzalez’s position regarding the application of section 654 to the three counts he has identified for this appeal. The Attorney General also does not dispute that the court imposed only one victim restitution fine. The only disputed issue on appeal is, therefore, the sufficiency of the evidence of specific intent for three of his convictions under section 288, subdivision (a).

Following minor Emmanuel R.’s admission he violated Health and Safety Code section 11364, subdivision (a), by possessing a methamphetamine pipe, the juvenile court declared him a ward, placed him on supervised probation, and released him to his parents. Minor challenges the court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence which occurred before minor’s admission. He also claims the court wrongfully imposed a maximum term of confinement. The court did not err in denying minor’s motion, and did not impose a maximum term of confinement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The trial court denied the motion of defendant United States Fire Insurance Company (Appellant) to vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail under Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (f) (section 1305(f)). As a consequence, summary judgment against Appellant was entered pursuant to Penal Code section 1306, subdivision (a). Nearly six months later, Appellant brought a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)), to set aside the summary judgment. After the trial court denied the section 473(b) motion, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from both the summary judgment and the postjudgment order denying the section 473(b) motion.
We conclude the notice of appeal was not timely as to the summary judgment and therefore dismiss that portion of the appeal. We also conclude the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s motion under section 473(b) to set aside the summary judgment and therefore affirm the postjudgment order.

Telonious Lamar Taylor was convicted of eight counts (counts 2 through 8, and 12) involving human trafficking, pimping, pandering, false imprisonment and criminal threats directed at Jane Doe and L.C. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison, principally based on count 5 (human trafficking of L.C.). However, this appeal is only concerned with the human trafficking count 5, and counts 8 (criminal threat made to L.C.) and 12 (assault against L.C. likely to produce great bodily injury). Taylor makes no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but asks us to review, in-camera, confidential sealed psychiatric records concerning the prosecution’s main witness, L.C., to determine whether the trial court’s refusal to disclose those records to the defense at trial may have violated any of Taylor’s constitutional rights. He also asserts that counts 8 and 12 should not run concurrently with his 15-year sentence on count 5, but should be stayed under section 654.

The court revoked probation and imposed a state prison term for defendant, Joe Raymond Rios, following a hearing at which a transcript of defendant’s preliminary hearing in another case was admitted into evidence. Defendant’s trial counsel failed to object. On appeal defendant argues the preliminary hearing transcript was inadmissible, because he was deprived of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We agree, but conclude the error was harmless. Alternatively, defendant argues his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We need not reach the issue because we exercise our discretion to decide the constitutional challenge even though defendant forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm.

The court adjudged appellant Alberto F. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after appellant admitted allegations charging him with misdemeanor vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1) and felony evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 2). On appeal, appellant challenges two of his conditions of probation. We find partial merit to appellant’s contentions, modify the judgment accordingly, and affirm as modified.

Appellant Suzanne Lowe, a registered nurse at a women’s correctional facility, applied for industrial disability retirement from California’s Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) in 2007. The application was rejected and Lowe filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in superior court. After the superior court denied her petition, Lowe filed this appeal, contending the court (1) failed to conduct a truly independent review of the evidence in the administrative record and (2) failed to consider doctor reports relating to her workers’ compensation case. The superior court correctly identified the applicable standard of review, which required the court to exercise its independent judgment as to the weight of the evidence. The court’s written decision demonstrated the court applied this standard when it examined the evidence in the administrative record and made its own factual findings, including credibility findings about the various doctor reports.

L.N. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order at the six-month review hearing. She argues there was insufficient evidence to support the findings (1) she received reasonable reunification services as to her teenage daughter, T.N., and (2) the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply.
The juvenile court removed T.N. from mother based on mother’s addiction to prescription pain killers and mental health issues. Early in the case, mother told the social worker she was a carrier of MRSA, a bacterial infection that is highly contagious and difficult to treat. Based on her representation, the court ordered mother to obtain medical clearance before visiting her daughter or beginning services. Over the next seven months, mother repeatedly promised clearance was forthcoming while simultaneously showing no interest in visitation or services.