CA Unpub Decisions

On August 19, 2014, the People filled a felony complaint against Manzanilla, charging him with one count of injuring a cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition under section 273.5, subdivision (a), for having injured his girlfriend, Kellie Warner.
According to the probation officer’s report, while inebriated, Manzanilla became angry with Warner for allegedly driving his car without his consent. Manzanilla choked Warner, causing her to lose consciousness. When she woke up, Manzanilla hit her on her face and upper torso. Warner escaped and called the police. When the police arrived, they observed injuries on Warner. She was treated by paramedics at the scene after she refused to go to the hospital. Manzanilla was arrested.

The Department became involved when it received a report alleging mother was smoking methamphetamine in D.M.’s presence. At the time, mother and father were not in a relationship; D.M. lived with mother. Father was living with paternal grandmother, paternal aunt, and D.M.’s half-sibling S.W.—father’s daughter from another relationship. (The juvenile court declared S.W. a dependent in February 2011. It ultimately terminated its jurisdiction and awarded father and S.W.’s mother joint custody.)
After investigating the initial allegation and additional allegations about domestic violence between mother and her boyfriend, the Department had D.M. removed from mother and released to father.

The Department became involved when it received a report alleging mother was smoking methamphetamine in D.M.’s presence. At the time, mother and father were not in a relationship; D.M. lived with mother. Father was living with paternal grandmother, paternal aunt, and D.M.’s half-sibling S.W.—father’s daughter from another relationship. (The juvenile court declared S.W. a dependent in February 2011. It ultimately terminated its jurisdiction and awarded father and S.W.’s mother joint custody.)
After investigating the initial allegation and additional allegations about domestic violence between mother and her boyfriend, the Department had D.M. removed from mother and released to father.

The events leading to the Department’s filing of a dependency petition, M.B.’s removal from Liah after the juvenile court sustained a single count pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), concerning Liah’s substance abuse, and the dependency proceedings through the juvenile court’s November 7, 2019 order summarily denying Liah’s petition for modification of its March 6, 2019 order terminating reunification services are detailed in our opinion affirming the November 7, 2019 order. (In re M.B. (Mar. 15, 2021, B302837) [nonpub. opn.].)
The section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, originally scheduled for July 3, 2019, was ultimately held on August 31, 2021. At the hearing the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence M.B. was adoptable and found no exception to termination of parental rights applied, specifically rejecting Liah’s argument based on the parent-child-relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

Cashanda has three children, each with a different father: C.S., nine-year old Cameron C., and two-year-old Conner M. On April 9, 2021, following Cashanda’s no contest plea, the juvenile court sustained in part an amended dependency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (c) (serious emotional damage), on behalf of all three children, finding, as to the subdivision (b)(1) count, that Cashanda has a history of mental and emotional problems that, without treatment, placed the children at risk of serious physical harm and, as to the subdivision (c) count, that Cashanda emotionally abused C.S. “by using derogatory language toward the child on multiple occasions. The child has mental and emotional problems including suicidal ideation, and self-harming thoughts due to the mother’s conduct.” Cassandra’s actions, the court found, placed C.S. and her two siblings at a substantial risk of suffering emotional harm.

This appeal is presented as a property dispute, but the facts reveal that it is much more personal. Specifically, both properties had previously been owned by Baghdassarians – the residential property held his home and the vacant lot behind it was largely unused. The dispute arose when SK Vision demanded, and ultimately foreclosed on, a deed of trust on Baghdassarians’s “personal residence located at 4343 Vista Place,” unaware that Baghdassarians’s address actually encompassed both parcels. Greg Kurdoglanyan is the owner and managing member of SK Vision. Kurdoglanyan and Baghdassarians (and their companies) had been involved in a number of real estate projects. The business relationship soured, and SK Vision brought suit against Baghdassarians for the loss of its investments. On August 26, 2010, they settled their dispute for $2.6 million, pursuant to a written agreement.

On October 21, 2020, after multiple hearings, the trial court issued a one-year civil harassment restraining order against Drake Whitlock under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, protecting Mitsy Natareno. Whitlock appealed, challenging the fairness of the hearings and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the restraining order. Natareno did not file a respondent’s brief. On October 21, 2021, while this appeal was pending, the restraining order expired.
We invited the parties to file supplemental briefing under Government Code section 68081, addressing whether the expiration of the restraining order rendered the appeal moot. Plaintiff and respondent Natareno filed a letter brief arguing the appeal is moot because the restraining order expired and was not renewed. Defendant and appellant Whitlock did not file a supplemental brief addressing the question of mootness.

