CA Unpub Decisions

In August 2012, plaintiffs and appellants Matthew and Dawn Hamel sued, among others, defendants and respondents Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I LLC (Bear Stearns), Lenox Financial Mortgage Corporation (Lenox), and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (Fidelity), for the allegedly wrongful foreclosure of their property located in Fontana, California (the property). On October 24, 2013, the trial court granted Lenox’s demurrer to the Hamels’ third amended complaint without leave to amend. On November 26, 2013, the trial court dismissed Bear Stearns and Fidelity as unserved defendants. In October 2014, the Hamels filed a fourth amended complaint for fraud and slander of title, again naming Bear Stearns as a defendant. Their sole claim against Bear Stearns was for fraud. On June 30, 2015, the trial court held a hearing for an order to show cause regarding dismissal of the action, and took the matter under submission.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-16, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-16 (Deutsche Bank) sued John P. Slawinski and Denise M. Honc for cancellation of instruments and declaratory relief. The gravamen of the complaint was that Slawinski and Honc caused certain fraudulent, written instruments to be recorded in the chain of title for certain real property. Deutsche Bank sought to cancel the instruments and for a judicial declaration that such instruments were null and void.
Deutsche Bank successfully moved for summary judgment. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank. Honc did not appeal from that judgment. Instead, nearly six weeks after the court entered judgment, Honc filed a motion to set aside the judgment as void. The court denied that motion after considering the papers and evidence as well as entertaining oral argument. Honc did not appeal that order.

Plaintiff Hal Scott Clark (Plaintiff) appeals following a court trial that resulted in a judgment in favor of defendant Carol Delay (Defendant) that included an award of attorney fees to Defendant under Civil Code section 1717. On appeal, Plaintiff raises no issues or arguments with regard to the trial. However, we agree with Plaintiff that the court erred in granting Defendant's posttrial motion for attorney fees. As we explain, the scope of the contractual attorney fees provision at issue does not include the breach of contract claim that Plaintiff filed and on which the court entered judgment in Defendant's favor. Accordingly, we will strike the award of attorney fees in the judgment and affirm the judgment as modified.

Defendant Tina L. Cross appeals from a postjudgment order of the trial court in favor of plaintiff FIA Card Services, N.A. (FIA Card Services).
In 2006, an arbitral forum entered an arbitration award against Cross and in favor of a bank that had issued Cross a credit card. A few years later, the bank, under a new name, sought to confirm the arbitration award in the trial court. The bank's petition to confirm the arbitration award was granted, and judgment was entered against Cross in the amount of the arbitration award.

Robert S., a homeless man, was bound with duct tape, kicked in the face, and doused with gasoline. His assailant threatened to light him on fire. In connection with this incident a jury convicted Mario Pinto of (1) assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) (count 3), (2) making a criminal threat (§ 422) (count 4), and false imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a) (count 5). In connection with counts 3 and 5, the jury also found that Pinto personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) and section 12022.7, subdivision (a). The court sentenced Pinto to five years in prison.
Pinto's only contention on appeal is that his conviction for making a criminal threat is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Carrie S., mother of the minors, appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights and freeing the minors for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Mother argues the juvenile court erred in failing to find she had established the beneficial parental relationship exception to the preference for adoption. We affirm.

This appeal involves a fractional interest (commonly known as a timeshare) in a condominium located in a ski resort development in North Lake Tahoe that appellants Charles and Deanne Weinberger, as trustees of the Weinberger Family 2003 Trust (the Weinbergers) bought as an investment. Not long after their purchase, the Weinbergers entered into a listing agreement with respondent Intero Real Estate Services, Inc. (Intero) in order to sell the timeshare. The listing agreement incorporated the resale agreement between the Weinbergers and the developer of the project, 8050 Tahoe, LLC (8050 Tahoe). The resale agreement provided rules on timeshare resales that governed the priority of sales when multiple owners sought to sell their timeshares.

In exchange for defendant Brad Craig Wion’s no-contest plea to misdemeanor counts of receiving stolen property, the parties agreed certain identified cases and “[r]emaining cases” would be “dismissed w/ Harvey waiver[ ] and/or not filed.” Unknown to the deputy district attorney who approved the plea agreement, separate narcotics and firearms charges were in the works against defendant based on a search warrant executed at defendant’s home six days prior; a different deputy district attorney had reviewed and approved the warrant application. Nevertheless, in response to defendant’s motion for specific performance of the plea agreement, the trial court dismissed those felony narcotics and firearms charges.

S.O. (Mother) appeals from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order made by the juvenile court. She argues there was insufficient evidence to support dependency jurisdiction over her two sons pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). In addition, she contends the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to participate in a psychological assessment as part of the family maintenance case plan. We affirm the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order.

Defendant and appellant Jose Enriquez broke into his neighbor’s house when only a 15-year-old girl, L.R., and her pregnant older sister, A.R., were home, threatened them both, demanded property from A.R., and escaped with a few items from another room. He was convicted of two counts of burglary (one for each victim) and the attempted robbery of A.R. As to all three counts, an allegation that he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon – a knife – in the commission of the offenses was found to be true. On appeal, defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence of the knife enhancement with respect to the counts pertaining to A.R. We conclude the evidence is sufficient. However, we modify the judgment to correct a sentencing error.

On May 24, 2016, defendant and appellant Anthony Thomas Scott entered a plea of no contest in case No. TA139916 to assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). Imposition of sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on formal probation for three years. Probation was ultimately revoked and terminated on November 9, 2016, based on the trial court’s evaluation of evidence received in defendant’s jury trial in case No. TA140763. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for the upper term of four years. He appeals from the judgment. This court appointed counsel for defendant on appeal. On December 8, 2017, appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues, but requesting this court to independently review the record for arguable contentions pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Defendant was advised by letter from this court of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days.

Over thirty-eight years ago, on September 20, 1979, Barbara Ballman was raped and murdered. She was 23 years old. Her killer was not identified until 2004, when DNA collected from her body in 1979 was matched to defendant Darrel Mark Gurule.
Thirty-seven years after Ballman died, on September 21, 2016, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder. The jury found true a personal firearm use allegation. Two special circumstances were also found true—that defendant was previously convicted of first degree murder, and that he murdered Ballman while committing rape. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on imposing the death penalty. After that result, the prosecution declined to retry the penalty phase. The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole plus four years.

K.B. appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition order removing her three-year-old son, Jerome H., from her care and placing him with his maternal grandmother. K.B. argues the juvenile court failed to make express findings on the record, as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivisions (c) and (d), that there were no reasonable means to protect Jerome other than removing him from K.B.’s custody and that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services made reasonable efforts to prevent the need for his removal. K.B. also contends there is no substantial evidence to support such findings. We conclude that the juvenile court’s failure to comply with section 361 was harmless and that there was substantial evidence the Department exercised reasonable efforts to prevent Jerome’s removal and there were no reasonable alternatives to removal. Therefore, we affirm.

Following the denial of their motion to suppress evidence at the preliminary hearing (Pen. Code, § 1538.5 ), in which they argued that they had been illegally detained and searched, and following the trial court’s denial of their renewed motion to suppress (§ 1538.5, subd. (i)), Arman Nikogosyan (Nikogosyan) and Arsen Nahapetyan (Nahapetyan) (collectively, Defendants) pleaded nolo contendre to a single count of identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3) ).
On appeal, Defendants contend the trial court erred in denying their suppression motions. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment.