CA Unpub Decisions

By appeal and by writ of habeas corpus, appellant M.R. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights as to her children, K.K., Y.K., and L.K. (the children). In her appeal, she contends: (1) her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the court’s order denying her reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6); (2) the court erred in summarily denying her section 388 petition; and (3) the beneficial parental relationship exception applied (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). Appellant R.K. (father) has filed a separate brief, joining in mother’s arguments and contending that, if this court reverses the order terminating her parental rights, the order terminating his parental rights must likewise be reversed. We reverse and remand.

A jury found defendant and appellant Amador Dean Bates guilty of attempted arson, assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm, and misdemeanor. A trial court sentenced him to a total of three years in state prison, consisting of three years on count 2 (the principal count), plus a concurrent two years on count 1, and one year on count 3. The court also imposed various fines and fees, including a restitution fine of $600, pursuant to section 1202.4. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court should have stayed the sentences on counts 1 and 3, pursuant to section 654; and (2) the court imposed the incorrect amount for the restitution fine. The People concede, and we agree, that the court should have stayed the sentence on count 1. We also agree that the court imposed the incorrect amount for the restitution fine on each count.

A jury found defendant and appellate George Anthony Topete guilty of (1) attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a)), 664) ; and (2) first degree residential robbery (§ 211). The jury found true the following allegations: (1) defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim during the robbery and attempted murder (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); and (2) the robbery was committed in concert with two or more people (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)). The jury found untrue the allegations that defendant committed the robbery and attempted murder to benefit, or in association with, a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a determinate term of 12 years and a consecutive indeterminate term of seven years to life. Defendant raises two issues on appeal. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Giovanni Rivera of one count of assault with a deadly weapon after he held a knife to his father's throat in the early morning hours after Thanksgiving Day in 2015. It was undisputed at trial that Rivera had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder when he was a teenager, and that a few months prior to the incident that led to his conviction, Rivera had suffered a traumatic brain injury as a result of a severe beating. An expert testified on Rivera's behalf regarding the effects of Rivera's cognitive impairments and mental health issues. On appeal, Rivera raises four issues, two of which involve the trial court's instructions to the jury and two of which involve the trial court's sentencing decisions. After reviewing the record on the appeal, we find no merit to Rivera's contentions. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Following entry of judgment against him, plaintiff and appellant Kenneth Stanley challenges the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents California Highway Patrol (CHP), Steve Ramos, Jason Reardon, Dane Lobb, B. O’Keefe, B.J. Whitten, Matthew Otterby, and Heidi Carroll. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence, and in awarding summary adjudication as to his claims for defamation, harassment, negligence, and for violating the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (the Bane Act; Civ. Code, § 52.1). We shall affirm the judgment.

Valerie D. Olmos appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted her of theft of property from an elder by a caretaker with special findings that the property was worth more than $950 (count 1; Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (e)), possession of a controlled substance (count 2; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4060), being under the influence of a controlled substance (count 3; Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)), and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, granted three years probation with 240 days county jail, and ordered appellant to pay $7,000 victim restitution and various fines and fees. We appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After counsel’s examination of the record, he filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised.

M.M. (Father) appeals an order terminating parental rights to his daughter, G. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) In case No. B282603, he appeals an order terminating parental rights to his son, B. B. is G.’s half brother and they are placed together with their prospective adoptive parents.
In our separate opinion in case No. B282603, we conclude that notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) as to B. was defective but cured and that ICWA does not apply to B.
Here Father contends that if B. is an Indian child, his joint placement with G. may be jeopardized, and the juvenile court should consider whether the sibling relationship exception applies. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) Our decision in case No. B282603 that ICWA does not apply to B. renders these contentions moot.

N.F. (Mother) and M.M. (Father) appeal an order terminating parental rights to their son, B. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Father also appeals an order denying his request to continue the matter to be heard with the case of B.’s half sister, G.
Mother and Father contend the trial court erred when it found that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) And Father contends that if ICWA applies the court should hear B.’s case with G.’s case to decide if the sibling relationship exception applies. We take judicial notice of the ICWA notices and responses provided while this appeal was pending, conclude the appeal is moot, and affirm the orders.

In this contract action, plaintiff and respondent Ramin E. Natan (Mr. Natan) recovered a money judgment against defendant and appellant Neda Natan (Ms. Natan) and others. Mr. Natan recorded an abstract of judgment and filed a notice of lien against Ms. Natan’s potential recovery in another case.
In this appeal, Ms. Natan challenges the denial of her post-judgment motion to expunge the abstract of judgment and notice of lien. Finding no error, we affirm.

L.R. appeals a juvenile court order specifying a maximum term of physical confinement following sustained petitions (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602 ), with findings that he committed second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (b)), harbored a felon (id., § 32), committed battery (id., § 243, subd. (a)), and vandalism (id., § 594, subd. (a)). We conclude that the court did not err by specifying a maximum period of physical confinement. (§ 726, subd. (d)(1).) We affirm.

Sharon Foreman Asberry (Plaintiff) sued Los Angeles Community College District (District) and Los Angeles Southwest College (College) (collectively, Defendants) for promissory estoppel relating to a purported breach of a collective bargaining agreement with Plaintiff’s union. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq. ) they have immunity from Plaintiff’s claim. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion without leave to amend.
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred, because Defendants do not have immunity from claims based “on contract” principles (§ 814), such as her claim for promissory estoppel. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment.

Appellant Buwei Shi Xi was married to Yanghua Xi. After Yanghua’s death, appellant allegedly entered into an agreement with Yanghua’s sister, respondent Lin Hua Xi, and other members of his birth family (collectively the Xi Birth Family), whereby, in exchange for $250,000, the Xi Birth Family would release all claims they had or might assert against Yanghua’s estate. Subsequently, Yanghua’s parents initiated estate proceedings against Yanghua’s estate in China and Los Angeles Superior Court. Appellant, individually and as personal representative of Yanghua’s estate, then filed a complaint against respondent, alleging that respondent had fraudulently promised to refrain from asserting claims on Yanghua’s estate. Respondent filed a special motion to strike the entire complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP motion). The trial court summarily granted the motion, and appellant appealed.

Appellant Calder Grove Investments, LLC appeals from a judgment confirming an arbitration award against it and in favor of respondents Robert Hosseini and Mojgan Hashemi. Appellant contends the trial court erred in holding an evidentiary hearing to determine the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement before granting respondents’ motion to compel arbitration. As discussed below, we find no error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

In 1996, the voters of the City of Rancho Palos Verdes approved a three percent user tax on all municipal utilities, including telephone service. As adopted, the telephone user tax applied to most telephone service, but expressly excluded services “exempt from or . . . not subject to . . . the tax imposed under Section 4251 of Title 26 of the United States Code.” When the voters approved the telephone user tax in 1996, Internal Revenue Code section 4251 exempted some very limited categories of telephone users, but otherwise applied to all telephone service. By 2006, however, the federal courts and the Internal Revenue Service had interpreted section 4251 to exclude most cell phone plans from the federal tax.