CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Ferial Aryeh petitioned for a permanent restraining order against defendant Jamshid Aryeh, her former spouse. At the outset of the hearing on that order, defendant requested a continuance, which the trial court denied. Following testimony, the trial court granted the petition and issued the permanent restraining order. Defendant subsequently moved to vacate that order under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. This motion was denied. Defendant now appeals from the order denying his section 473 motion. We affirm.

Raul B. Orozco appeals from the summary judgment granted to Bardomiano A. Garcia and Arminda B. Garcia (plaintiffs) on their complaint for breach of contract. Orozco contends the trial court committed reversible error by denying his ex parte application for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing. He claims he was eligible for such relief under either the discretionary or mandatory provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) [hereafter section 473(b)]. The record confirms, however, that the ex parte application was brought under section 437c, subdivision (h) [hereafter section 437c(h)], and that the court properly exercised its discretion to deny the application as untimely. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Lucille Nicolosi appeals from a judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant and respondent Suntrust Bank in this action arising out of a property inspection notice. Nicolosi contends the complaint states causes of action for invasion of privacy based on portraying her in a false light, defamation by innuendo, and negligence. She also contends that the trial court should have allowed her to amend her complaint to further allege causes of action for invasion of privacy, libel, and trespass. We conclude that the complaint does not state a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on a false light theory, defamation, or negligence. Nicolosi has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend the complaint. We therefore affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Ronald Alwin Moffett of maintaining a place for selling or using a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366). The trial court granted probation for three years on terms and conditions, including 108 days in county jail.
Moffett contends there was insufficient evidence that he intended to maintain his house for drug use and sale; and that the trial court erred in directing the jury to continue deliberating after the jury sent notes stating that it could not reach a unanimous decision. We affirm.

Appellant Richard Harrison (husband) appeals the denial of his motion to vacate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). Respondent Loretta Nicholson Harrison (wife) obtained a default judgment in a marriage dissolution action in 1974. Husband contends the default judgment is void due to faulty service. Because the judgment is not void on its face, and because husband brought his motion to vacate more than two years after entry of default judgment, the court correctly denied the motion to vacate. We affirm.

Doctor Kofi Kessey appeals from an order awarding defendants Los Robles Regional Medical Center (Hospital) and its affiliate, HCA Holdings, Inc. $52,500 attorney fees after the trial court granted in part an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss Kessey’s whistleblower action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c) [prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike entitled to attorney fees and costs].)

A jury rejected defendant Vershonda Charisse Sneed’s self-defense claim and convicted her of first degree murder. The jury further found defendant personally and intentionally discharged a handgun causing death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced defendant to 50 years to life in state prison. We affirm the judgment of conviction but remand to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under section 12022.53, subdivision (h) as amended effective January 1, 2018.

In a joint trial with separate juries, defendants and appellants Victor Manuel Fonseca and Rogelio Elias Castillo were convicted in count 1 of attempted premeditated murder and in count 2 of assault with a firearm. The juries found that defendants committed both offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang. Fonseca’s jury found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury in count 1, and that he discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury in count 2. Castillo’s jury found that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury in count 1, and that a principal was armed with a firearm in count 2 (§ 12022, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found Castillo had suffered a prior juvenile adjudication for a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three strikes law.

Defendant Donnie Lee Walton, Jr. was convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, he contends the prosecutor used an impermissibly suggestive pretrial photographic identification procedure that tainted his in-court identification of defendant; testimony from the prosecution’s gang expert improperly included case-specific testimonial hearsay; the prosecution’s gang expert improperly testified about defendant’s guilt, motive, and intent; the trial court imposed unauthorized sentences on defendant’s murder convictions when it sentenced him to six terms of life without the possibility of parole; and the trial court should have stayed the imposition of sentence on the Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c) enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivision (f) rather than under section 654.

In 1993, defendant Larry Giraldes was convicted of two counts of first degree murder (Penal Code § 187, subd. (a)) , possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)), first degree burglary (§ 459), and conspiracy to escape from custody. (§§ 182, subd. (a) & 4532, subd. (b).) The trial court also found a prior serious felony conviction allegation to be true. (§ 667, subd. (a).) On March 9, 1993, the court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life to be served consecutively to an aggregate term of twelve years, four months. This court affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Giraldes (June 22, 1995, H011038) [nonpub. opn.].)

The Summit Fire in May 2008 burned several thousand acres in the Santa Cruz Mountains and destroyed structures and outbuildings. Defendant Channing Parker Verden was arrested and charged with recklessly causing the wildfire based on preliminary hearing evidence it originated from a burn pile left by Verden after a brush removal operation. The district attorney later dismissed that charge, and Verden petitioned the trial court for a finding of factual innocence under Penal Code section 851.8. On appeal, Verden claims that the court erred in denying his petition and, specifically, failed to employ the burden shifting analysis required under the statute. We shall affirm.

Jordan A. (father) appeals from May 2017 juvenile court orders terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all references to this code unless otherwise noted) to his daughter, Ava L. (born in June 2015). Father contends the juvenile court and Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA)) because the notices sent to the relevant tribes and governmental agencies contained insufficient and incorrect information concerning Ava’s ancestry. For the reasons expressed below, we will conditionally reverse the judgment and remand with directions to provide adequate ICWA notification.

Seeking to recover approximately half a million dollars loaned to Defendant Mohamed Abouelmagd, Plaintiff Debra Newell appeals from a judgment dismissing her second amended complaint after the court sustained defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend. The court concluded her claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. In doing so, the court rejected plaintiff’s assertions that the statutes of limitation had been tolled during defendant’s absence from the state, and that defendant should be estopped from asserting the limitation period as a defense.
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in two respects. First, she claims the court wrongly concluded that tolling under Code of Civil Procedure section 351 would be unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution.1 (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.; commerce clause.) Second, she claims the court erroneously concluded she did not plead sufficient facts to estop defendant from

Defendants Aaron Guardado and Mauricio Gonzalez attacked two people with a screwdriver while stating the name of their gang. A jury convicted defendants of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (with associated gang allegations), a substantive gang offense, and gang-related simple assault and battery charges.
Defendants appeal on several grounds. Both defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions. Gonzalez argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to bifurcate the gang evidence. Guardado also argues that the court abused its discretion by not dismissing his prior strike conviction. We disagree.