CA Unpub Decisions

J.G. is the father of A.G., the child at issue in this juvenile dependency matter, in which the juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.
On appeal, the father challenges the termination of his parental rights, contending: (1) no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply; and (2) the juvenile court violated the father’s fundamental due process right of access to the court by failing to provide him with his requested accommodation for hearing loss. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

In this taxpayer refund action, Land Partners, LLC, and Los Alisos Ranch Company (collectively, Land Partners) appeal from a postjudgment order denying their motion for attorney fees brought pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 5152. Although the court had found the County of Orange Assessor (Assessor) used a constitutionally invalid methodology in valuing Land Partners’ property for property tax purposes, the court determined there was no evidence the Assessor’s actions were due to his subjective belief that a certain constitutional provision, statute, rule or regulation was invalid or unconstitutional. Because the court concluded proof of the latter was a statutory prerequisite to recovery of fees under the statute, it held Land Partners was not entitled to attorney fees.
Land Partners contend the court erred in interpreting section 5152. It asserts proof of the Assessor’s subjective mindset is not required.

Defendant Al Rodriguez was charged with and convicted of two crimes after he choked a cohabitant. The information and jury verdict form described one of those crimes as corporal injury to a cohabitant “with [a] prior” under section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1).
During trial, the jury was informed that defendant had stipulated that he suffered a prior conviction for corporal injury on a spouse on December 12, 2011. There is no indication defendant was advised of his trial rights before entering into the stipulation.

Father was granted temporary sole physical and sole legal custody of the child. Mother was granted limited supervised visitation. Mother requested increased visitation; father requested that he be permitted to move with the child to Idaho. The court tried the matters together. It concluded the child should be permitted to move away with father, but continuing the supervised visitation would effectively result in no visitation for mother. It ordered that the existing visitation arrangement continue until father and child relocated, but upon relocation, mother would be allowed unsupervised visitation, including 30 uninterrupted days during the child’s summer vacation and specified holidays. Father appeals, contending the conditional order is designed to coerce him into abandoning his plans to relocate and does not give priority to concerns about the child’s safety.

A jury convicted appellant Timothy Alan Ray of making criminal threats and carrying a concealed dirk or dagger on his person, and found true a personal use of a weapon enhancement in count 1. In a separate proceeding, the court found true a serious felony enhancement and allegations that Ray had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law. On January 26, 2016, the court sentenced Ray to an aggregate 10-year prison term consisting of a doubled, middle term of four years on his criminal threats conviction, a one-year arming enhancement in that count, a five-year serious felony enhancement, and a concurrent, doubled term of four years on his carrying a concealed dirk or dagger conviction.
On appeal, Ray contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for possession of a concealed dirk or dagger; (2) the court committed instructional error; and (3) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

Scottie Dova Carter appeals from a judgment of conviction for crimes involving the rape of a 14-year-old girl. He contends the trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing regarding his appointed counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden)—a claim we reject as meritless. Carter also challenges the trial court’s ruling on a hearsay objection but fails to show he was prejudiced by the alleged error. We affirm the judgment.

This matter involves three defendants, appellant Miguel Angel Villegas, Gustavo Jesus Mendoza, and Joel Serrato (collectively the Codefendants). A jury convicted appellant of attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664/211; count 1) and conspiracy to commit robbery (§§ 182/211; count 2). The jury found true firearm and criminal street gang enhancements. Appellant received an aggregate prison sentence of 12 years.
In companion appeals F071822 and F072054, we resolve issues raised by Mendoza and Serrato, respectively, for their involvement in this attempted robbery. In the present matter, appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions in counts 1 and 2. He also contends that the trial court committed various prejudicial errors regarding jury instructions, a failure to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations, a failure to grant a new trial, and a failure to unseal a juror’s contact information. We affirm.

This matter involves three defendants, appellant Joel Serrato, Gustavo Jesus Mendoza, and Miguel Angel Villegas (collectively the Codefendants). A jury found appellant not guilty of attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664/211; count 1), but convicted him of conspiracy to commit robbery (§§ 182/211; count 2) and prohibited possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 5). The jury found true a criminal street gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)) in both convictions. Appellant received an aggregate prison sentence of 10 years, eight months. In companion appeals F071822 and F072155, we resolve issues raised by Mendoza and Villegas, respectively, for their involvement in this attempted robbery. In the present matter, appellant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing argument. He further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations. We affirm.

This matter involves three defendants, appellant Gustavo Jesus Mendoza, Miguel Angel Villegas, and Joel Serrato (collectively the Codefendants). A jury convicted appellant of attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664/211; count 1); conspiracy to commit robbery (§§ 182/211; count 2); prohibited possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3); and masked criminal possession of a firearm in public (§ 25300, subd. (a); count 4). The jury found true firearm and criminal street gang enhancements. Appellant received an aggregate prison sentence of 31 years. In companion appeals F072155 and F072054, we resolve issues raised by Villegas and Serrato, respectively, for their involvement in this attempted robbery. In the present matter, appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in failing to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations.

This case concerns defendant and appellant, D.M. (father), and his teenage daughter, E.R., who was 13 years old when this case began in May 2015. In April 2017, the juvenile court appointed legal guardians for E.R. and terminated dependency jurisdiction. Father appeals from this order and raises only one argument: his counsel was ineffective because she failed to request presumed father status. We affirm. Father fails to establish counsel’s performance was deficient or that her performance prejudiced him.

The juvenile court found the seven children of K.G. (Mother) and M.V. (Father) came within the court’s jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (a), (b), (g) & (j).) Mother raises two issues on appeal. First, Mother contends the juvenile court erred by requiring her to cooperate with interviews of the six younger children at the Children’s Assessment Center. Second, Mother contends the juvenile court erred by ordering that visitation with Z.G., the eldest child, is contingent upon Z.G.’s consent to the visits. Father joins in Mother’s contentions. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

On September 30, 2016, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Matthew Hayes Beckett of evading a peace officer with willful disregard under Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a) (count 1). In a bifurcated trial, the jury also found true that defendant had a prior strike conviction and had served two prior prison terms.
On October 31, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for eight years, consisting of the upper term of three years, doubled pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law, plus two years for his prior prison terms. The trial court also imposed fines and fees.
On November 1, 2016, defendant filed a notice of appeal.

A jury found defendant and appellant, Derik Colin Oliver, guilty as charged in nine counts of committing sex offenses against his two minor daughters, C. and R., and found defendant committed counts 1, 4, and 5 against more than one victim. Defendant was sentenced to 11 years plus 75 years to life. In this appeal, defendant challenges his convictions in counts 8 and 9. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant, Nakita Rice, appeals from the judgment in favor of defendants and respondents, FCA USA LLC (Chrysler) and James Parker. Chrysler employed Rice as an operations manager and then a warehouse supervisor at one of its plants. Parker was the plant manager during her time there. After Chrysler terminated her in 2014, Rice brought this lawsuit alleging a host of employment-related causes of action. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all causes of action. Because we conclude that defendants were entitled to summary adjudication on some but not all the causes of action, we reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter an order denying in part and granting in part defendants’ motion. More specifically, Chrysler proffered significant evidence that it changed Rice’s position, suspended her, and then terminated her for legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonretaliatory reasons.