CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant, M.M., was declared a ward of the juvenile court and placed on formal probation, following her admission that she committed a battery on school grounds. (Pen. Code, § 243.2, subd. (a)(1).) We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Gilbert David Martinez, of driving or taking a vehicle without consent and receiving stolen property with a value not exceeding $950, specifically toys, video games, and computer equipment. The jury additionally found true an allegation that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction. The court found true an allegation defendant committed the offense while he was out on bail. (Pen. Code, § 12022.1.) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of six years of incarceration.
On appeal, defendant contends the court committed structural error in denying defense counsel’s request for a continuance after the People turned over fingerprint evidence to the defense after the jury had been sworn. We affirm.

Lamond Nathan was charged with assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1) and battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (b); count 2). The information alleged Nathan personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) with respect to both counts and that Nathan was previously convicted of two serious prior felonies. Nathan pleaded not guilty, denying all the allegations against him. The matter proceeded to trial and the jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts and found both enhancement allegations under section 12022.7, subdivision (a) true. Nathan waived his right to a jury trial on the allegations under section 667 and admitted they were true.

After the Planning Commission of the City of San Diego (Planning Commission) approved the project, the local community planning board, Peninsula Community Planning Board (PCPB), appealed to the City Council of San Diego (City Council). The City Council granted the appeal and overturned the Planning Commission's decision. The superior court denied the property owner, Mark Peeling, mandamus relief and entered summary judgment in favor of the City of San Diego (City) and former Councilmember Ed Harris on Peeling's inverse condemnation claim.
On appeal, Peeling contends (1) PCPB did not have standing to appeal approval of the project to the City Council, (2) the hearing before the City Council was untimely, and (3) the court should not have granted summary judgment because the inverse condemnation cause of action is ripe for judicial review. We disagree with each of these contentions and affirm the judgment.

In a litigation malpractice action, a plaintiff establishes causation by showing that "but for the alleged malpractice, it is more likely than not that the plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result." Proving causation in such cases has been likened to a trial within a trial, or case within a case, in which the trier of fact determines how the underlying proceeding would have been resolved had the attorney met the standard of care. (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 820, 832-833 (Mattco Forge).) This method of proving causation applies not only in attorney malpractice cases, but also in analogous cases against nonlawyer "litigation support professionals." (Id. at pp. 834-835.)
This appeal does not arise from a legal malpractice case, but it involves analogous facts. The trial court characterized this as a "collection agent malpractice" case.

While he was serving a jail term, defendant Lawrence Carl Studyvin, Jr., pleaded guilty to vehicle theft with a prior (Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a); statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated), with the understanding that an additional year (one-third the middle term for that offense) would be added to his existing sentence. At sentencing, however, the trial court restructured defendant’s sentence resulting in a sentence of seven years and four months. On appeal, defendant contends the sentence exceeded the terms of the plea bargain. The People concede the error, and we agree.

Father of the minors appeals the juvenile court’s order adjudging the minors dependents of the juvenile court and removing them from parental custody. Father contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional finding that the minors were at risk of serious physical harm. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b).) He further contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing the minors from his custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Finding no error, we affirm.

Jonathan S. La Pointe, Father, appeals from a court order declining to exercise jurisdiction over this matter under the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and ceding jurisdiction to Johnson County, Kansas. Father contends the trial court found California an inconvenient forum without considering or weighing all the factors under Family Code section 3427, and erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction because California continues to have jurisdiction under section 3422.
As a preliminary matter, on this record, we conclude Father’s appeal is timely. On the merits, we conclude the trial court considered and weighed all the factors under section 3427. We also conclude section 3422 does not apply to this case. We affirm the orders of the trial court.

Defendant Christopher Terzo challenges the trial court’s order for victim restitution. Finding an error in the trial court’s calculation of interest, we shall modify the judgment to correct the amount of victim restitution. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Rawls Justin Amores appeals after pleading guilty to possession of methamphetamine while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)).
A police officer stopped Amores for a seatbelt violation. During the stop another officer saw a firearm on the floor of Amores’s vehicle. It was loaded. A subsequent search revealed methamphetamine in one of Amores’s jacket pockets.

Father, Desmond T., appeals from the juvenile court’s exit order granting sole legal and physical custody of his son L.T. (L.) to the child’s mother, Julie W. and awarding father monitored visitation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 364.) Father contends that the portion of the order requiring that his visits be supervised, either by a monitor approved by mother or by a paid professional, effectively and improperly gave mother veto power over father’s visits. We conclude that father has not demonstrated that the visitation portion of the exit order was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the order.

The question before us is whether petitioner Kareem Jamal Brown is entitled to habeas corpus relief based on his claim that the evidence is insufficient to support a felony-murder special circumstance finding in light of the California Supreme Court’s rulings in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 609-623 (Clark).
On April 11, 1996, a jury convicted Brown of first degree felony murder for aiding and abetting the attempted robbery of the Chino Valley Bank, during which codefendant Bobby White shot and killed Theresa Hernandez, a teller at the bank. Brown was waiting outside the bank with the getaway cars when the attempted robbery and shooting occurred. There was no evidence from which the jury could find Brown intended to kill Hernandez. Brown was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

Carlos David Noriega was sentenced as a second-strike offender to six years in state prison after he was convicted by a jury of firearm-possession offenses. He filed a timely notice of appeal. His court-appointed appellate counsel notified this court pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 he was unable to find any arguable issues to assert on appeal. We affirm the convictions.

Kenneth and Phyllis Tierstein brought a bad faith action against their insurance company, Mercury Casualty Company (Mercury), for its failure to defend them against a cross-complaint brought by their neighbors. The trial court granted Mercury’s motion for summary judgment on the ground it had no duty to defend under the terms of the policy. We affirm.