CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Troy Stewart occupied a room at an Extended Stay America hotel for more than a year. Hotel staff asked Stewart to leave, Stewart refused, and the hotel evicted Stewart through an unlawful detainer action. Stewart sued Extended Stay America, Inc. and ESA Management, LLC, as well as two ESA employees, respondents Ashe Ajmera and Sophia Nguyen. Against Ajmera and Nguyen, Stewart alleged causes of action for fraudulent concealment; violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. (section 17200 or UCL); and invasion of privacy.
Ajmera and Nguyen demurred, asserting that Stewart’s complaint failed to alleged facts sufficient to state any of the alleged causes of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. Stewart did not amend his complaint, and Ajmera and Nguyen moved to dismiss the action against them. The court granted the motion. Stewart appealed, asserting that the trial court erred.

Douglas Hopper appeals from a judgment denying his petition to vacate an arbitration award and confirming the award in favor of respondent Anthem Blue Cross of California (Anthem). The award involved fraudulent claims submitted to Anthem by Hopper’s agent and Anthem’s recoupment of payments made for those claims. Hopper argues the arbitration award should be vacated because the arbitration panel refused to allow him to pursue a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.). Because the panel correctly concluded he did not have authority to bring an ERISA claim, we affirm.

This lawsuit is brought pursuant to Labor Code section 2698, the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). We affirm the summary judgment because plaintiff Hamid H. Khan failed to provide adequate notice of his claim to the relevant agency prior to bringing the lawsuit against his former employer Dunn-Edwards Corporation (Dunn-Edwards).

Appellant Lawrence Phillips appeals from the judgment of conviction of two counts of criminal threats. Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threats. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Raymond Pacheco (defendant) was convicted by jury of 10 counts of sexual offenses against V., beginning as early as V.’s seventh birthday in 2001 and continuing until her 16th birthday in 2010. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 29 years four months, consisting of the midterm of 12 years for the count 1 continuous sexual abuse conviction, the full midterm of six years for the count 6 forcible rape conviction, two years each for counts 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9 and eight months each for counts 4 and 10. An eight month sentence was imposed concurrently for count 5.Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending there is insufficient evidence to support the count 7 oral copulation conviction which was alleged to have occurred between V.’s seventh and ninth birthdays and the count 1 continuous sexual abuse conviction which was alleged to have occurred between her ninth birthday and the end of 2005.

In this appeal from the judgment following a bifurcated jury and court trial, plaintiff and appellant Zeta Graff challenges the denial of her request for a mistrial following the jury trial, the denial of her motion to continue the court trial, and the award of costs to defendants as the prevailing parties. We conclude her contentions lack merit, and affirm except as to the amount of costs awarded to the prevailing parties Newform Construction Company and Oleg Fur.

Plaintiff James MacDonald (plaintiff) appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered after the court granted defendant Shereen Arazm’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff sued Arazm and a handful of other individuals, corporate entities, and trusts under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Government Code section 12940 et seq.) asserting claims for workplace harassment, wrongful employment termination, and failure to take reasonable steps to prevent harassment. In addition, he asserted a claim for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5.
Throughout the litigation, plaintiff consistently conceded Arazm was not his employer—a posture fatal to his claims against her for wrongful employment termination, failure to take reasonable steps to prevent harassment, and retaliation, which may only be properly asserted against an employer.

Appellant Rose Kabbe (Appellant) appeals the trial court’s order denying her request to renew the interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage (Judgment), which was filed in 1984 and previously renewed in both 1994 and 2004. The trial court declined to renew the Judgment in the absence of any evidence documenting the current amount Appellant claimed her ex-husband, respondent Friedrich Karl Kabbe (Respondent), owed her under the Judgment. Although at the February 2015 hearing on the matter, Appellant provided the trial court with a November 2005 “abstract of support judgment” indicating Respondent owed Appellant $17,000, that figure was over nine years old, and, in any event, admittedly was not filed with the court. As discussed below, we conclude the trial court properly denied Appellant’s request for renewal and, therefore, affirm.

Petitioner, the mother of 10 children (Mother), challenges juvenile court orders in related proceedings considered in a consolidated manner, setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing for all the children, on the grounds that (1) she should have been provided additional services to reunify with her nine older children; (2) she should have been provided reunification services for her tenth child, who was born while she was receiving reunification services for her older children; and (3) the juvenile court erred when it reduced the number of visits with the children after setting the section 366.26 hearing. For the reasons given below, we shall deny the petition.

Judgment was entered against The Fields of the Wood, Inc. (TFOW) in a code enforcement proceeding brought by the County of Sonoma (County). The trial court later issued an order awarding the County the costs it incurred in enforcing the judgment, and Tony Avila Sampson now seeks to appeal that order. The County has moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Sampson lacks standing: he cannot challenge the award as an individual because he is not a party to the proceeding below, and he cannot challenge the award on behalf of TFOW because he is not an attorney. We agree with the County, and accordingly dismiss the appeal.

V.C. (Mother) is the mother of now nine-year-old R.M. and now eight year-old A.M. (collectively, the children). The children were taken into protective custody in January 2016. In September 2017, the juvenile court held an 18 month review hearing after which the court found that the return of the children to Mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being within the meaning of section 366.22, subdivision (a)(1) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a permanency hearing under section 366.26. Mother filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the court’s order. She argued the juvenile court erred by finding that the return of the children to Mother would create a substantial risk of harm to the children. We deny the writ petition.

Justin R., age 14, was adjudged a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) following his admission of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(2); count I), possession of a concealed stolen firearm (id., § 25400, subd. (c)(2); count II), and first degree burglary (id., § 459; count III). He was placed on probation on various terms and conditions and now appeals, contending his motion to suppress evidence (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1) should have been granted. We disagree and affirm.

Nathaniel S., age 16, was adjudged a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after he was found to have made two misdemeanor criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422; counts 1 & 2). He was placed on probation on various terms and conditions and now appeals, claiming the evidence is insufficient to sustain the findings on the two counts. We agree and reverse.

The juvenile court denied defendant and appellant, A.L.’s (Father), Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Thereafter, the court terminated Father’s parental rights. On appeal, Father contends the court erred in summarily denying his petition. We affirm.