CA Unpub Decisions

A court convicted defendant Marcel Drake Johnson of human trafficking of a minor with intent to pimp and pander, posing a minor for photos involving sexual content, and 12 counts of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child under the age of 14 years. The court sentenced defendant to state prison for an aggregate term of 28 years, that is, the midterm of eight years for count 9 (human trafficking), consecutive one-third the midterm or two years each for counts 2, 3, 6, 8, and 14 through 19 (lewd and lascivious), and concurrent six-year terms for counts 5 and 7 (lewd and lascivious). The court stayed sentence (§ 654) on count 10 (posing minor for photos). Defendant appeals. He contends (1) insufficient evidence supports his conviction on certain child molestation counts or (2) section 654 required the court to stay sentence on such counts. We will remand to the trial court and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Paul A. Bridges appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for default judgment and its order dismissing the action with prejudice. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 581d, 585.) We affirm.

Defendant Paul A. Bridges appeals an order of the superior court granting a Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) restraining order. (Fam. Code, §§ 6200, 6300.) The trial court authorized Bridges, a state prisoner, to make a telephone appearance for an 8:30 a.m. hearing. The hearing took place at 10:05 a.m., and the court proceeded with the hearing after finding Bridges did not call in. We conclude, among other things, that the court erred by not making a finding on whether Bridges willfully failed to make a telephone appearance. We reverse and remand.

Mitchel J. (Father) and K.M. (Mother) appeal a juvenile court order, which terminated their parental rights over their daughter, Hailey J. They contend the order should be reversed because the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the parent-child relationship exception. They further contend the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights to allow for proper ICWA notice, but otherwise affirm.

Yesenia Pineda appeals from the March 23, 2017 judgment of conviction by jury of two felony counts of fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly and a sentence of six years. Following our independent examination of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we conclude no arguable issues exist. Accordingly, we affirm.

B.P. admitted allegations in a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 that he committed one count of forcible rape of a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)), two counts of forcible oral copulation on a victim under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (c)(2)(B)), and three counts of forcible lewd act on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)). The juvenile court sustained the petition and adjudged B.P. a ward of the court. It declared the offenses to be felonies and ordered B.P. committed to the custody of the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a maximum period of 27 years 8 months. The court also imposed probation conditions.
B.P. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it committed him to DJJ custody. He also contends, and the Attorney General concedes, the dispositional order includes three improperly imposed probation conditions. We modify the dispositional order, and affirm.

Jose Virgen appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for recall of sentence and resentencing. We affirm the order.

Based primarily on evidence provided by law enforcement witnesses, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Deshon Atkins of the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murders of Mark Beasley (count 4) and Dashon Wright (count 5) and found gang and gun enhancements to be true. Defendant appeals, contending insufficient evidence supports his conviction for the attempted murder of Beasley and the gang enhancements; the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument, and defense counsel failed to object; and the trial court erred in failing to award him presentence conduct credit. The Attorney General concedes the latter point.

A jury convicted Eugene Pak (defendant) of assault with a deadly weapon based on evidence he struck his erstwhile friend Lanisha Carter in the face with a liquor bottle, which broke her nose and caused a gash requiring stitches. At trial, the investigating police detective testified he called defendant after the incident and left a voicemail message asking defendant to call him back. Asked whether he ever heard from defendant, the detective answered, “I never have to this day.” During closing argument the prosecution argued defendant’s failure to return the detective’s call was evidence of his consciousness of guilt. We consider whether to reverse defendant’s conviction because the detective’s answer and the prosecutor’s argument violated defendant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Defendant John Wayne Willis pled guilty to felony driving or taking a vehicle with a prior conviction in violation of Penal Code section 666.5. He later moved to reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, sections 490.2 and 1170.18. The trial court held that defendant was not eligible for a reduction as a matter of law. Defendant appealed.
While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that a person convicted of vehicle theft may be eligible for resentencing under sections 490.2 and 1170.18 if the defendant can show the conviction was for a theft offense and the vehicle was worth $950 or less. (People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page).) We requested further briefing to address the effects of Page on this case. The parties agree that defendant is entitled to file a new petition to allow him to assert facts that may render him eligible for a reduction under sections 490.2 and 1170.18. We therefore affirm the denial of defendant’s motion without preju

Ayvaz and Narek Yegikyan sued the City of Los Angeles after the City placed the Yegikyans’ multi-unit residential property into the City’s rent escrow account program (REAP). The Yegikyans appeal from the judgment entered after the trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend. We conclude that the Yegikyans’ failure to comply with the claim presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) bars their state law causes of action, that the statute of limitations bars their remaining cause of action under 42 United States Code section 1983, and that the Yegikyans have not demonstrated they can amend to cure these deficiencies. Therefore, we affirm.

A jury convicted Ricardo Quel of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and aggravated mayhem (§ 205). The jury also found Quel acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, personally used a deadly weapon, and inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, his former girlfriend, Veronica Bacenas-Flores. Quel argues that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding the attempted murder was premeditated and deliberate and that the trial court should have instructed the jury that provocation can raise a reasonable doubt regarding premeditation and deliberation. Quel also argues the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding a hearsay statement by the victim relating to Quel’s provocation defense and by failing to admonish the jury after the prosecutor in her closing argument misstated the law regarding provocation. Finally, Quel contends the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors deprived him of due process and a fair trial.

This is the second appeal in this malicious prosecution action. In the underlying action two plaintiffs sued their employer and his wife for employment discrimination and harassment. One plaintiff prevailed against the employer, the other did not, and neither plaintiff prevailed against the employer’s wife, who subsequently filed this action for malicious prosecution against the plaintiff who did not prevail against the employer. The unsuccessful plaintiff in the underlying action, the defendant in the action for malicious prosecution, filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the motion in part (declining to strike the malicious prosecution cause of action), and we affirmed. (La Grange v. Tran (Nov. 12, 2015, B255835) [nonpub. opn.] (La Grange I).)

A jury convicted Jeremy Quwan Mitchell of several crimes, including attempting to murder two victims for the benefit of and in association with a criminal street gang. One of Mitchell’s codefendants, Semaj Tipton, pleaded guilty during the trial and the other, Dwayne Johnson, was acquitted by the jury.
Mitchell contends the trial court erred by denying his motion under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Batson/Wheeler motion) and by admitting the testimony of the prosecution’s gang expert in violation of Mitchell’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Mitchell also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective and, in a supplemental brief, that we should remand the matter for resentencing to allow the trial court to exercise discretion under a recently-enacted statute to strike the firearm enhancement. We affirm the judgment but remand for the trial court to hold a new sentencing hearing under the new statute, to co