CA Unpub Decisions

This action arises from an attempted foreclosure of a home. Plaintiffs executed a deed of trust securing a loan on the home. They failed to make the required payments, and foreclosure was scheduled. But prior to the trustee’s sale, plaintiffs sued, asserting a number of causes of action mostly premised on the claim that the promissory note and deed of trust were void. The court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and plaintiffs appealed.

Appellant Darryl Paul Ash pled no contest to making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422; count 5) and admitted allegations that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

After his Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence was denied, appellant Oscar Ulloa pled no contest to one count of transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and admitted the associated enhancement based upon the weight exceeding one kilogram (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.4, subd. (b)(1)). Ulloa appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We agree and reverse.

In this appeal, Jonathan V. (Jonathan) contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). We affirm.

Defendant and respondent, Brian P. Lanz, an attorney, represented plaintiff and appellant, Hebe Garcia-Bolio, in an action against Garcia-Bolio’s former fiancé. Garcia-Bolio signed a contingent fee agreement that contained a clause granting Lanz a lien on the proceeds recovered for Garcia-Bolio. In this litigation, Lanz obtained a residence for Garcia-Bolio. Lanz filed a notice of attorney lien and received a deed of trust securing this lien against the residence.
Lanz filed an action against Garcia-Bolio seeking a judicial declaration establishing the amount, validity, and enforceability of the attorney lien and deed of trust. After the trial court fixed the amount of the lien, Lanz proceeded with a non-judicial trustee’s sale of the residence.

Appellant Glenn Edward Hardy appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126 (Proposition 36) with respect to his 2007 second degree burglary conviction (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)). On appeal he contends: (1) the court erred when it denied his petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.126 with respect to this conviction; and (2) the court erred by its failure to apply section 1170.18’s (Proposition 47) definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” in ruling on his petition. We affirm.

A jury convicted appellant, Jory Landon Toms, of kidnapping, domestic violence, making a criminal threat, and witness intimidation. The People’s evidence showed Toms injured and threatened his girlfriend, Jane Doe, forced her to return home when she sought help at a neighbor’s home, choked her, and then stopped her from opening the door for law enforcement when they responded to the neighbor’s report about the abuse. Toms denied he had used physical force against his girlfriend and said she received her injuries in a fight the day before with a woman named Crystal with whom he had been sexually involved.
In closing, defense counsel argued the jury should find Crystal, not Toms, injured Doe, and should therefore reject the witness intimidation charge because Toms had no reason to try to stop Doe from talking to the police.

In December 2006, plaintiff and appellant, Deatra Dehorney, obtained two loans secured by deeds of trust on real property—the house where she has since lived. In 2007, her loans were securitized under third party pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) which called for her deeds of trust to be assigned to securitized asset trusts. By 2014, she had gone into default, and her mortgage servicing provider warned it would initiate foreclosure proceedings. Roughly contemporaneous with the foreclosure warning, the mortgage holder’s nominee belatedly assigned one of the loans to one of the securitized asset trusts, seemingly in preparation to foreclose.

In dependency proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court issued an order finding that it had jurisdiction over S.S., then about one year old, and removing her from the custody of H.D., her mother (Mother), and R.S., her father (Father). Mother appeals the order, contending there is insufficient evidence to support findings that: (1) S.S. suffered, or there is a substantial risk she will suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of the willful or negligent failure of Mother to adequately supervise or protect her from the conduct of the custodian with whom she has been left (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)); and (2) there will be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of S.S. if she is returned home and there are no reasonable means by which her physical health can be protected without removing her from Mother's physical custody.

Mother and Father appeal from juvenile court orders terminating their parental rights to the minor child, M.A., and choosing adoption as the child's permanent plan. Mother contends we must reverse the orders because the court erred in finding neither the beneficial parent-child relationship exception nor the beneficial sibling relationship exception applied to prevent adoption. Father is incarcerated and has only had phone calls with M.A. Father joins Mother's arguments and requests reversal of the order terminating his parental rights if the court reverses the order terminating Mother's parental rights.
We conclude the court properly found the beneficial parent-child exception inapplicable in this case. There was substantial evidence to support the court's determination Mother did not maintain regular visits or a beneficial parental relationship.

On appeal, we are bound by the trial court's credibility determinations. Hence, here, we must accept the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff did not, as required by a contract for the sale of a condominium, deposit $10,000 in earnest money in an escrow account. We also agree with the trial court's legal conclusion that plaintiff's failure to deposit the earnest money relieved the defendant seller of any obligation to complete the sale. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of defendant.

In this attorney malpractice case the trial court found the 51 percent majority shareholder of a closely held corporation, plaintiff and appellant David Gong, cannot recoup attorney fees the corporation paid to an attorney, defendant and respondent Dan Lawton. Lawton was disqualified from representing both Gong and the corporation in proceedings adverse to the corporation's minority 49 percent shareholder, Gong's brother Jeffrey Gong. The circumstances disclosed in the record here fully support the trial court's unwillingness to ignore the corporation's separate existence and attribute to David Gong amounts paid by the corporation. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment denying David Gong any relief on his claims against the attorney.

Julie Harper was charged with the murder (Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a)) of her husband, Jason Harper, and with allegations that she personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and that the discharge of the firearm resulted in Jason's death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Julie's first trial resulted in the jury finding her not guilty of first degree murder and deadlocked on the lessor included offenses of second degree murder and manslaughter. As a result, the trial court declared a mistrial. Julie was tried a second time and convicted of second degree murder. The second jury also found true both firearm allegations. Julie was sentenced to 40 years to life, consisting of 15 years to life for murder and 25 years to life for violation of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Julie challenges her conviction on five grounds

While defendant John Thomas Abrams was serving a prison sentence in Nevada, the Sacramento County District Attorney (DA) filed a detainer, i.e., a request asking the institution in which defendant was incarcerated to either hold him for the DA or notify the DA when defendant’s release was imminent. (Carchman v. Nash (1985) 473 U.S. 716, 719 [87 L.Ed.2d 516, 520] (Carchman).) The detainer was based on a complaint filed by the DA charging defendant in Sacramento County with nine counts of lewd and lascivious acts with a minor.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD, Pen. Code, § 1389 et seq.) required the DA to bring defendant to trial on the complaint within 180 days after defendant asked the DA for a final disposition of the complaint, but when the DA did not meet the 180-day deadline, the DA dismissed the initial complaint charging lewd acts.