CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants, Courtney Gillespie and Melody Gillespie, challenge the judgment quieting title to a 10-acre parcel of real property.
Appellants entered into an agreement to purchase a portion of this property from respondents. After appellants did not receive permission from the county to subdivide the parcel, respondent, Nicklas Hoffman, returned the promissory note executed by Courtney Gillespie marked “void” and returned the payments Gillespie made under the agreement. Following a bifurcated trial, the court ruled that Hoffman had successfully rescinded the agreement in phase one. In phase two, the court balanced the equities, awarded appellants over $18,000 in compensation, ordered appellants to remove all their personal property from the premises, and entered the quiet title judgment.
Appellants argue that the trial court granted relief that was not available under the facts and law. Appellants further contend that the statute of limitations barred relief based on resciss

Defendant and appellant Thomas Robert Dilks pled guilty to first degree burglary and was sentenced to two years in prison. We affirm.

Defendant Sherree L. Lutter moved to suppress all evidence found in a warrantless search of her house. The trial court denied the motion, finding that she had voluntarily consented to the search. Defendant then pleaded guilty to one count of cruelty to an animal (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b)) and was placed on probation for five years.
In this appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by finding that her consent was voluntary. We will hold that there was substantial evidence that defendant’s consent was voluntary and no evidence that required the trial court to find that it was involuntary. Accordingly, we will affirm.

In 2005, a man was shot and killed at an apartment complex in Rialto. In 2013, a professed eyewitness came forward and identified defendant Michael Anthony Castrellon as the killer. She told the police and testified at trial that the victim tried to buy marijuana from defendant; defendant accused the victim of killing one of his “homeboys,” then shot him.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), with an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, causing death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)). He was sentenced to a total of 50 years to life in prison, along with the usual fines, fees, and miscellaneous sentencing orders.
Defendant’s only claim of error is that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request an instruction that evidence of provocation can reduce what would otherwise be first degree murder to second degree murder.

Defendant and appellant Gabriel Vargas Ruiz appeals his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon and criminal threats. We reject all of his contentions, with the exception of his contentions concerning imposition of a consecutive one-year term of imprisonment for a sentence enhancement on a subordinate count and an erroneous award of presentence conduct credits.

After a nine-year marriage and five children, Sonya Cueva (Mother) petitioned to dissolve her marriage with Francisco Cueva (Father), and sought support payments and attorney fees. After a hearing, the court ordered Father to pay spousal and child support and child support arrears. The court also ordered Father to pay Mother's estimated attorney fees of $2,000 under Family Code section 2030.
Father challenges only the $2,000 attorney fees award. We determine the court did not abuse its discretion, and affirm.

Zjeannique Gago pleaded guilty to committing felony corporal injury on a girlfriend in the current case (Pen. Code, § 273.5; case No. SCD264924). The court sentenced him to a total of six years in prison as follows: the low term of two years doubled because of his prior strike; plus a consecutive 16-month term for a prior first degree residential burglary conviction (§§ 459, 460.1; case No. SCD247108); plus a consecutive eight-month term for a prior conviction for possession of a firearm as a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); case No. SCD262010). Gago contends the court erroneously believed consecutive sentences were mandatory for the two prior convictions under section 667, subdivision (c)(6), when in fact concurrent sentences were required for those prior convictions. We affirm the judgment.

Father J.M. and mother L.M. (parents) appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minors for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) They contend the juvenile court erred in finding the minors adoptable and in failing to consider the wishes of the minors with respect to their permanent plan. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Diann Marie Davis sought to file a claim against defendant and respondent City of Sacramento (the City) based on her contention that she was unlawfully arrested. She failed to file a claim within the six-month period following her arrest, as required by Government Code section 911.2. The City denied her application to file a late claim. She petitioned the trial court for relief pursuant to section 946.6 claiming the delay was due to counsel’s mistake of law. On appeal, she contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her petition for relief. We disagree and shall affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Evan Jack Lewis of vandalism, recklessly causing fire to a structure, two counts of arson of property, and petty theft in connection with a break-in, theft and fires set at Jalapenos restaurant in Mammoth Lakes. Defendant now contends (1) the trial court erred in ruling that a statement by a third party was not admissible under the statement against penal interest hearsay exception; (2) defendant’s postarrest statements to police were involuntarily made and defendant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for their exclusion at trial; and (3) insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant maliciously set fire to, burned or caused to burn certain property.
We will affirm the judgment.

On October 2, 2012, Terry S. Boyland (appellant) pleaded no contest to human trafficking of a minor (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to six years in prison. Execution of the sentence was suspended. Pursuant to a plea deal, he was placed on probation for five years under the condition that he serve 365 days in jail. He received 392 days of custody credit to be applied to a future sentence.
On December 28, 2015, the trial court was advised that appellant was sentenced to prison in Maricopa County, Arizona for one and a half years. As a result, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered him to appear at a probation revocation hearing. At that hearing, which happened more than a year later, the prosecutor established that appellant was arrested for pandering in Arizona on August 27, 2014, and later convicted. The trial court found him in violation of his probation and imposed the previously suspended six-year sentence.

Thompson Building Materials (Thompson) appeals from an order denying its request for attorney fees following judgment entered in its favor and against respondents Jefferey A. Prince and Sherri Prince (collectively, the Princes) after a bench trial.
In April 2009, the Princes filed suit against Thompson based on its sale of defective flagstone to their masonry subcontractor, Simich Construction, Inc. (Simich) (Thompson/Simich contracts). The Princes sought, among other things, to enforce contractual warranties under a third party beneficiary theory. Although the Thompson/Simich contracts contained an attorney fees provision, the trial court denied Thompson’s request for attorney fees, ruling the express language of that provision only affected the buyer and seller to the agreement, that is, Thompson and Simich, and not the Princes as third party beneficiaries.

Plaintiff and respondent Jose Ortiz filed the operative first amended complaint alleging various wage and hour causes of action against his former employer, appellant and respondent Roberts Tool Co., Inc. (Roberts). Roberts’ motion to compel arbitration was denied after the trial court ruled the arbitration agreement was unenforceable on unconscionability grounds. We affirm.

Claimant and appellant Ara Hunanyan (Hunanyan) appeals an order continuing a hearing on his “Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing for Determining the Standing of Ara Hunanyan As a Creditor and Interested Person for Objections to Accounting and Surcharge Motion.” We are asked to decide whether the probate court’s continuance is an appealable order.