CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiffs brought this class action against the San Francisco Deputy Sheriff’s Association (SFDSA), the San Francisco Deputy Sheriff’s Foundation (the Foundation), and four individuals, alleging they misappropriated membership dues. Defendants brought a special motion to strike six of the seven causes of action, which the trial court granted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Defendants sought nearly $200,000 in attorney fees for their expenses in bringing the anti-SLAPP motion. (§ 425.16, subd. (c).) The trial court awarded them $20,000. On appeal, defendants contend the trial court abused its discretion in not making a larger attorney fee award. We shall affirm the order.

The People charged Kettrell Lamar Berry with two counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger than him (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (c)) (counts 1, 2); two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child 14 or 15 years of age (§ 288, subd. (c)(l)) (counts 3, 4); two counts of oral copulation between an individual over 21 years of age and a person under 16 years of age (§ 288a, subd. (b)(2)) (counts 5, 6); two counts of oral copulation with a person under the age of 18 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1)) (counts 7, 8); four counts of sexual penetration by a foreign object of a person under 16 years of age by a person over 21 years of age (§ 289, subd. (i)) (counts 9, 10, 11, 12); and one count of sexual penetration by a foreign object of a person under 18 years of age (§ 289, subd. (h)) (count 13).

A jury convicted Richard Anthony Berumen of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1) and found true an allegation he personally inflicted great bodily injury in commission of the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)). The jury also convicted him of hit and run with injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a); count 2) and reckless driving resulting in serious injury (Veh. Code, § 23105, subd. (a); count 3). In a bifurcated proceeding, Berumen admitted he was previously convicted of unlawfully taking a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a)) and had three prison priors (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668). The court sentenced Berumen to an aggregate term of nine years eight months in state prison.

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, a jury found defendant Paul Lynn Evans guilty of possession of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed defendant on three years of informal probation, and ordered him to serve 90 days in county jail.
Defendant now contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion by applying the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, because the officers lacked probable cause to believe defendant’s vehicle contained contraband. We will affirm the judgment.

Michael Wayne Smith pled guilty to two counts of possessing child pornography (Pen. Code, §§ 311.1, 311.11, subds. (a) & (c)(1).) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Smith on five years formal probation Smith appeals on the ground that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The trial court granted his petition for a certificate of probable cause.
We appointed counsel to represent Smith in this appeal. After counsel’s examination of the record, he filed an opening brief raising no issues.

Chris Jaillard Peretiako pled guilty to assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).) The trial court placed Peretiako on probation subject o terms and conditions, including that he participate in a treatment program and that he not have contact with two named persons.

Appellant Crystal C. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s December 14, 2016 dispositional order removing her infant son, Christopher C. (born September 8, 2016), from her care and denying her request to be permitted to reside in the home of the maternal aunt with whom Christopher is placed. Mother argues the court erred by refusing to allow her to reside with Christopher in the maternal aunt’s home as a reasonable alternative to the child’s removal, and that the dispositional order effectively rendered her homeless and precluded her ability to reunify with her son. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Ventura County Council Boy Scouts of America (VCC) obtained an order compelling respondent Sally Patton Walter, administrative and management trustee of the Patton Family Lead Trust (the Lead Trust), to distribute $238,669.20 of the Lead Trust’s assets to VCC. VCC also sought an award of interest on the amount of the distribution. The trial court declined to award interest. VCC appeals. We affirm.

The City of Hermosa Beach (the City) enacted an ordinance expressly prohibiting short term vacation rentals (STVR’s) in areas zoned for residential housing. Because some residential areas are located in the “coastal zone,” plaintiffs contend the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act) preempts the ordinance. Plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s denial of the request for a preliminary injunction. They also argue the trial court’s application of the “balance of harm test” failed to recognize plaintiffs’ status as private attorneys general representing the state’s interest in effectuating the mandates of the Coastal Act. We affirm.

Defendant and respondent Los Angeles Jewish Home for the Aging (JHA) sued plaintiffs and appellants Val West (West)—the daughter of one of JHA’s residents—and David Dizenfeld (Dizenfeld)—a family friend and an attorney—for defamation, civil harassment, trespass, and interference with contract. West and Dizenfeld prevailed on an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike JHA’s defamation claim. Doubling down, West and Dizenfeld then initiated a separate lawsuit against JHA and its legal counsel, defendant and respondent Arent Fox LLP (Arent Fox), asserting they maliciously prosecuted the first suit. JHA and Arent Fox responded by filing their own anti-SLAPP motions arguing—successfully, as the trial court later ruled—West and Dizenfeld’s malicious prosecution claims arose from protected activity and lacked minimal merit. On appeal from the trial court’s ruling, the parties agree West and Dizenfeld’s malicious prosecution claims arise from protected activity. Thus, we

Plaintiff and appellant Arthur Andelson’s (plaintiff’s) father initially arranged to have his remains cremated and scattered at sea off the coast of Los Angeles County upon his death. After plaintiff’s father died, plaintiff’s brother, Robert Andelson (Robert), scattered the father’s ashes off the coast of Orange County. Plaintiff sued two mortuaries that were involved in handling his father’s remains, defendants and appellants Neptune Management Corp. d/b/a Neptune Society-Sherman Oaks (Neptune Sherman Oaks) and Leneda, Inc. d/b/a Neptune Society of Riverside (Neptune Riverside) (collectively, defendants). Plaintiff’s complaint asserted numerous theories of liability, most of which ultimately derived from plaintiff’s contention that defendants should never have given his father’s cremated remains to Robert. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted defendants’ motions. We now consider whether summary judgment was gr

This appeal is governed by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The parties own contiguous parcels of land near the Santa Clara River in Ventura County. In 2013, the trial court adjudicated a declaratory relief action regarding an easement, brought by appellant South Fork Ranch, LLC (South Fork) against R. Eric King and respondents David Bunn, Ellen Birrell, and the Nature Conservancy (TNC) (South Fork I). The trial court declared that South Fork and King “no longer have easement rights which would permit them to substantially alter or remove the revetment wall or groins,” referring to a flood protection barrier that impedes appellants’ construction of a water well on respondents’ property.

The juvenile court removed two brothers from their mother’s custody, awarded sole custody to their previously noncustodial father and terminated dependency jurisdiction. Mother argues the court failed to properly assess whether the case required ongoing supervision. As we will explain, in light of the lack of evidence in the record concerning the father’s circumstances, the court’s failure to explain its decision to immediately terminate jurisdiction requires us to reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings.

Robert Bradford appeals the trial court’s order, after a jury trial, extending his commitment to Napa State Hospital pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5. Bradford contends the court erred in allowing two expert witnesses to testify at his trial about case-specific facts based on inadmissible hearsay as prohibited by People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). We conclude that to the extent these expert witnesses testified to inadmissible hearsay, Bradford was not prejudiced by the erroneous admission of this evidence, and his constitutional rights were not violated. We affirm the order extending his commitment.