CA Unpub Decisions

In 1995, a jury convicted defendant Glenn Wright (defendant) on two counts of second degree burglary. As a third strike offender, he was sentenced to fifty years to life in prison. Many years later, defendant filed Proposition 36 and Proposition 47 petitions to recall his sentence. The trial court denied both petitions based on its finding that resentencing defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Appealing the trial court’s ruling on his Proposition 36 petition in this case, defendant’s opening brief argued Proposition 47 enacted a more restrictive definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” that governed petitions filed under Proposition 36, and the trial court wrongly concluded defendant posed a danger under that heightened Proposition 47 standard. efendant’s reply brief concedes that argument is no longer viable after our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347 (Valencia).

Appellant Nathaniel Friedman appeals from an order granting Friedman’s petition for an award of attorney fees made in connection with the approval of his minor client’s compromise of a medical malpractice claim. According to Friedman, the trial court committed legal error when it applied a preempted local rule to reduce the amount of attorney fees awarded from the requested 33.33 percent of the minor’s recovery to 25 percent. Because the record does not support Friedman’s assertion that the trial court applied the wrong standard or otherwise abused its discretion in declining to designate a greater share of the minor’s settlement award as attorney fees, we reject his claim.

Defendant John Lee Culver appeals from his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Elroy Gomez told an acquaintance that he was obligated to kill him and proceeded to slash and stab the acquaintance with at least two different weapons. A jury convicted Gomez of attempted premeditated murder, possession of ammunition by a felon, and assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court sentenced him to 24 years and four months to life in prison. On appeal, Gomez claims that the attempted murder conviction was supported by insufficient evidence of intent and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him to accept a plea offer of a nine-year sentence. We affirm.

This appeal takes as its predicate the differing statutory procedures by which a person may seek release from confinement after being adjudicated a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP), or a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO), or Not Guilty by reason of Insanity (NGI). The dispositive issue is whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion that a compelling state interest justifies the disparate treatment, and thus the more onerous procedures for SVPs do not violate the guarantee of the equal protection of the law. It does, so we affirm.

Appellants Audi Daou, Majid Daou, and May Daou appeal from a probate court order approving an $8.5 million settlement between, on the one hand, respondent John I. Kessler, the special administrator of the estate of their brother Imad “Ed” Daou, and on the other hand, respondents Carmen Hamady and Christina Daou, the wife and daughter of Ed Daou. The settlement resolved Carmen and Christina’s civil action against Kessler, as special administrator of the estate of Ed (the alleged tortfeasor), for (1) wrongful death of Carmen and Ed’s son, (2) domestic violence on Carmen, and (3) assault and battery on Christina.
On appeal, we understand the siblings Audi, Majid, and May to contend that substantial evidence does not support the probate court’s factual findings concerning the settlement, and that the court therefore abused its discretion in determining that the settlement was made in good faith and was in the best interest of the estate.
For reasons that we will explain, we

In this action for personal injuries, a jury awarded plaintiff Dayle Landmoore damages attributable to an automobile accident caused by defendant Clarre Foxcroft. Plaintiff sought pretrial costs and prejudgment interest. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to tax costs in part, and it denied plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the court should have included all of her claimed costs, including expert witness fees, because the judgment she obtained exceeded both her pretrial offer and the amount awarded her in judicial arbitration. She further asserts error in the court’s denial of prejudgment interest. We find the rulings to be proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.21 and Civil Code section 3291. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a brief which set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against the client, but advised the court no issues were found to argue on defendant’s behalf. Defendant was given 30 days to file written argument in defendant’s own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from defendant.
On May 24, 1995, a first amended complaint was filed against defendant Majid Tabibi, aka Mohsen Tabibi, aka Majid Tabibian, aka Majid Fabibi, alleging perjury, insurance fraud, arson, false credit application, grand theft and submitting false evidence. On May 22, 1996, defendant pled guilty to violating numerous Penal Code statutes. He was sentenced to three years in state prison and was ordered to pay restitution of $439,313.37.

Mike Rafipoor (Husband) and Mahnaz Harris-Rafipoor (Wife) ended their 17-month marriage in 2003. A stipulated dissolution judgment stated Husband owed Wife $400,000. Wife has been trying since 2009 to collect this debt. After much litigation over the validity of the debt, a trial court determined the stipulated judgment was unambiguous and constituted an enforceable money judgment in 2013. We affirmed this ruling.

Appellant Jesus G. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s orders terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to his now nine-year-old daughter, J.R.G., and four sons, J.V.G., Jesse, Julian and Jeremy, eight-, seven-, six-, five- and four-years old, respectively (collectively the children). After reviewing the juvenile court record, father’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf. This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Father filed a letter but failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

Appellant George Hamilton sought to have two felony convictions for violating Penal Code section 211, robbery, redesignated as misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47, as embodied in section 1170.18. The superior court denied the request and Hamilton appealed. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Appellant Jeffery David Smith pled no contest to one count of violating Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4), assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. In this appeal, Smith contends the trial court erred in calculating his presentence custody credits. We agree Smith is entitled to an additional nine days of presentence credit.

After his two nieces told their parents he had been touching them inappropriately over the course of several years, defendant Timothy Chavez was arrested and charged with multiple offenses. Following a trial by jury on 18 counts, defendant was convicted of the following offenses against victim S.A.: 12 counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act against a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) (counts 1–12); one count of contact or communication with a minor (Pen. Code, § 288.3, subd. (a)) (count 13); and one misdemeanor count of indecent exposure (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. (1)) (count 18). On counts 2 through 7, the jury found true that defendant had substantial sexual contact with a child under the age of 14 years, rendering him ineligible for probation (Pen. Code, § 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on counts 14 through 17, committing a lewd or lascivious act against a child under the age of 14 years involving victim L.M.

The County of Riverside (the County) and the County's Sheriff-Coroner Stanley Sniff appeal from a judgment in favor of Gabriel Dennington in his petition for writ of mandate challenging the decision of the County's Sheriff's Department (the Department) to terminate his employment as a deputy sheriff for improperly deleting a photograph from a camera that he seized as evidence.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's ruling that the Department failed to meet its burden to prove that Dennington deleted the photograph from the camera, and accordingly we affirm the judgment.