CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants Anil and Sunita Patel own and operate a hotel in Santa Rosa. They also own a parking lot that is located across the street from the hotel in between two commercial properties owned by respondent Adel Atallah. For many years, the parties’ predecessors shared the use of the parking lot in question. However, in November 2015, appellants reconfigured the parking lot to limit its usage to hotel guests, and respondent filed this lawsuit claiming a prescriptive easement. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction ordering appellants to remove the parking restrictions and enjoining them from interfering with respondent’s use of their lot for parking. We find no abuse of discretion and therefore will affirm the order.

Lester Young was fatally shot by a man who came to the front door of a friend’s home where Young was staying. Two eyewitnesses identified appellant Steven A. Buggs, who knew Young, as the shooter. Following a jury trial at which he presented a defense of mistaken identity, appellant was convicted of first degree murder with firearm enhancements, including a finding that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the offense, causing great bodily injury and death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d).) The court found recidivist allegations to be true in a bifurcated proceeding (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 667.5, subds. (b) & (c), 1170.12), and appellant was sentenced to prison for 75 years to life plus seven years.

K.G. (mother) seeks extraordinary writ relief (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450 & 8.452) from the juvenile court’s September 13, 2017, order terminating reunification services concerning her children, Nathan (born 2008) and Alexia (born 2010), at the 12-month permanency hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.21, subd. (f)(1); all statutory references are to this code unless otherwise noted), and scheduling a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing for January 11, 2018. Mother contends the court abused its discretion in declining to continue the 12-month review hearing, and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings the children would be at risk if returned to her care. Our review discloses no basis to overturn the court’s orders and therefore we deny the requested relief.

Plaintiff Cadles of Grassy Meadows II, LLC (Cadles), appeals from an order granting the motion by defendants Robert W. Blackburn and Dianne M. Blackburn (collectively, the Blackburns) to set aside a default and default judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). Though acknowledging a lack of case law support for its determination, the trial court concluded the default and default judgment were void because the request for entry of default, and the default itself, listed the filing date of a version of the complaint which was no longer operative at the time.
Cadles contends the trial court lacked the authority to grant the motion because the date discrepancy did not render the default or the default judgment legally void. We agree, and, therefore, reverse the order and remand with directions to enter a new order denying the motion.

A commissioned sales employee sued his former employer. The jurors found that the employer did not owe the employee for any unpaid wages. On appeal, the employee claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. He also argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury.
We affirm the judgment. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s factual finding regarding the employee’s commission wages. The employee’s instructional claims fail to establish any prejudicial errors.

Appointed counsel for defendant Anthony Beasley asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. On review, we find no arguable issues.

Appointed counsel for defendant Larry Anthony Johnson asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. On review, we find no arguable issues.

Appointed counsel for defendant Sonny Cardoza asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. On review, we find no arguable issues.

This appeal involves a challenge to an update of the City of Visalia’s (Visalia) general plan. Included in the update is a land use policy affecting areas designated “Neighborhood Commercial.” Under the policy, no tenant in a Neighborhood Commercial area may be larger than 40,000 square feet in size.Appellant claims Visalia violated the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.; “CEQA”) by failing to analyze the potential for the land use policy to cause a phenomenon called urban decay. “CEQA does not define urban decay” but some have defined it as “visible symptoms of physical deterioration that invite vandalism, loitering, and graffiti that is caused by a downward spiral of business closures and multiple long term vacancies.” (Joshua Tree Downtown Business Alliance v. County of San Bernardino (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 677, 685 (Joshua Tree).)

Appellant, Robert Kapral, challenges the judgment on the pleadings on his cross-complaint in favor of respondents, VDC, LLC (VDC) and Gordon Downs. The trial court concluded that retraxit, i.e., res judicata, barred this cross-complaint because Kapral based it on the same primary right as a cross-complaint involving the same cross-defendants filed in a previous action that the parties voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.
According to Kapral, the court erred because it failed to make factual determinations regarding the effect of the settlement agreement that terminated the prior action. Kapral further argues the same primary right was not asserted in both cross-complaints because each alleged a different harm.
The trial court did not err as Kapral claims. Therefore, the judgment will be affirmed.

Appellant/petitioner Gerardo Gonzales pleaded no contest in 1987 in the Superior Court of Kern County, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of violating Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), commission of a lewd and lascivious act upon a child. The victim was identified as five-year-old Brooke H., who had apparently been a friend of his daughter. Appellant was sentenced to three years and ordered to register as a sex offender.

What began as a petty theft of beer from a 7-Eleven store in Bakersfield escalated into an armed robbery followed by a shooting at an occupied patrol car. Defendant Daniel Garcia was arrested for the crimes shortly afterward and convicted by jury of the following six offenses: attempted murder of Officer Brady Barber, assault with a firearm upon a peace officer, shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, robbery, active participation in a criminal street gang, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury found true the special allegations that the attempted murder of Barber was willful, deliberate and premeditated (§ 189) and that the victim was a known peace officer. The jury also found true the gang enhancement attached to counts 1 through 4, and the firearm enhancements attached to counts 1 through 5.

Deshawn Marques Roberts (defendant) stands convicted, following a jury trial, of premeditated attempted murder in which a principal intentionally and personally discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury; count 1), permitting another person to discharge a firearm from a vehicle, being a felon in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealable firearm in a vehicle while an active participant in a criminal street gang, and being an active participant in a criminal street gang. Counts 1 through 3 were found to have been committed for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street gang. Defendant was sentenced to a total unstayed prison term of life with the possibility of parole after seven years plus 25 years to life and ordered to pay various fees, fines, and assessments.

Appellant/defendant David Park was convicted of four counts of assault with a firearm on a peace officer (Pen. Code , § 245, subd. (d)(1)), with firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (c), § 12022.5, subd. (a)); and one count of drawing or exhibiting a semiautomatic rifle with the intent to resist or prevent arrest by a peace officer (§ 417.8). He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 32 years eight months in prison.Defendant was originally charged with nine counts of assault with a firearm on a peace officer; each count specified a particular officer as the victim. As we will explain, the court dismissed one count before the case went to the jury. The jury found defendant guilty of four counts based on the two deputies who initially responded to defendant’s trailer to conduct a welfare check and were fired upon; and two members of the SWAT team, who testified that shots were fired directly at their positions.