CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Kenneth Alan Hoddick killed a man by driving into him head-on while drunk. Defendant appeals from his second-degree murder conviction and sentence of 15 years to life, which he received after pleading guilty. We affirm.

In 2002 a jury convicted defendant William Michael Dalby of aggravated sexual assault against children under the age of 14, and the trial court imposed 16 consecutive indeterminate sentences of 15 years to life (240 years to life) plus a determinate term of six years eight months, for a total aggregate sentence of 246 years eight months to life in prison. Defendant appealed, and in a prior decision filed in 2004, this court remanded the matter to permit the trial court to exercise its discretion to sentence defendant either consecutively or concurrently on the 16 indeterminate life terms. In 2015 the trial court exercised its discretion and once again imposed 16 consecutive indeterminate sentences of 15 years to life. Defendant had already served his six-year eight-month determinate term.

Father, Marco P., appeals from an order summarily denying his petition to modify prior dependency orders pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, and a subsequent order terminating his parental rights under section 366.26. He contends his section 388 petition presented a prima facie showing of the elements necessary to warrant modification, and the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing on the merits. And he argues the ruling on the section 388 petition “infected” the subsequent section 366.26 proceeding, such that the order terminating his parental rights also must be reversed. We conclude the court’s ruling on the section 388 petition was supported by the record and within the legal standards authorizing summary denial of a section 388 petition. Accordingly, we affirm both orders.

Jonathan Patton appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing. His appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), requesting independent review of the record. We affirm the order.

Defendant Bobby Gonzalez appeals the trial court’s order that revoked his parole, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted defendant’s motion to represent himself. We affirm because defendant was fully informed by the court of the risks of self-representation, and was competent to, and knowingly waived, his right to counsel.

Caroline M. (Mother) appeals the dependency court’s orders that she attend sexual abuse awareness counseling, submit to a psychological/psychiatric assessment, and complete an anger management program. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) concedes the record does not support the anger management provision of the final order. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Mother to undergo sexual abuse awareness counseling and a psychological assessment. Acknowledging the parties’ views with respect to the anger management provision, we delete that provision and otherwise affirm.

Defendant appeals from his judgment of conviction for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, §11352, subd. (a) and true findings of allegations that he had suffered a prior conviction for a drug crime (§ 11370, subd. (a)), and a prior conviction for a drug crime (§ 11370.2, subd. (a) and had served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) He was sentenced to a six-year term, consisting of 1460 days in county jail with the remainder to be served on mandatory probation, and was ordered to pay various fees. Appellant’s Opening Brief recounts in detail the procedural history of the case and the evidence presented. A single issue is raised on appeal: imposition of the drug program fee under section 11372.7, subdivision (a). Appellant argues this $150 fee should not have been imposed because the record is silent on appellant’s ability to pay it.

Michael Stella unsuccessfully sued Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (AMC) and its principals James Hopper and Gloria Hopper, seven limited partnerships, their general partners and various other entities and individuals Stella believed were responsible for the preparation and distribution of private placement memoranda used to solicit his investment in the limited partnerships. After judgment was entered in the trial court, the judicial referee, appointed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 638, awarded attorney fees and costs to the defendants as prevailing parties based on sections 1032 and 1033.5 and the attorney fee provision in the limited partnership agreements involved in the litigation. We affirmed the judgment of dismissal in Stella v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181 (Stella I). Stella now appeals the postjudgment award of attorney fees and costs.

This action is Morillo Construction, Inc.’s third attempt to sue the City of Pasadena (City) for damages arising out of the City’s cancellation of a portion of a construction project. In 2008, Morillo and the City entered into a contract whereby Morillo agreed to serve as the general contractor on a project for the construction of one building and the renovation of another. Midway through the project, the City cancelled the renovation portion of the project. Morillo separately sued the City for breach of contract in both 2011 and 2012. Judgment was entered for the City in the first action, and the second action is pending.In 2015, Morillo filed the third and present lawsuit against the City for what it calls “tortious” breach of contract, and against City employees for fraud and negligence arising from their management of the project’s budget.

Plaintiff and appellant Andre DeCohen is a fire captain employed by defendant and respondent County of Los Angeles. DeCohen is African-American. One day, a group of firefighters under the command of DeCohen and a Caucasian captain, Tom Brady, played volleyball on Venice Beach while they were on duty. The firefighters and their supervising captains were all disciplined for the volleyball game. The two captains, DeCohen and Brady, each received a 15-day suspension. DeCohen brought suit, alleging that his 15-day suspension constituted discrimination and harassment based on race, within the meaning of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The County obtained summary judgment. Concluding that there is no admissible evidence that the suspension was motivated by DeCohen’s race, we affirm.

Christopher Joe Gomez (appellant) appeals from an order extending his probation to enable him to pay the outstanding balance of victim restitution. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no issues, but seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). We find no arguable issues and affirm.

This appeal is from an order denying appellant’s petition to recall his sentence under Penal Code section 1170.126, a provision of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 that was enacted pursuant to Proposition 36 (the Act or Proposition 36). Proposition 36 “created a postconviction release proceeding whereby a prisoner who is serving an indeterminate life sentence imposed pursuant to the three strikes law for a crime that is not a serious or violent felony and who is not disqualified, may have his or her sentence recalled and be sentenced as a second strike offender unless the court determines that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1170.126.)” (People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 168.) In the present case, appellant contends the trial court erred by finding that resentencing him under the Act would create an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. We affirm the challenged order.

Defendant Jaime Ayala was convicted by a jury of several charges arising out of an incident in which he refused to pull over for police officers and led them on a high speed chase, sometimes on the wrong side of the road, on surface streets and on Highway 1. The pursuit continued into a residential area of Seaside where Ayala hit several parked vehicles before his own was finally disabled. When Ayala resisted being placed under arrest, he was Tasered and even bitten by a police dog before he was finally subdued. Ayala was sentenced to a total term of 12 years, eight months in prison and the trial court imposed various fines and fees, detailed below.

Morton Levy failed to pay child support and spousal support as ordered by a court in New Jersey. In 2016, Selma Levy, Morton’s ex-wife, registered the New Jersey support order in the family law court in Orange County, California. Sidell Levy, Morton’s second wife, requested that the registration be vacated or cancelled. The trial court granted Sidell’s request on the grounds the matter belonged in probate court because Morton was deceased.
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Family Code section 5700.101 et seq. (UIFSA), does not specify in which court a support order may be registered. (All further statutory references are to the Family Code.) The local rules of the Orange County Superior Court, however, require that UIFSA proceedings be filed in family court. Under UIFSA, a support order from another state that is registered in California may be challenged on specific grounds; the death of the party ordered to pay support is not one of those grounds.