CA Unpub Decisions

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiff and appellant Audrey Cooper (Cooper) appeals (1) a September 18, 2014 order denying her motion to vacate an order enforcing Cooper’s liability on a $20,000 cash deposit that was a condition of Cooper’s obtaining a preliminary injunction against the foreclosure of her home (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. BC431878; 2d Civ. No. B259535); and (2) a May 27, 2015 judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants and respondents SDLA Properties LP (SDLA), Pacifica Homes LP (Pacifica Homes), and Pacifica Companies LLC (Pacifica Companies) (collectively, the SDLA defendants) (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. BC543978; 2d Civ. No. B264669).
As explained below, Cooper’s contentions lack merit, and the order and judgment are affirmed.

The trial court issued a civil harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6) in a dispute between a landlord and tenant over the landlord’s right to use part of a rented house for storage and occasional occupancy. The court ordered the landlord to remove his personal property and to stay away from the house. The landlord appeals, contending that this landlord-tenant dispute was mistakenly treated as harassment. The contention has merit, requiring reversal of the restraining order.

Defendant Jefferson Hilsabeck was placed on mandatory supervision after a jury convicted him of a felony count of driving or taking a vehicle without consent and a misdemeanor count of resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer. His appellate counsel has asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Taper was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. We conclude there are no arguable issues and affirm.

Defendant Clemente Magallon appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 64, the Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act (the act). (Prop. 64, § 8.7, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff. Nov. 9, 2016; Health & Saf. Code, § 11361.8.) Defendant contends the trial court erred in concluding that his felony conviction under section 11366.5, subdivision (a), is not subject to reduction under Proposition 64. We agree and shall reverse.

A jury found defendant Bobby Ray Hardeman guilty of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and inflicting corporal injury upon the mother of his children for the second time within seven years. (Pen Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 273.5, subds. (a),(f)(1).) After the trial court found true allegations that defendant had three prior felony convictions (Pen Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), it sentenced defendant to state prison for an aggregate term of six years. The major theme of defendant’s contentions on this timely appeal is that the jury was improperly exposed to evidence of his history of domestic violence. The minor theme is that the trial court erred in closing an avenue of impeaching the victim. We reject all of defendant’s contentions, and affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant Jamaal Anthony Prince was convicted of the murder of Jennifer Kingeter. The jury found the degree of the murder to be first degree and also found that defendant had personally used a knife in its commission. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in state prison for first degree murder plus a one-year consecutive term on the knife use enhancement.
Defendant timely appeals, raising three claims of instructional error, which we reject for the reasons discussed below. Defendant also maintains that, as a result of an error in the clerk’s minutes, the trial court erroneously failed to adjudicate his competence after previously suspending the criminal proceedings when defense counsel declared a doubt as to his competence. Defendant argues, and we agree, that the judgment should be reversed, subject to the trial court’s authority to hold a retrospective competency hearing if feasible and, if so, to reinstate the judgm

In 2002, defendant Emmanuel Morales Baquiran pleaded no contest to taking or driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent in violation of former Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (hereafter Vehicle Code section 10851(a)), and receiving stolen property in violation of former Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a). Defendant was placed on probation, and his probation was terminated in 2005.
In 2017, defendant filed a petition with the trial court pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivision (f), which was enacted as part of Proposition 47, to have both felony convictions redesignated as misdemeanors. The court granted the petition as to the conviction for receiving stolen property (former § 496, subd. (a)) but denied the petition as to the conviction for taking or driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent (former Veh. Code, § section 10851(a)). The court determined that the Vehicle Code offense was categorically ineligible for redesignation under section 1170.18.

The juvenile court made a presumed father finding under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d) in favor of Steven, a family friend and father figure to C.G. since the child’s birth. The mother of C.G. challenges that finding on procedural grounds and for insufficient evidence. Finding no prejudicial error in the manner in which the request for presumed father status was presented to the juvenile court, and finding substantial evidence to support the finding, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Tony Alvarez guilty of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)) and found true the allegation that a person, other than an accomplice, was present during the burglary (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(21). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation. Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of an uncharged offense and gave a jury instruction which was improperly argumentative. We affirm.

In January 2017, officials discovered a broken fire sprinkler in the cell where appellant Brandon A. was housed at a juvenile detention center. Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true that appellant had committed misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a); count 2). Appellant was continued as a ward of the court and committed to a program for 24 months. He was ordered to pay restitution, in addition to other imposed terms and conditions.
On appeal, appellant contends there was insufficient evidence of malice to support the juvenile court’s order. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jason Patrick Lund appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify his sentence under former Government Code section 13967, requesting the trial court strike a $10,000 restitution fine imposed during his 1997 sentencing proceeding. Based on our independent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

A year and a half after the filing deadline for Proposition 36 petitions had passed, defendant and appellant Chad Isaac Huber filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126, known as the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)). The trial court denied defendant’s petition as untimely. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his petition as untimely because he had shown good cause for the delay in filing his resentencing petition under Proposition 36. We agree with the trial court that in this case there was no good cause to justify the untimely filing of the petition, and therefore affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs and respondents Julia and Gerard Biggs (plaintiffs) sued defendants and appellants Sheila and Abraham Tekin (defendants). The trial court awarded plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees in the amount of $32,133.50. Defendants contend the trial court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees because (1) the case should have been resolved via a motion rather than trial; (2) the case was not difficult and plaintiffs failed to obtain a majority of their requested damages; and (3) plaintiffs failed to apportion their attorneys’ fees between the contract and non-contract causes of action. We affirm the order.

This case involving defendant and appellant Antonio Avila Ramos comes to this court for a second time after he was found guilty of attempted robbery, false imprisonment, assault with a firearm and being an active member of the Varrio Coachella Rifa (VCR) gang at a second trial. wearing a court-ordered ankle bracelet that was tracked by the use of GPS technology. On the night of March 7, 2012, just before 11:30 p.m., defendant was driving a Dodge Charger and forced another car with two occupants to the side of the road. Defendant defended the charge in his first trial by presenting an opening statement and cross-examining witnesses on his theory that, although the GPS on his ankle monitor showed he was in the area at the time of the crime, at the exact time of the crime, he was one mile away from the scene. Defendant’s counsel moved to have the evidence excluded.