In August 2016, plaintiff filed a civil complaint against defendants alleging employment discrimination and other causes of action. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to compel arbitration before JAMS pursuant to the parties’ agreement, and the arbitration was heard by retired judge George H. King (Judge King).
Judge King made initial disclosures in September 2017 concerning his and JAMS’s business with the parties and their attorneys. According to the disclosures, Judge King was involved in one ongoing arbitration involving the law firm representing defendants, Jackson Lewis, P.C. (Jackson Lewis); none of the individual attorneys representing defendants were involved in that other arbitration. JAMS administered five matters involving plaintiff’s attorney and her firm, 499 matters involving Jackson Lewis (including several involving defendants’ individual attorneys), and one matter involving LAZ Parking.

On March 15, 2021, at approximately 6:32 p.m., Mendocino County Sherriff’s Deputy Siderakis pulled Degurse over in Willits in a black GMC Yukon with an expired license registration tag. When asked, Degurse admitted that he was on probation and Deputy Siderakis learned that Degurse had several active warrants for his arrest from Siskiyou County. Degurse consented to a search of his person and his vehicle, which produced a red ice chest containing over 1,000 rounds of ammunition. After learning that Degurse was prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition because of his prior felony convictions, Deputy Siderakis placed Degurse under arrest.
On March 17, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint charging Degurse with being a prohibited person in possession of ammunition (Pen. Code § 30305, subd. (a)(1)) (count 1), misdemeanor driving with a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code § 14601.2, subd.

Morrow worked as a technician for the Daly City DMV. Over a five-month period beginning in the summer of 2004, she issued fraudulent driver’s licenses and identification cards to several customers, using other individuals’ personal information to which she had access. In March 2005, she was charged with five felony counts of identity theft and five felony counts of altering public records. She pleaded no contest to one count of each crime, and the remaining charges were dismissed. That September, the trial court suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Morrow on probation for three years.
Approximately 15 years later, Morrow filed a petition for relief under sections 1203.4 and 17(b). In August 2020, the trial court denied the petition on the basis that Morrow had “an outstanding balance with revenue services.” Three months later, Morrow filed another petition for relief under the same statutes after confirming that only her supervision fees were outstanding.

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 31, 2022, be modified as follows: The first full paragraph on page 22, beginning “Nor do we conclude . . .” is deleted and replaced with the following paragraph:
“Nor do we conclude that Defendant has demonstrated that the TRO provisions of section 527.6 are unconstitutional as applied to him. In his opening brief on appeal, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s papers did not claim there were grounds to shorten or waive notice. Defendant further contends that Plaintiff sought the TRO to prevent him from attending and speaking out at Plaintiff’s retirement party, which did not constitute urgency justifying dispensation with proper notice. The record is to the contrary.”

On March 21, 2017, Appellant fired a shotgun at the victim from a distance of about 60 feet. He was charged by felony complaint with three counts: premeditated attempted murder with an allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, 12022.53, subd. (c)), possessing a firearm having been previously convicted of a felony (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). The complaint also included a firearm use allegation and a prior prison term allegation. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b).) The prior prison term was based on a conviction for infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5).
Appellant entered into a plea agreement that called for him to plead no contest to attempted murder without premeditation and to admit a firearm use allegation under section 12022.5, subdivision (a) and a prior prison term under section 667.5, subdivision (b).

On March 21, 2017, Appellant fired a shotgun at the victim from a distance of about 60 feet. He was charged by felony complaint with three counts: premeditated attempted murder with an allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, 12022.53, subd. (c)), possessing a firearm having been previously convicted of a felony (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). The complaint also included a firearm use allegation and a prior prison term allegation. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b).) The prior prison term was based on a conviction for infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5).
Appellant entered into a plea agreement that called for him to plead no contest to attempted murder without premeditation and to admit a firearm use allegation under section 12022.5, subdivision (a) and a prior prison term under section 667.5, subdivision (b).

On April 8, 1991, Walker was charged by information with forcible rape of T.T. (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 1), and unlawful sexual intercourse with T.T. as well (§ 261.5; count 3). He was also charged with forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 2) involving a separate incident against victim M.T.
Walker was held to answer on all of the charges following a preliminary examination. He submitted counts 2 and 3 for trial based on the preliminary examination transcript, police reports and a sexual assault investigation report. (Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592.) The district attorney dismissed count 1 and the trial court found Walker guilty of counts 2 and 3. He was sentenced to 2 years for unlawful sexual intercourse in count 2 and 3 years consecutive for the forceable rape in count 3. This court affirmed the judgment in People v. Walker (Oct. 6, 1994, No. H011846 [nonpub. opn.]).