CA Unpub Decisions

In this consolidated appeal, plaintiff and appellant James MacDonald primarily challenges the trial court’s orders granting special motions to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti SLAPP statute) brought by two sets of defendants: Martin Singer, Andrew Brettler and the law firm of Lavely & Singer (collectively, Singer defendants), and Shereen Arazm and Oren Koules. Plaintiff, who largely represented himself below, continues to represent himself on appeal.

The juvenile court declared 17-year-old Oscar B. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after finding he committed two misdemeanors: unlawfully fighting in a public place (Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (1) (Count 1)) and disturbing the peace by loud and unreasonable noise (§ 415, subd. (2) (Count 2)). The court placed Oscar on probation.
Oscar appeals. He contends—and the Attorney General agrees—the judgment must be reversed in light of our decision in In re Fernando C. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 499 (Fernando C.). We accept the Attorney General’s concession. We reverse the judgment and dismiss the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition.

Patricia E. Jackson (Jackson) appeals from a judgment on her spousal property petition. During her marriage to Regginald R. Jackson (decedent), Jackson and decedent sought a reverse mortgage on their property held in joint tenancy to help pay living expenses. Because Jackson was not old enough to qualify for the reverse mortgage but decedent was, she quitclaimed the property to decedent as his separate property. Decedent died intestate. When Jackson petitioned the probate court for a determination that the property be distributed entirely to her as the surviving spouse, the trial court rejected her claim based on the lack of clear and convincing evidence of an agreement between decedent and Jackson that the property remained community property notwithstanding the form of title.

Defendant Susan Hughes pled no contest to a single misdemeanor count of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Safety Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), after the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence of the methamphetamine police found in her makeup bag during a warrantless search of her car. She now appeals, asserting the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. We conclude the search was a lawful search incident to probation, and affirm.

Defendant Justice Robinson appeals from the trial court’s post-judgment restitution order. Defendant maintains that the restitution order was improper because there is no factual nexus between the conduct underlying her conviction and the damage to the victim’s vehicle. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant Jeffrey Hall was convicted of receiving stolen property. He was sentenced to five years in county jail. Defendant asserts the trial court erroneously admitted his statements to the police because they were made during a custodial interrogation without the requisite Miranda warning. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 372 on flight. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant appeals from the sentence imposed by the trial court for second degree burglary following revocation of probation. Defendant contends the court was unaware of the scope of its discretion when it pegged his current sentence to what would have been an appropriate sentence for his conviction of first degree burglary, which was subsequently dismissed pursuant to the original plea bargain. We affirm.

Kevin Williams appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered due to his failure to prosecute the case in a timely manner. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 583.310, 583.320.) He contends the court erred both in dismissing the case and in denying his motion to vacate the dismissal. Respondents Eric Safire and John Houston Scott cross-appeal, contending the court erred in vacating an earlier arbitration decision. We will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted appellant Dominic Batiste of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, but found him not guilty of participation in a street gang. The jury also found the street gang enhancement not to be true. A mistrial was declared regarding a robbery charge. Following a negotiated plea bargain, appellant entered a guilty plea on the robbery charge in exchange for a grant of probation. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on probation for three years, with various terms and conditions including that he not come with 150 yards or three blocks of the corner of 24th Street and Mission Street. On appeal, appellant argues that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s great bodily injury finding. He also contends the court erred by imposing an overbroad condition of probation. We affirm.

As a result of amendments to California’s workers’ compensation law that took effect in 2013, an injured worker may challenge a decision denying medical treatment by requesting a determination of medical necessity from an independent medical review (IMR) organization. (Lab. Code, §§ 139.5, 4610.5. ) The IMR organization, which is regulated by the Division of Workers’ Compensation of the Department of Industrial Relations (Division) and operates under contract with the administrative director of the Division, designates one or more medical professionals to review pertinent medical records, determine whether the disputed treatment is medically necessary, and prepare a written report including statutorily-required findings to support the reviewer’s determination. (§ 139.5, subd. (a)(1), § 4610.6, subds. (a) through (e); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9792.10.1 et seq.) The determination of the IMR organization is deemed to be the determination of the administrative director,

Defendant David M. Gomez, while serving a life term in state prison, killed his cellmate Franklin Feliz in 2005. In 2009, defendant assaulted inmates Lynford Perry and Lewis Bruister on separate occasions. The prosecution charged defendant with murder (count 1; Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and three counts of assault by a person undergoing a life sentence (counts 2, 3, and 4 as to Feliz, Perry, and Bruister respectively; § 4500).
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, but during trial he withdrew his insanity plea as to counts 3 and 4. In the guilt phase, a jury found defendant guilty on all counts. At the end of the sanity phase, the trial court granted a directed verdict of sanity as to counts 1 and 2. The court imposed a total term of 75 years to life consecutive to two life terms without the possibility of parole for 27 years.

Petitioner Jorge Perez filed a petition for writ of mandate/prohibition challenging respondent court’s order vacating his plea and sentence and reinstating criminal proceedings. The petition is granted. With respect to the judgment, the District Attorney concedes that once the respondent court pronounced judgment and execution of the sentence commenced by remanding petitioner to the custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the court was without authority to vacate or in any way modify the judgment. With respect to the sentence, the District Attorney also concedes the respondent court may recall the sentence, but any order resentencing petitioner is statutorily limited to a sentence no greater than the initial sentence. Accordingly, we order respondent court to vacate its order granting the District Attorney’s Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, and order the court to enter a new and different order denying the motion. Respondent court is further ordered

This is the second appeal by David G. (David Sr.) regarding his son, also called David (David Jr.). David Jr. was detained in February 2015 at age 16 months after his mother, Ciera S., who was heavily into drugs, fed him a marijuana brownie to make him stop fussing. The dependency process dragged on far beyond the prescribed time for a child of David Jr.’s age, and, despite the recommendation of Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) that David Jr. live with his father, Ciera regained custody of David Jr. in October 2016, under a family maintenance program.
David Sr. appealed the custody order, and we very reluctantly affirmed, in a two-to-one decision. Although the entire panel agreed the case had been mishandled to David Sr.’s detriment, the majority concluded the applicable standards of review – substantial evidence and abuse of discretion – militated against second-guessing the juvenile court’s decision.

A jury found defendant Evaristo Ricardo Romero guilty of committing four sexual assault crimes against a child. In this appeal, Romero argues that the trial court improperly admitted his statements to the police following his arrest.
We disagree and affirm the judgment.